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FOREWORD 
II n'est pas pour moi un seul de ces soixante-neuf kilometres de route qui ne soit recouvert de 
souvenirs et de sensations. L' enfance violente, les reveries adoiescentes dans Ie ronronnement 
du car, Ies matins, les filles fral:ches, Ies plages, les jeunes muscles toujours a Ia pointe de leur 
effort, la legere angoisse du soir dans un creur de seize ans, Ie desir de vivre, Ia gloire, et 
toujours Ie meme ciel au long des annees, intarissable de force et de Iumiere, insatiable Iui-
meme, devorant une a une, des mois durant, les victimes offertes en croix sur la plage, a l'heure 
funebre de midi. Toujours la meme mer aussi, presque impalpable dans Ie matin, que je 
retrouvai au bout de I'horizon des que la route, quittant Ie Sahel et ses coUines aux vignes 
couleur de bronze, s' abaissa vers la cote. Mais j e ne m' arretai pas a la regarder. J e desirais 
revoir Ie Chenoua, cette lourde et solide montagne, decoupee dans un seul bloc, qui longe la 
baie de Tipasa a l' ouest, avant de descendre elle-meme dans la mer. On I' aper~oit de loin, bien 
avant d' arriver, vapeur bleue et legere qui se confond encore avec Ie ciel. Mais elle se condense 
peu a peu, a mesure qu' on avance vers elle, jusqu' a prendre la couleur des eaux qui l' entourent, 
grande vague immobile dont Ie prodigieux elan aurait ete brutalement fige au-dessus de la mer 
calmee d'un seul coup. Plus pres encore, presque aux portes de Tipasa, voici Ie vieux dieu 
moussu que rien n' ebranlera, refuge et port pour ses fils, dont je suis. 
C' est en Ie regardant que je franchis les barbeles pour me retrouver parmi les ruines. Et sous la 
lumiere glorieuse de decembre, comme il arrive une ou deux fois seulement dans des vies, qui, 
apres eel a, peuvent s' estimer comblees, je retrouvai exactement ce que j' etais venu chercher et 
qui, malgre Ie temps et Ie monde, m' etait offert, a moi seul vraiment, dans cette nature deserte. 
Du forum jonche d'olives, on decouvrait Ie village en contrebas. Aucun bruit n'en venait : des 
fumees legeres montaient dans l'air limpide. La mer aussi se taisait, comme suffoquee sous la 
douche ininterrompue d'une lumiere etincelante et froide. Venu du Chenoua, un lointain chant 
de coq celebrait seulla gloire fragile du jour. Du cote des ruines, aussi loin que la vue pouvait 
porter, on ne voyait que des pierres grelees et des absinthes, des arbres et des colonnes parfaites 
dans la transparence de l' air cristallin. II semblait que la matinee se flit fixee, Ie soleil arrete 
pour un instant incalculable. Danse cette lumiere et ce silence, des annees de fureur et de nuit 
fondaient lentement. l' ecoutais en moi un bruit presque oubhe, comme si mon creur, arrete 
depuis longtemps, se remettait doucement a battre. Et maintenant eveille, je reconnaissais un a 
un les bruits imperceptibles dont etait fait Ie silence: la basse continue des oiseaux, les soupirs 
Iegers et brefs de la mer au pied des roc hers , la vibration des arbres, Ie chant aveugle des 
colonnes, les froissements des absinthes, les lezards furtifs. l' entendais cela, j' ecoutais aussi les 
flots heureux qui montaient en moi. II me semblait que j' etais enfin revenu au port, pour un 
instant au moins, et que cet instant desormais n' en finirait plus. 
Mais peu apres, Ie solei! monta visiblement d'un degre dans Ie ciel. Un merle preluda 
brievement et aussitot, de toutes parts, des chants d' oiseaux exploserent avec une force, une 
jubilation, une joyeuse discordance, un ravissement infini. La joumee se remit en marche. Elle 
devait me porter jusqu' au soir. 
Albert Camus: L' ete - Retour a Tipasa 
\ 
Return to Tipasa 
To me, there is hardly anyone of those sixty-nine kilometres of road that is not bristling with 
memories and feelings. Violent childhood, adolescent dreams in the puffing of the coach, 
mornings, blossoming girls, beaches, young muscles always at the peak of their effort, light 
evening anxiety in a sixteen year-old heart, the desire to live, glory, and always the same sky all 
along those years, with its never-ending strength and light, itself insatiable, gulping down, for 
months on end, its victims, laid out on the beach as sacrificial lambs at the fatal hour of twelve, 
noon. Always the same sea, too, almost impalpable in the morning; I found it unchanged at the 
end of the horizon as soon as the road, leaving the Sahel and its bronze-coloured vineyards, 
started to lead downhill towards the coast. I did not stop to look at it, though. I wished to see the 
Chenoua again, that heavy solid mountain, etched out in one block, that lies along the Tipasa 
bay on the West side, before it reaches down into the sea. It can be noticed from far away, long 
before one arrives, in the form of blue and light steam still mingling with the sky. But then it 
condenses little by little, as one moves towards it, until it takes the colour of the waters 
surrounding it, like a large, still wave, whose prodigious thrust had been brutally transfixed over 
the sea calmed down in between in a jiffy. Nearer still, at Tipasa's gates, here stands the old, 
mossy god that nothing will unseat; it is a haven for its sons and I am one of them. 
As I was watching it, I stepped over the barbed wires and found myself among the ruins. In the 
glorious light of December, as happens only once or twice in a person's life, who may then 
consider it to be fulfilled, I found exactly what I was looking for. In spite of time and space, this 
was given to me, to me only, in this barren setting. From the forum ground scattered with olives, 
one could see the village down below. No sound came from there: some light smoke was rising 
from the clear air. The sea was silent too, as if suffocated by the uninterrupted flow of 
scintillating and cold light. A remote rooster's song could be heard coming from the Chenoua, 
alone to celebrate the fragile glory of the day. On the side of the ruins, only worn stones and 
absinthes, trees and erect columns could be seen as far as the eye could reach in the 
transparency of the crystal air. It seemed that the morning had become still as if the sun had 
stopped for and indefinite period. In this light and silence, years of fury and darkness were 
mingling slowly. I was listening to a long forgotten sound inside me, as if my heart had started 
beating again, after a long moment of rest. Awake again, I recognised one by one the 
imperceptible sounds that made silence: the continuous tone of the birds, the faint and brief 
sighs of the sea at the foot of the rocks, the vibration of the trees, the blind song of the columns, 
the light movement of the absinthes and the swift lizards. I could hare all this, I was listening to 
the joyous flows of emotions that were rising inside me. I felt as if I were home again, at least 
for an instant, and that this instant was everlasting. 
But shortly afterwards, the sun rose slightly up in the sky. A blackbird gave a short preluding 
song and all at once from everywhere, the birds burst into singing with incredible strength, 
jubilation, joyous discord and infinite elation. The day was resuming slowly and was to lead me 
through to the evening. 
Albert Camus text - free translation by Blaise Gadanecz 
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ABSTRACT 
THIS THESIS EXPLORES the micro-structure of the market for syndicated loans from the 
demand and supply side and aims to provide a detailed micro-economic analysis. The 
focus is on the determinants of loan pricing to both developing and industrialised 
countries. Particular attention is paid to the characteristics of both lenders and 
borrowers. The thesis comprises four papers. 
Paper 1 defines key concepts and provides a historical outlook on the international 
market for syndicated loans since the late 1970s. 
Paper 2 analyses in an extensive risk-return framework the determinants of the pricing 
of syndicated credits granted to developing country borrowers between 1993 and 2001. 
It concludes that risk is properly reflected in loan pricing, although the effect of purely 
micro-economic price determinants is in several instances weaker when variables 
reflecting macro-economic conditions in borrowers' countries are also introduced into 
the model. Analysis of market structure allows us to make inferences about the effects 
of bank market power and perceived risk concentration in syndicated lending to 
developing country borrowers. 
Paper 3 extends the second one in a first attempt to our knowledge to analyse the 
determinants of the pricing of developing and industrialised country loans and bonds 
taken together in the 1990s. On average, we find that developing country bonds have 
been riskier than developing country loans and industrialised country loans riskier than 
industrialised country bonds. We analyse how spill-over effects may have taken place 
from one market segment to the other in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. We also 
compare market access and structure on the respective market segments. We find that 
banks and investors may have exercised their market power to the greatest extent or that 
the penalising effect of higher perceived risk concentration may have been most 
pronounced in the case of bank loans being made to developing country borrowers. 
Paper 4 is the first of its kind to investigate the effects of bank characteristics on the 
structure and pricing of syndicated loans at an international level, using a unique 
dataset. We show that the pricing of loans is likely to be lower as banks participating in 
those loans become less liquidity-constrained or better capitalised, or enjoy a regulatory 
advantage. The relationship between bank characteristics and loan pricing generally 
appears to be stronger in the case of senior banks than of junior banks. This confirms 
the stronger pricing power of senior banks when arranging loans, while junior 
participants tend to act more as price takers. Contrary to the existing literature we find 
evidence of senior banks offloading larger shares of riskier loans in a potentially 
opportunistic way to outsider junior banks with little knowledge of the borrower. They 
also tend to hold higher portions of loans they arrange when they are better capitalised. 
In addition, as information about the borrower becomes less transparent, junior banks 
rely more on the reputation of the senior bank, to determine their level of commitment, 
than when borrower information is widely available to the public. 
X\"l 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1 
1. Introduction 
INTERNATIONAL SYNDICATED LENDING REPRESENTED $1.4 trillion in 2001, or more than 
one third of all new international financing on capital markets. Syndicated lending _ 
where several banks form a group to lend to the same borrower - is deemed to have 
generated more underwriting revenue in recent years than either the equity or the bond 
Inarket (Madan, Sobhani and Horowitz, 1999). At the time of writing, in 2002, many 
corporations were having difficulty financing themselves on international bond, 
commercial paper or equities markets, leaving them no choice but to turn to their 
bankers for loans. But twenty years ago, on the eve of the sovereign default by Mexico 
in 1982, most of developing countries' debt already consisted of syndicated loans. The 
default threatened large Western financial institutions and indeed parts of their 
countries' financial systems. The eventual restructuring of Mexican debt into Brady 
bonds, whereby creditors saw their loans exchanged for securities guaranteed by the US 
government, created a precedent in the way it changed the structure of financial 
markets. 
Medium-term syndicated bank loans were the principal instrument for channelling 
foreign capital to the developing countries of Africa, Asia and especially Latin America 
between 1971 and 1982, as banks massively recycled OPEC countries' oil-related 
wealth by means of euro-dollar trading. Syndication - primarily intended to share risk-
allowed smaller financial institutions to acquire exposure to emerging market borrowers 
without having to establish a local presence in those regions, in what seemed an 
advantageous risk-return combination. Syndicated lending to emerging market 
borrowers grew more than sixfold from $46 bn worth of facilities granted in 1972 to 
over $300 bn in August 1982. Lending came to an abrupt halt that year, after Mexico 
had suspended payments on its sovereign debt. This made lenders much warier about 
lending to emerging markets, which resulted in a sharp phase of contraction m 
syndicated lending to these countries, with volume bottoming out at $19 bn in 1985. 
By the beginning of the 1990s, banks, which had been burnt by developing countries' 
debt crisis a decade before, had learnt some of the risk-based pricing techniques of the 
public corporate-bond market and started applying those techniques to syndicated 
lending. While banks became more sophisticated, much more data became available on 
2 
the performance of loans, and financial markets made it possible to trade loans between 
banks and sell them even to non-banks such as pension funds. Moreover, it became 
possible to buy protection against credit risk while keeping the loans on the balance 
sheet. Most importantly, corporations in industrialised countries developed an appetite 
for syndicated loans which they saw as a useful, flexible source of funds that could be 
arranged quickly and relied on to complement other sources of external financing such 
as equities or bonds. As a result, syndicated lending is now the largest financial market 
in America (Madan, Sobhani and Horowitz, 1999), generating more underwriting 
revenue than equities or bonds. 
2. Research questions and methodology 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the determinants of syndicated loan pricing and to 
provide a detailed micro-economic analysis. As noted in the introduction above, the 
international syndicated loan market is a very important segment of international 
financial markets and we seek to provide an in-depth analysis of how it operates. The 
resulting inferences about market structure and borrower market access have important 
implications for the global financial system as a whole. 
It is rare and difficult for researchers to access banks' books to glean information on 
individual loan specifications. However, there exist commercially available facility-by-
facility databases such as those of Dealogic Loanware where individual borrowings are 
recorded. Only recently have researchers started to analyse such facility-by-facility 
databases in a systematic risk-return framework. A wealth of facility-level information 
on loan specifications (such as pricing, maturity, size or purpose), together with the 
characteristics of borrowers (like sector or nationality) and lenders (bank name, 
nationality, role - junior or senior - and level of commitment) can be used in order to 
gain valuable information about borrowers' market access and lenders' price-setting 
power. But a great amount of effort is required to make the data suitable for empirical 
analysis. 
3 
The focus of our work is on both the determinants of loan pricing to developing and 
industrialised countries. Particular attention is paid to the characteristics of both lenders 
and borrowers. The main research objective of the PhD is to investigate ho\v loan 
pricing and other characteristics are used to reach market equilibrium as supply and 
demand (risk) meet and resolve information asymmetry issues between borrowers and 
lenders on the one hand and among different lenders on the other. Loan demand and 
supply are analysed separately and the thesis comprises four papers, each looking at one 
particular area. The first paper provides a review of institutional and empirical issues. 
The second and third papers focus on the demand side. The second one contributes a 
detailed study of the pricing of developing country syndicated loans - these countries 
were historically among the first recipients of such loans - while the third one extends 
the analysis to industrialised country borrowers and also compares the characteristics of 
syndicated loans with those of bonds, one of the main alternative sources of financing to 
loans. The fourth paper pays particular attention to the supply side issues of syndicated 
lending. 
Paper 2 explores the relationship between developing country economic structure and 
the pricing of syndicated credits to borrowers in emerging markets. It is reasonable to 
begin any analysis of the syndicated loan market with developing country borrowers as 
lending to sovereign developing countries was how syndicated loans came into 
existence in the first place in the 1970s and 80s, providing an indispensable source of 
financing for these countries by recycling the OPEC countries' oil wealth. As a result, 
some developing countries have become excessively dependent on foreign funds or aid, 
which has left them unable to escape the poverty trap by their own means (Grinols and 
Bhagwati, 1976). As early as twenty years ago, concerns were expressed about such 
countries' growing reliance on credits from private international banks (e.g. Buira Seira, 
1979). Economic problems in developing countries have often triggered major 
international financial crises over the past three decades. The Mexican crisis of 1982 
was among the first crises to have a major impact on the functioning of international 
capital markets, with the development of Brady bonds (Rhodes, 1996). More recently, 
the financial crises in South-East Asia (1997) and Russia (1998) also had a major 
impact on international lenders' behaviour (see, for instance, IMF, World Economic 
Outlook, October 1998). Several recent papers discuss bank lending to emerging 
markets (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001; Goldberg, Dages and Kinney, 2000: 
Goldberg, 2001) and crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). The sustained availability 
of foreign credit to developing countries is viewed as one means for deepening capital 
markets in these countries and potentially reducing the severity of crises, when they 
occur (Goldberg, 2001). As some developing countries have nowadays become very 
dependent on syndicated lending by foreign banks to finance their development, raising 
funds on this market to a large extent, it is useful to examine how banks have reacted to 
this dependence and to borrower visibility on the market. How does a developing 
country's dependence on the market for international syndicated loans influence the 
pricing of foreign funds that are available to it? More generally, what is the relationship 
between borrower market share, market structure and developing country loan pricing, 
other micro- and macro-economic factors being equal? This is the main research 
question examined in the second paper, as an extension of the framework used in 
existing studies such as Eichengreen and Mody (2000). 
The theory of financialliberalisation (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; Fry, 1988) has for 
a long time considered that domestic financial liberalisation, i.e. channelling of 
domestic savings, was key to economic development. Inflows of foreign capital were 
deemed to be secondary and McKinnon (1973) goes as far as to suggest that they should 
be sterilised with a view to avoiding inflationary risk in a system of fixed exchange 
rates. The blatant failure of such policies undertaken in the 1970s has brought back to 
the fore the issues of lending to developing countries, the sustainability of foreign debt 
and financialliberalisation (e.g. Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2001). According to the 
theory of financial liberalisation, macro-economic stability is an absolute prerequisite 
for developing countries aspiring to obtain foreign loans. In this context, macro-
economic stability should be understood to mean inflation and public deficits under 
control, but also a legal and political environment which can ensure financial deepening, 
i.e. legally enforceable contracts and efficient supervision of commercial banks by the 
central bank! or some other supervisory authority. King and Levine (1993) argue that 
better financial systems improve the probability of successful innovation and thereby 
accelerate economic growth. Similarly, financial sector distortions reduce the rate of 
economic growth by reducing the rate of innovation. One stream of academic literature, 
1 For a review of the literature on the relationship between central bank independence and inflation, see 
Barro (1997). Barro also stresses the importance of parsimonious government consumption and the rule 
of law as determinants of real per capita GDP growth. 
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which started to appear in the late 1970s/early 1980s with the Latin American financial 
crisis, examines the effects of sovereign borrowers' macro-economic characteristics on 
the financing conditions obtained by them. The availability of foreign funds to 
developing countries has thus been related to these countries' solvency (Hanson, 1974; 
Harberger 1980; Sachs, 1981, 1984; Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Edwards, 1983), 
liquidity (Feder and Just, 1977; Edwards, 1983; Eichengreen and Mody, 2000), 
sovereign debt repudiation and rescheduling history (Boehmer and Megginson, 1990; 
Gooptu and Brun, 1992). The relationship between the availability of foreign funds and 
investment relative to economic output has also been analysed (Sachs, 1984; Edwards, 
1983; Gersovitz, 1985) together with the effects of the economic growth rate 
(Eichen green and Mody, 2000). More recent papers on secondary bond spreads study 
the determinants of spreads including local and global factors, (Mauro, Sussman and 
Yafeh, 2002; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). Other papers on market discipline analyse the 
interest rates charged to different banks according to bank characteristics and macro-
economic variables (Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2001). 
Yet, in addition to macro-economic considerations, banks also take into account micro-
economic factors such as borrower business sector, loan purpose, maturity or 
guarantees, to determine the terms of their lending. Indeed, many banks these days, at 
least the larger ones, run sector as well as country desks and use their research as 
information inputs for their loan decisions. Information asymmetry theory (Leland and 
Pyle, 1977; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Fama, 1985; Diamond, 1991) suggests that 
financial contracts should be formulated in such a way as to address the problems of 
adverse selection (supply of credit such that the less risky projects drop out of the 
market) and moral hazard (risk of non-repayment by the borrower, who has been 
prompted by a higher interest rate to choose a riskier project). The micro-economic 
characteristics of each loan contract are related to the equilibrium rate of interest in the 
theoretical and empirical literature. Smith and Warner (1979), Smith (1980), Bester 
(1985), Besanko and Thakor (1987), Berger and Udell (1990), Eicheingreen and Mody 
(2000) and Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) have among others analysed the 
relationships between loan pricing and size, maturity, collateral and guarantees, loan 
purpose and borrower sector. 
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Overall, the determinants of bank lending to developing countries have been examined 
in the existing academic literature within a risk-return framework, but the conclusions 
of earlier articles have often been only partial or contradictory. The availability of a 
comprehensive database of individual syndicated credit facilities allows us to apply the 
risk-return framework to study the determinants of syndicated lending to developing 
countries in a more systematic manner. We bring together the macro- and micro-
economic determinants and gauge their relative importance. This is the analysis we 
undertake in the second paper. It begins by reviewing the existing academic literature on 
the pricing and availability of developing country syndicated credits. It then goes on to 
present a simple loan pricing model including both micro- and macro-economic factors 
as determinants of the loan price, discussing the expected effects of each variable. That 
pricing model is then estimated for a sample of 5,000-plus developing country loans 
signed between 1993 and 2001. Inferences are made about the relative influence of 
macro- and micro- economic variables as determinants of loan pricing. Furthermore, 
evidence is provided about the relationship between market structure (bank market 
power or perceived concentration of risk) on the one hand and loan pricing on the other. 
In today's globalised financial environment, emergmg and industrialised country 
borrowers compete for funds: for instance developing country bonds and loans compete 
for investors with US junk bonds (Cline and Barnes, 1997; Vine, 2001). This increases 
the potential of investor sentiment affecting developing country borrowers to impact 
industrialised country borrowers and vice versa. Thus, contagion - reflected, for 
instance, by higher spreads or flight to qualitl - can happen between these market 
segments during times of crises or financial turbulence. After the Mexican sovereign 
default of 1982, the appearance of Brady bonds had implications for world financial 
markets as a whole. Likewise, commentators have argued that the Asian financial crisis 
for a while threatened the entire world economy (The Economist, 6 July 2002). While 
most of the earlier loan and bond pricing literature has focused on developing countries 
or on industrialised countries separately, our third paper makes a first attempt - to our 
knowledge - at comparing pricing mechanisms and market structure for industrialised 
and developing country loans and bonds, combining these two branches of the academic 
literature. While the international market for syndicated credits was, at its inception in 
2 Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) discuss the relative importance of trade links and finance as sources 
of contagion. We focus here on the financial link. 
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the 1970s, driven by the financing needs of developing countries, the situation has since 
then reversed and industrialised country borrowers now raise far more funds on the 
syndicated loan market than developing countries. Indeed, the US nowadays drives the 
world market for syndicated loans. As suggested by Bekaert and Harvey (2002) and 
Bilson, Brailsford and Hooper (2002), we take account of the differences in the 
institutional operating environments (corporate governance, political environment, 
corruption) between industrialised and developing countries by explicitly introducing 
countries' corruption index into our loan and bond pricing models. Based on the 
research described in our second paper about developing country economic structure 
and the pricing of syndicated credits, the third article examines whether the market 
structure effects found for developing country borrowers trying to access bank loan 
markets are limited to that market segment. This allows to make inferences about those 
countries' overall access to foreign funds, including via bond markets. 
There are a number of theoretical, practical and empirical justifications for comparing 
the characteristics of loan and bond instruments. The theoretical ones can be found in 
the information asymmetry literature which extensively compares the characteristics of 
bonds and loans from a monitoring, incentives and debt seniority perspective (Sachs and 
Cohen, 1982; Berlin and Loeys, 1988; Berlin and Mester, 1992; Eichengreen and Mody, 
1998; Bolton and Freixas, 2000). Practitioners of financial markets actively compare the 
characteristics of bonds and loans when resorting to securitisation3 of loans, issuance of 
backstop or liquidity credit facilities to refinance maturing bonds4, or to arbitrage 
between highly leveraged transaction loans and high-yield bonds. Empirical research 
that compares the pricing of the two instruments (e.g. Kamin and von Kleist, 1999) 
finds many similarities in the two instruments' spreads to changes in factors such as 
credit rating or maturity. 
Following the logic of the "pecking order theory" of finance, companies use internal 
money (retained profits) in the first instance to finance their development and when they 
subsequently seek external funds, they graduate from bank finance to bond finance as 
information about their creditworthiness becomes more complete (Myers, 1984; Myers 
3 Removal of the claims from the bank's balance sheet and purchase by a special purpose vehicle (SPV) 
which issues securities that are subsequently serviced by the cash-flow from the loans, allowing some 
tranching of the risk in the process. 
4 Treasurers of large corporations often use loans and bonds as complementary means of financing. 
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and Majluf, 1984; Diamond, 1991; Carey, Prowse, Rea, and Udell, 1993; Bolton and 
Freixas, 2000). While this may be so for industrialised country borrowers, other authors 
(Edwards, 1986; Sachs and Cohen, 1982; McKinnon, 1984; Folkerts-Landau, 1985; 
Eichengreen and Mody, 2000) report that there is more risk in bonds than in bank loans 
in the case of developing country borrowers. 
After a reVIew of the loan and bond pricing literature, our third paper re-estimates 
refined versions of the developing country loan pricing model elaborated in the second 
article, for developed and industrialised country loans and bonds. It compares the 
riskiness of developing and industrialised country bonds and loans with reference to the 
pecking order theory, and explores how negative market sentiment - reflected by peaks 
in issuance spreads - may have spilled over from one market segment to the other. It 
draws inferences about the relative influences of market structure, perceived risk 
concentration and bank market power on pricing on each market segment. 
The second and third papers of the thesis analyse how information asymmetry issues are 
being dealt with between borrowers and lenders by means of the pricing and structuring 
loan contracts. In syndicated lending, however, information asymmetries are taken one 
level further, as junior banks who participate in syndicates at a low level to provide 
funds have in practice much less information about the borrower than do senior banks 
who arrange the syndication. Diamond (1984) was among the first academics to explore 
the issue of delegated monitoring in financial intermediation theory. Monitoring a 
borrower (to ensure that he meets his contractual obligations laid down in the loan 
contract) typically involves increasing returns to scale, which implies that it is more 
efficiently performed by specialised firms. Therefore, individual investors tend to 
delegate the monitoring activity, instead of performing it themselves. This introduces 
the problem that the information produced by the monitor may not be reliable 
(Campbell and Krackaw, 1980). Thus, the monitor has to be given incentives to perform 
its job properly. In the case of one lender monitoring one or several borrower(s), 
deposits seem to be an efficient incentive to achieve this purpose (Diamond, 1984; 
Calomiris and Kahn, 1991). A bilateral loan with a single lender can give rise to a 
principal-agent relationship between the lender and the borrower. In a syndicated loan 
with multiple lenders, one can think of such a relationship between senior and junior 
lenders. Although in theory the junior lenders are responsible for making their own 
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analysis about the borrowers' riskiness, in practice they often act as principals who give 
a mandate to the senior arranger bank to screen and monitor the borrower. Some lead 
banks originating syndicated credits, especially when they are capital- or liquidity-
constrained, may exploit the procedure by passing on risky loans to junior syndicate 
participants whose knowledge about the true level of risk involved may be limited. 
Senior banks' incentive to monitor the borrower is limited once the claim has been sold 
down from their balance sheet to junior participants (Gorton and Pennachi, 1995). 
Dell' Ariccia (2001) argues that asymmetric information and learning are among 
determinants of the structure of bank markets. They limit the number of competitors a 
market can sustain in equilibrium, provide incumbents with an advantage over new 
lending institutions, and induce banks to compete more intensely for market share. We 
surmise that junior participants in bank syndicates may accept to suffer temporary 
losses with the hope of getting to know the borrowers better, winning ancillary business 
from them and indeed arranging syndicated loans for them at a senior level in the future. 
A learning process is thus involved and junior syndicate members may be thought of as 
reasoning in terms of expected gains over the whole horizon of their relationship with 
the borrowers. The distinction between junior and senior bank roles also corresponds to 
a separation between traditional financial intermediation activities (earning an interest 
margin) and investment bank type (fee-generating) businesss. This is of importance for 
the banks themselves as well as regulators and supervisors. For instance, banks with a 
diversified income mix can save on capital and supervisors may need fewer resources to 
monitor them (Stiroh, 2002). 
Many authors6 have analysed agency issues arising between syndicate members with 
different seniorities. Empirical tests using US regulatory data have found that senior 
banks' liquidity and capital constraints do influence their behaviour vis-a-vis junior 
syndicate members, although there is little evidence of senior banks deliberately selling 
bad loans to junior banks. 
5 During the past decade, banks have tried to diversify away from traditional lending into fee-gener~ti.ng, 
trading and other activities with a view to reducing the volatility of their earnings. For an empmcal 
analysis of the relationship between diversification and the ~olatility of bank earnings, see St.iroh (2002). 
6 See, for instance, Greenbaum and Thakor (1987), Pennachl (1988), Flannery (1989), Banerjee and Cadot 
(1996), Berlin and Mester (1992), Simons (1993), Angbazo, Mei and Saunders (1998), Dennis and 
Mullineaux (2000) and Jones, Wiliam and Nigro (2000). 
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Regulatory constraints, in particular those related to bank capital, influence how banks 
structure and price credits granted to borrowers, i.e. how they behave vis-a-vis the 
borrower itself as well as other syndicate members. Thakor (1996) has reported how 
capital constraints can result in credit rationing by banks. Pavel and Phillis (1987), 
Pennachi (1988) and Simons (1993) note that loan sales or syndications can be used by 
banks as a means of alleviating regulatory capital constraints. Chen, Mazumdar and Yan 
(2000) find that banks subject to differing regulatory or supervisory regimes have 
differing lending behaviours. More generally, we expect that lenders with different 
characteristics are likely to issue credits with different specifications, other things equal. 
The relationship between loan supply and lender characteristics also has important 
implications for the transmission of monetary policy through the so-called bank lending 
channel (Altunba~, Fazylov and Molyneux, 2002). Banks transmit changes in monetary 
policy to the real economy by altering their supply of credit and it is found that this 
transmission mechanism differs depending on bank asset size, liquidity and 
capitalisation. Furthermore, the issue is also related to the credit crunch literature. 
Hancock and Wilcox (1998) find that between 1989 and 1992, small banks in the 
United States shrank their loan portfolios relatively more than did large banks in 
response to declines in their own bank capital. Berger and Udell (1994) and Peek and 
Rosengren (1995) empirically establish the relationship between capital constraints 
resulting from bank capital regulation and the shrinkage in US bank lending, 
distinguishing between different types of bank management and different sorts of 
borrowers7• 
Lastly, one important lender characteristic likely to have an effect on loan specifications 
is that of bank location. Sirmans and Bejamin (1990), Jones, William and Nigro (2000) 
and Sommerville (2001) make the case that conditions on local or relationship loans are 
really different from those on other types of loans while Petersen and Rajan (2000) are 
of the view that the availability of borrower credit records, as well as the greater ease of 
processing these, makes distance between lenders and borrowers less relevant8• 
7 Distinction is made between the (1) risk-based capital (2) leverage (3) loan examination and (4) 
voluntary retrenchment versions of the credit crunch hypothesis. 
8 For a review of the literature on distance issues in lending, see Degryse and Ongena, 2002. 
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To complement our two papers focusing on the demand for syndicated credits and how 
the resulting risk is priced, we subsequently undertake a study of the supply-side issues 
of syndicated lending. The aim is to explicitly control for the competitive effects 
identified in the preceding papers by introducing lender characteristics into the loan 
pricing model. This type of study has not yet been carried out at an international level as 
far as we know. The research objective of our fourth article is to investigate the 
relationships between the structure and pricing of syndicated loans and lender 
characteristics, using international data and distinguishing between banks with different 
seniorities present in the syndicates. First, we examine the effects of bank regulatory 
constraints on syndicated loan pricing. An international stock taking exercise on the 
relationship between bank capital and loan pricing is especially relevant as the Basel II 
Accord lays out new internationally applicable capital recommendations. Attention is 
then turned to agency issues in the syndication of loans, such as whether senior banks 
sell "lemons" to junior banks and how senior banks' reputations are related to the 
proportions of loans sold to junior banks. Lastly, the effect on loan specifications of 
lender location relative to that of the borrower is analysed. 
After a reVIew of the literature, the paper estimates a loan pncmg model where 
borrower, loan and lender characteristics are all used as explanatory variables. 
Distinction is made between lenders of different seniorities in the syndicate with a view 
to gauging their relative price-setting power. Evidence is provided on the relationship 
between bank capitalisation and loan pricing, and the possible exploitation of private 
information about the borrowers by senior syndicate members vis-a.-vis junior syndicate 
participants. 
3. Structure of the thesis 
The rest of the PhD is structured as follows. Paper 1 defines key concepts and provides 
a historical outlook on the international market for syndicated loans since the late 
1970s. We first define the main features of a syndicated loan and explain why it lies on 
the borderline between public and private finance. The roles and motivations of the 
various parties (lender and borrower) to a syndicated credit are discussed and the 
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different components of pricing are clarified. The subsequent historical analysis - which 
helps to understand key concepts, together with the origins and evolution of the market 
- is divided into three parts: (i) the 1970s, when syndicated loans were a major source 
of finance for developing countries, (ii) the 1980s, marked by a period of sharp 
contraction in syndicated lending in the aftermath of the Mexican debt moratorium of 
1982, (iii) the renaissance of the 1990s. Data on individual loan transactions is available 
to us starting in this third period of the 1990s and the first paper ends with a 
presentation of the richness of the breakdown available in these micro-level data. The 
evolution of various loan market segments is analysed, with particular attention paid to 
specific borrower types, nationalities, ratings, lender nationalities, facility types, 
currencies, purposes and maturities. 
In the papers that follow, we examine the different demand- and supply-side factors that 
influence the availability of syndicated credits. 
On the borrower side, we proceed to look at micro- and macro-economic factors for 
emerging country borrowers, together with market structure (Paper 2). We first review 
the academic foundations underlying our study: they can be found in the information 
asymmetry literature of the late 1970s and early 1980s (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1981; Fama, 1985; Diamond, 1991) for the micro-economic part and in the 
external debt literature for the macro-economic part (Sachs, 1981, 1984; Eaton and 
Gersovitz, 1981, Edwards, 1983, 1986; Boehmer and Megginson, 1990, Eichengreen 
and Mody, 2000). We subsequently analyse the macro- and micro-economic 
determinants of developing country loan pricing separately and then in combination. 
These pncmg mechanisms are then compared to those for industrialised country 
borrowers and bonds (Paper 3). In addition to the literature reviewed in the second 
paper, here we also draw on work comparing pricing mechanisms on loan and bond 
markets such as Berlin and Mester, 1992; Bolton and Freixas, 2000. Refined versions of 
the developing country loan pricing model are then estimated first for developing 
country loans and bonds and then for industrialised country bonds and loans. 
Turning to the lender side, we examine how the characteristics of banks involved in 
syndicated lending influence the pricing of loans (Paper 4). We first add lender 
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characteristics into a simple version of the loan pricing models of the second and third 
papers and distinguish between different bank seniorities in the lending syndicates. We 
then follow Simons (1993), Jones, William and Nigro (2000) and Dennis and 
Mullineaux (2000) to investigate the effects on pricing and risk taking of information 
sharing between various layers of lenders and the borrower. 
A summary and a general discussion are provided in the final section of this thesis. 
4. Contributions to the literature 
Overall, the thesis makes several contributions to the existing academic literature on 
bond and loan pricing and bank market structure. 
• Previous empirical literature has used spreads over a benchmark interest rate 
(e.g. LmOR) to represent syndicated loan pricing. However, this does not 
represent the true economic cost of loans as additional pricing factors, such as 
fees, are typically charged in loan syndications. Our empirical analysis uses a 
pricing measure known as the drawn return which includes both fees and 
spreads, and is therefore a more comprehensive measure than looking at merely 
spreads. 
• We distinguish between the notion of explicit guarantees and implicit guarantees 
as determinants of loan pricing: the former are explicit commitments by third 
parties while the latter can arise from ownership of the borrower by a parent 
company. We find different effects on loan pricing. 
• We analyse the relative importance of macro- and micro-economic determinants 
of the pricing of syndicated loans granted to developing country borrowers; we 
find that macro-economic factors dominate micro-economic ones. 
• Borrower market share and market structure variables are explicitly introduced 
into the analysis and conclusions are derived from this pertaining to banks' 
market power and the effects of perceived risk concentration on loan pricing. 
• We establish that borrowers from developing countries that are more heavily 
dependent on syndicated loans are charged more to access funds. 
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• We find that the relationship between borrower creditworthiness and the form of 
financing (via retained profits, bank loans, bonds or equities) as suggested in the 
"pecking order theory" of finance is different for industrialised and developing 
country borrowers. 
• Industrialised and developing country borrowers' access to bond and loan 
markets is analysed together, with a view to comparing pricing, market structure 
and spill-over effects from one market segment to another in times of financial 
turbulence. 
• Accordingly, we find that market access conditions faced by developing country 
borrowers can influence those faced by industrialised country borrowers. 
• Empirically, we establish differences in the way bonds and loans are priced, 
although theory suggests similarities. We also detect differences m pncmg 
mechanisms between developing and industrialised countries. 
• The effects of the corruption index are studied on loan and bond pricing for the 
first time for developing and industrialised country borrowers. 
• We find differences in the way corruption and political risk influence market 
access conditions for developing country borrowers on the one hand and 
industrialised country borrowers on the other. 
• The relationship between lender characteristics and loan specifications is 
explored at an international level for the first time. Most studies so far have used 
US data, mainly from regulatory, i.e. national returns. But non-US banks appear 
to have arranged 54% of loans for US borrowers in 2001 and funded 51 % of 
them, so our study makes a contribution in analysing competitive effects in an 
important segment of the market. 
• Distinction is made between banks of different seniorities within syndicates 
when analysing the relationship between lender characteristics and loan 
specifications for the first time as far as we know. 
• Senior banks are found to have more pricing power in syndicates while junior 
banks tend to act more as price takers. 
• Junior banks are found to rely more on the reputation of the senior banks when 
participating in syndications where information about the borrower is more 
opaque. 
• Contrary to the prevIOUS literature, semor banks are found to behave in a 
potentially opportunistic way vis-a-vis junior banks by passing on relatively 
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larger shares of riskier loans to junior participants after they have syndicated 
them. 
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THE MARKET FOR SYNDICATED LOANS represents a very important element of the global 
financial system today, amounting one third of total international financing in 2001. In 
this paper, we define what a syndicated credit is, discuss how syndicates of lending 
banks operate and what the roles and motivations of the various parties are. We also 
discuss the components of loan pricing and describe various loan facility types. We go 
on to present a historical analysis of the international market for syndicated credits since 
the 1970s. We distinguish between the 1970s, when syndicated loans were a prime 
source of external financing for developing countries, followed by a sharp reduction in 
syndicated lending during the 1980s, and a revival in the 1990s. Then, we analyse 
developments on various loan market segments during the 1990s, using micro-level data 
available to us for that period, focusing on borrower types, nationalities, ratings, lender 
nationalities, facility types, currencies, purposes and maturities. We finally describe the 
evolution of loan pricing during the past decade and combine this with all the preceding 
main points of the paper to present a logical model for the pricing of syndicated credits. 
1. The syndicated loan: a borderline case between 
public and private finance 
In this section, we explain how the syndicated loan lies on the borderline between 
public and private finance, and what the motivations of each party are to engage in such 
a transaction. We also describe the roles of the main parties to the deal, what the pricing 
structure is and what the most commonly used syndicated loan instruments are. 
1.1 Definitions 
In a syndicated loan, two or more banks (members of a syndicate) agree jointly to make 
a loan to a borrower. Every syndicate member has a separate claim on the borrower, 
although there is only a single loan agreement contract. One or several lender(s) will 
typically act as arranger(s) or lead manager(s), mandated by the borrower to bring 
together the consortium of banks prepared to lend money at a given set of terms. The 
borrower's relationship banks are often at the core of the syndicate and they may bring 
in other institutions according to the size, complexity and the pricing of the loan as well 
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as the desire of the borrower to increase the range of its banking relationships 
According to Dennis and Mullineaux (2000), syndicated credits thus lie somewhere in 
between relationship loans and public debt (or transaction loans). While the lead bank(s) 
may have some form of relationship with the borrower, this is less likely to be the case 
for the banks participating in the syndicate at a more junior level. 
Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) cite several potential motivations that banks originating 
a syndication (also called lead banks) may have for doing so. Syndication can be a 
means of avoiding excessive single-name exposure, to comply with regulatory limits 
regarding lending to a single borrower. Syndication may also reflect a voluntary 
diversification motive, a mechanism for managing interest rate risk or a strategy for 
enhancing fee income9• In the main, it allows agents and underwriters to deliver the 
funding commitments that borrowers demand without having to bear the market and 
credit risk alone. 
Banks participating in a syndicated loan at a more junior level may be motivated by a 
lack of origination capabilities in certain types of transactions, geographic areas (as 
happened in the 1970s in emerging markets, see Robinson, 1996) or industrial sectors, 
or indeed a desire to cut down on origination costs. While junior participating banks 
typically earn low margins and hardly any fees, they may also hope that in return for 
their involvement, the client will reward them later with more profitable business, such 
as treasury management, corporate finance or advisory work (Allen, 1990)10. 
For borrowers, using the syndicated loan market represents the following advantages for 
borrowers (Allen, 1990): 
• They can achieve spreads lower than what they might pay through a series of 
bilateral arrangements. An increase in the number of banks participating in the 
loan is likely to lead to more competitive pricing. 
• Arranging a loan is less costly - in terms of origination fees - than issuing a 
bond. 
9 On the various fees earned by the various syndicate members, see Table 1. 
10 In practice, though, these rewards fail to materialise in a systematic manner. 
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• 
• 
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Syndication can provide a more flexible funding structure, such as multiple 
currency options, which guarantee to the borrower the availability of funds in 
the currency of his choicel1 . 
Financing via syndicated loans can constitute a way to widen a corporation's 
circle of lenders through syndicates that include foreign banks. 
A credit facility provides the borrower with a stable source of funds - of 
particular value in the event that other capital markets are subject to some form 
of disruption. 
The syndicated loan sector generally allows borrowers to raise larger sums than 
they would be able to obtain through either the bond or the equity markets under 
a time constraine2• 
Syndicated credit facilities can be arranged quickly and discreetly, which may be 
of value for certain transactions such as takeovers. 
• Commitments to lend can be cancelled relatively easily, contrary to borrowing 
in securities markets where such actions would dent investor confidence. 
1.2 Roles of the different participants to the syndicated credit deal 
The arranger or mandated arranger]] bank is responsible for putting together the deal 
(Allen, 1990; Rhodes, 2000). In consultation with the borrower, the arranger bank 
prepares an 'information memorandum' that contains descriptive and financial 
information concerning the facility and the borrower (including projections of cash 
flows). Recipients of the memorandum sign a confidentiality agreement. The arranger 
will typically market the deal to prospective participating banks, explaining the credit, 
describing the borrower and its business, answering questions. The lead bank negotiates 
and drafts all the loan documents and the participants are not generally involved with 
the borrower. Acting as an intermediary, the lead bank attempts to satisfy the potentially 
competing objectives of the borrower and the syndicate members. 
11 For a more thorough description of instrument types, see § 1.4. 
12 Indeed, in order to bid for third generation mobile phone licenses in 2000 auctioned off by various 
European countries' governments, many European telecommunications firms tapped the syndicated 
credits market for large amounts in the first instance, subsequently aiming to refinance the initial short-
term debt by later issuing medium or long term securities. 
13 The term mandated is to reflect the fact that the arranger has won a mandate from the borrower to put 
together the loan. In the case of several arrangers or mandated arrangers, some of them are sometimes 
called lead arrangers - this is in order to rank arrangers according to seniority. 
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If it is thought that the arranger may not be able to put together a syndicate which will 
come up with the required amount of credit at a given price, then, in exchange for an 
underwriting fee, the arranger bank may also co-ordinate for a group of banks to 
guarantee the availability of funds. Underwriters and sub-underwriters are brought 
together during the first phase of syndication called primary syndication. In a second 
phase or secondary syndication, new banks are invited to join the consortium. They are 
called, in decreasing order of seniority, co-lead managers, managers, co-managers, or 
participants14 • The commitments of the underwriters get re-examined according to the 
success of the second phase of the syndication. If the deal fails to attract enough 
institutions in the second phase, underwriters may have to provide some of the funds 
they have guaranteed. If on the other hand the terms of the loan or the borrower are 
considered attractive by the market, the loan may well be oversubscribed. Then, the 
arranger may either invite the borrower to increase the size of the commitments or 
scales down every bank's participation pro rata. 
Once the lending syndicate has been set up, the arranger(s) or lead manager(s) will thus 
eventually find themselves at the centre of a whole hierarchy of institutions, which may 
accept positions as co-lead managers, managers, co-managers, underwriters, sub-
underwriters or just participant banks, depending on their pecuniary commitment and 
their contribution to the syndication process. 
14 A senior arranger bank can also allocate a certain portion of the loan of the loan to itself, i.e. also 
occupy a junior position. 
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Diagram. A: Simplified representation of the various stages of the life of a syndicated I 
and parties present oan 
1. Origination stage 
Senior banks 
Arranger( s) or mandated arranger( s ) 
Lead manager( s ) 
2. Underwriting stage 
Senior banks 
Arranger( s) or mandated arranger( s ) 
Lead manager( s ) 
Underwriter(s), sub-underwriter(s) 
3. Syndication stage 
Senior banks 
Arranger( s) or mandated arranger( s ) 
Lead manager(s) 
Underwriter(s), sub-underwriter(s) 
:.. Borrower 1 
'----------------' 
..... IJl'" Borrower 
----------------------{!------------------------------~~ ~ 
~--------------~ 
Borrower 
Junior banks (in decreasing order of seniority) 
Co-lead manager( s) 
Manager(s) 
Participant(s) 
4. During the life of the loan 
Junior banks 
Co-lead manager(s) 
Manager(s) 
Participant(s) 
Source: Diagram by author 
Agent bank 
Conduit bank Borrower 
One important role in the syndicate is that of the agent bank (often one of the arrangers) 
who administers the loan, typically acting as an intermediary between the borrower and 
participating banks, intervening throughout the life of the loan. The agent calculates 
required interest payments, obtains waivers and amendments to the loan documents and , 
in case of a secured loan, holds all pledged collateral on behalf of syndicate members. 
He/she also ensures that information (annual financial statements, interim reports, 
certificates of compliance and other documents) are delivered on time by the borrower 
or an independent auditor. The agent is contractually exculpated from any potential 
liability to the syndicate members except where it results from 'gross negligence or 
wilful misconduct'. The agent may declare an event of default, but will typically seek 
the prior advice of the member banks. Indeed, the loan agreement will identify which 
decisions require the consent of a designated proportion of the member banks. 
Unanimity is normally required for any reduction in principal, interest or fees or for 
extensions of any terms of the credit. 
Diagram A above summarises the different bank roles as they appear through various 
stages of the life of the syndicated loan. 
1.3 Pricing structure: spreads and fees 
As well as earning a margin over LIBOR (or any other benchmark) when the loan is 
drawn, banks in the syndicate receive various fees (Allen, 1990). The arranger and other 
members of the lead management team generally earn some form of upfront fee in 
exchange for putting the deal together. This is often called a praecipium or arrangement 
fee. The underwriters similarly earn an underwriting fee for guaranteeing the 
availability of funds. Other participants (those at least on the 'manager' and 'co-
manager' level) may expect to receive a participation fee for agreeing to join the facility 
_ the actual size of the fee generally varies with the size of the commitment. The most 
junior syndicate members typically only earn the spread over LIBOR or over a 
comparable market reference. Once the credit is established and as long as it is not 
drawn, the syndicate members often receive an annual commitment or facility fee (to 
compensate for the cost of regulatory capital that needs to be set aside against the 
commitment) again proportional to their commitments. As soon as the facility is drawn, 
the borrower may have to pay a utilisation fee, as often as not a means of separating it 
(i.e. not announcing to the market as included in the total cost) from the price that he is 
paying. The agent bank typically earns an agency fee, usually payable annually, to cover 
the costs of administering the loan. Loans sometimes incorporate a penalty clause, 
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whereby the borrower agrees to pay a prepayment fee or otherwise compensate the 
lenders in the event that it reimburses its debt prior to the specified term. 
Table 1: Fees paid by the borrower using a syndicated loan 
Fee Type Remarks 
Arrangement fee One-off 
Legal fee One-off 
Also called praecipium. Received and retained by the 
lead arrangers in return for putting together the deal 
Remuneration of the legal adviser 
U n d~;;~·i·ti·~i·i~~·--·-···-· · ··-······· ·· ············- · ·· · ····· ····· ·-·-·-·-···· ·· ····O~~=·;"ff"····--·· · ···· ·····-···-······--······-p·~-i"~~····;f···th~·-~;~~i-t-;;;~~-t-t;··-;b-t;i;:;-"f~a n ce d ur i n g the 
first level of syndication 
Participation fee One-off Received by the senior participants 
C;·~t~~~t·-f~~···--·-·-- ··-·· · ··-·· .. _. __ ... __ .... _ .. _-_ ....... __ ._._ .... -P~~--~~~u;;;-·-···---···--·p;id·· ;~··-i;-;;g as -th~-i~~·iiitY-i-~~-;t-~se-d, to compensate 
Utilisation fee 
Agency fee 
Conduit fee 
Prepayment fee 
Source: Compiled by author 
Per annum 
Per annum 
One-off 
One-off if 
prepayment 
the lender for the tying up of the capital corresponding 
to his commitment. 
To boost lender's yield, to enable borrower to 
announce a lower spread to the market than what is 
actually being paid, as the utilisation fee does not 
always need to be publicised on the tombstone 
Remuneration of the agent bank's services 
Remuneration of the conduit bank15 
Penalty for prepayment 
Table 1 above gives a summary of the most common fees that the user of a syndicated 
loan has to pay. 
1.4 Instrument types 
Syndicated credits may take the form of term loans16 (specific amount for a set amount 
of time), of revolving credit facilities J7 , standby facilities (essentially revolving facilities 
arranged for backup purposes), or standby letters of credit (whereby the bank enhances 
the borrower's credit risk in relation to a third party). Loans can have multiple currency 
options or compartments, can incorporate a swap or other types of instruments actually 
15 Institution through which payments are channelled with a view to avoiding payment of withholding tax. 
16 Two tranches of the same loan targeted at different classes of investors are called A-Loan and B-Loall . 
17 These also correspond to a specific amount for a set period of time, but they offer the flexIbility to draw 
down, repay and redraw all or part of the loan at the borrower's discretion. 
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closer to securities than loans. In particular, revolving underwriting facilities (RUFs) 
and note issuance facilities (NIFs) constitute funding commitments on banks' behalf to 
a borrower; they can be combined together, or alternatively with other instruments into 
a multiple options facility (MOF). A MOF is the general name for a number of credit 
and money-market fund raising mechanisms18 • Finally, a mezzanine loan is an 
instrument on the borderline between equity and debt. 
Next we examine how the market for syndicated credits has behaved historically from 
the 1970s onwards. 
2. Historical analysis 
This section describes how international market for syndicated credits saw its first large 
wave of development in the 1970s with lending to emerging market borrowers, 
followed by a dominance of bond markets over loans in the 1980s, until syndicated 
credits again became an indispensable source of finance again in the 1990s. 
2.1 The 1970s: syndicated loans as a major source of finance for 
developing countries 
Helped by the advent of the eurodollar, the euromarkets and the LmOR as an 
internationally standardised pricing reference, the intermediate term (1 to 5 year), 
floating-rate, general-obligation syndicated bank loan became the principal instrument 
between 1971 and 1982 for channelling capital to the developing countries of Africa, 
Asia and especially Latin America (Boehmer and Megginson, 1990). Developing 
country sovereign borrowers were the main recipients of funds, along with a limited 
number of non-sovereign ones, such as their government-controlled enterprises, local 
operations of multinational corporations and certain hard currency generating firms like 
privately owned international shipping companies (Robinson, 1996). The borrowing 
18 These will typically comprise a revolving credit, a cash advance facility, banker's acceptances and note 
issuance facilities, packaging together a variety of banking services through one agent rather than a 
multitude of bilateral banking relationships. 
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governments essentially saw the loans as a way to promote exports and to mitigate the 
balance of payments problems stemming from the OPEC-related explosion of oil prices 
in the 1970s. A need to redistribute oil-related wealth led to the exponential 
development of euro-dollar trading by banks. Among other recipients of funds, the 
capital-hungry Latin American borrowers were a ready market. Syndicated loans soon 
began to displace traditional bilateral loans and club deals 19, to the extent that they 
allowed smaller, primarily domestic banks in many countries to lend directly to 
emerging market borrowers without having to establish a local presence in those 
regions. Furthermore, the banks were offered diversification and were able to earn high 
yields (in line with higher risk, though). 
2.2 Sharp contraction following the Mexican debt moratorium of 
August 1982 
Emerging market borrowers' debt grew from $46 bn in 1972 to over $300 bn in August 
1982 (Eichengreen and Mody, 2000), when the Mexican debt moratorium20 shocked 
market participants into more carefully assessing the true risks inherent in sovereign 
lending. According to the Bank of England's database on international capital markets, 
total new syndicated credit facilities - granted to emerging markets and industrialised 
countries - were worth almost $83 bn in 1980, and a further $101 bn were booked in the 
following year (Allen, 1990). As Table 2 below indicates, from August 1982 onwards, 
the euroloan21 market entered a phase of sharp contraction, bottoming out in 1985, when 
the value of new international syndicated loans amounted to only $19 bn. 
19 A form of syndicated credit where the facility is not sold down on the market but reserved for a limited 
number of insider banks. 
20 The realisation of the magnitude of former Soviet satellite states' indebtedness and a Polish debt 
suspension worth $8 bn in 1981 were the forerunners of the major debt rescheduling programmes of the 
1980s. . 
21 The term euroloan is used here in its original meaning, i.e. a loan made in a currency abroad and outSIde 
the control of the country of origin (Rhodes, 2000). 
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Table 2: Announcements of international syndicated credit facilities by regions 
1980 19811982 19831984 19851986 1987 1988 1989 
Industrialised countries 39.9 48 .9 41.0 21.8 16.1 9.5 18.1 76.3 91.1 122.6 
Developing countries22 41.9 51.2 45 .8 14.6 13.5 9.3 10.4 11.5 10.5 26.2 
........ _ .. _-.-.... _ ..-...... . 
_ .. _ ... _. __ ._-_ ..... __ .... _ ... _ ....•...• _._ ............ _._ ... _. __ ... __ .•.... _ ... __ ._ .. _ ...... _._ ...... _ ..... __ ... _--_._._--_ ... _-------------_.----------
Other23 1.0 0.8 1.4 1.6 0.5 0.2 1.1 0.9 0.2 0.2 
Total 82.8 100.9 88.2 38.0 30.1 19.0 29.6 88.7 101.8 149.0 
Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 
2.3 The renaissance of the 1990s 
In the 1980s, the expansion of public debt markets (in particular junk bond markets) 
seemed to threaten the future of syndicated bank-lending. Indeed, banks were unwilling 
and essentially unable to lend because they were grappling with bad loans, writing off 
losses and, after 1989, managing their Brady bonds24 • But by the beginning of the 1990s, 
traditional lenders have learnt some of the risk-based pricing techniques of the public 
corporate-bond market. Previously, one or more banks would originate a loan, 
underwrite it and, often, hold it to maturity. There was little data on the performance of 
loans, so pricing often bore little relation to risk. Since the beginning of the 1990s, 
banks originating loans have been typically part of a syndicate (traditional single-bank 
lending has genuinely been dying out) and sell on a loan to other investors, such as 
pension funds. This has helped to make loans much more competitive. As a result, 
syndicated lending is now the largest financial market in America. It is also the most 
lucrative for the firms arranging the loans (commercial and investment banks alike). In 
1998, revenues from underwriting syndicated loans were around $6 bn, compared with 
$4.6 bn for equities and $3.2 bn for corporate bonds (Madan, Sobhani and Horowitz, 
1999). 
Syndicated loans have shown significant growth in the 1990s, and have been tapped by 
emerging market and industrialised-country borrowers alike. According to the Dealogic 
Loanware database, total loan syndication volume - including domestic deals -
22 Including Eastern Europe and oil producing countries. 
23 Including international organisations. 
24 Developing country debt-conversion programmes have gone hand in hand with the development of the 
secondary market for syndicated credits. Under a debt-conversion programme, an investor can convert 
dollar-denominated syndicated loans purchased on the secondary market into local currency for fixed 
investments in the debtor countries. The so-called Brady conversion for Latin America was among the 
first such debt-conversion programmes. 
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represented $1.7 trillion in 2001, more than three times the amount of $533 bn in 1993. 
The proportion of merger, acquisition and buyout related loans represented 15% of the 
total volume in 2001, against 7% in 1993. Following a spate of privatisations in 
emerging markets, utilities, banks, transportation and mining companies - often with 
large asset bases, substantial capital needs and good debt service capacity - have started 
to displace sovereign borrowers in these regions (Robinson, 1996). They have turned 
the focus on capital investment to the private sector, from balance of payments lending 
to the public sector or sovereign states, previously. They have also been able to obtain 
longer-term loans, thus ending the dominance of self-liquidating short-term finance 
geared to emerging markets. As for the industrialised countries, many of their corporate 
borrowers have been relying on syndicated lending to finance mergers, acquisitions and 
leveraged buyouts since the beginning of the 1980s. Corporate institutions in developed 
countries have also been eager to restructure their existing lines of credit into more 
flexible financing arrangements, such as multiple-option facilities. Besides, second-tier 
corporate borrowers that did not possess a sufficiently high credit rating to obtain access 
to the eurobond market and use interest rate swaps at favourable rates have been tapping 
the syndicated credits market. More recently, European telecommunications firms have 
borrowed huge amounts on this market to finance the purchase of third-generation 
mobile phone licenses. According to figures published in the March 2001 issue of the 
Quarterly Review of the Bank for International Settlements, international syndicated 
lending to telecommunications firms amounted to $256 bn for the whole of 2000, a 
more than threefold increase over 1999. Facilities intended to support purchases of 
third-generation mobile phone licenses accounted for at least 20% of such financing. 
Commercial and investment banks alike have benefited from the renaissance of 
syndicated lending in the 1990s. This is because bank and institutional debt markets, 
while not exactly merged, are now intertwined. For instance, it is very common 
nowadays for a medium term syndicated loan provided by a syndicate to be refinanced 
by a bond at, or very much before, the loan's stated maturity. Another frequent hybrid 
format is the US commercial paper programme backed by a syndicated letter of credit. 
These packages have contributed to blurring the lines between investment and 
commercial banking. It has become usual to see bank loan syndicates led by major 
investment banks include commercial banks. 
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Syndicated lending is increasingly undertaken these days by private financial 
institutions in conjunction with multilateral agencies such as the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) or the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB). This takes the form 
of syndicated IFC or IDB loans with tranches reserved for private sector bank lenders. 
Finally, syndicated credits are increasingly traded on secondary markets. However, 
compared to the total volume of syndicated credits arranged secondary trading volumes 
remain relatively small. The biggest market for secondary loan market trading of loans 
is the United States where the volume of such trading represented $118 bn in 2001, 
according to the Loan Pricing Corporation. Loan trading in Europe amounted only to 
$29 bn (according to the Loan Market Association, a European professional body). 
3. Borrower and lender behaviour in the 1990s 
In this section, we analyse the overall evolution of the syndicated credits market since 
1986 and compare it to that of securities markets. We then study in detail the borrowers 
and the lenders present on the market since 1993 and finally discuss the characteristics 
of facilities for the same period. 
3.1 Size of the market, comparison to other markets 
Over the past 15 years, the market for syndicated credits has grown substantially. 
Announced (new) facilities represented $88 bn in 1980, growing to hit a temporary peak 
of $736 bn in 1989. Activity then stayed lower by $100 bn in the two subsequent years, 
partly because of the reduction in syndicated credit financing to corporate borrowers, in 
particular for mergers and acquisitions. Lending has constantly grown since then, driven 
by banks' confidence that they were adequately capitalised. This translated into a "size 
for size's sake" perception that they should gain market share by building up their 
balance sheets (Rhodes, 2000). In the mid-1990s, a new spate of mergers and 
acquisitions and refinancing-related transactions also fuelled the market. For the whole 
of 2001, syndications volume had reached $1.7 trillion. Annual volumes for the period 
1986 - 2001 are displayed in Figure 1 below. As noted in Onsrud and Pinto (1991), the 
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rate of adoption of an innovation for a class of potential users typically plots an S-shape, 
reflecting a slow beginning as only a few innovators adopt, followed by a rapid spread 
throughout the class, and finally by a levelling off as full diffusion is reached. To the 
extent that syndicated lending came into existence in the 1970s, was soon widely used 
by emerging country borrowers, subsequently levelled off in the 1980s and then started 
a new life in the 1990s, the shape of Figure 1 could be thought of in this context of 
innovation. Financial innovation that competed with syndicated lending from the 1980s 
onwards would notably include securitisation and the widespread use of 
dis intermediated financing. However, this interpretation should be nuanced by the fact 
that syndicated loans are nowadays largely complementary to financing through 
securities (see Paper 3 for more on this). Figure 2 compares announcements of 
international syndicated loans for the 1994 - 2001 period with other sources of 
financing on international capital markets: bonds and notes, money market instruments 
and equity issuance. It shows that for the years under consideration, international 
syndicated credits announcements have represented amounts comparable to 
international bonds and notes issuance, with international equities and money market 
instruments representing on average another 25% of funds raised internationally. 
Figure 1: Signings of international and domestic Figure 2: Comparison of international 
syndicated credit facilities, US$ bn equivalent syndicated credits and securities markets, gross 
announcements, US$ bn equivalent 
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3.2 Borrower characteristics 
3.2.1 Borrower type and residence 
Figure 3 below displays a breakdown of the syndicated credits market since 1993 by 
borrower type. For the sake of simplification, we classified borrowers into three main 
groups: 
• 
• 
sovereigns, quasi-sovereigns (comprising central government, local government, 
international institutions); 
financial institutions (including banks and other financial institutions such as 
insurance companies, stockbroker firms and the like); 
• the corporate (i.e. non-financial) sector. 
As can be seen from the chart, the lion's share of syndicated lending has been directed 
at the non -financial corporate sector for the period under study, representing, in 2001, 
76% of all loans. Financial institutions accounted for 22% of the total, leaving only 2% 
to sovereign borrowers. As already mentioned, the financing needs of the corporate 
sector have mainly corresponded to mergers and acquisitions, refinancing (rolling over 
of previous debt or temporary source of short-term finance before tapping longer-term 
securities markets). With auctions of third-generation mobile phone licenses taking 
place in 2000, the telecommunications companies have been extensively using the 
market (see § 2.3). 
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Figure 3: Syndicated loan volumes by borrower Figure 4: Syndicated loan volumes by residence 
type, US$ bn equivalent of the borrower, US$ bn equivalent 
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Figure 4 above breaks down syndicated lending SInce 1993 by residence of the 
borrower. During this period, borrowers resident in North America have been the largest 
recipients of funds (with the US accounting for $939 bn in 2001, or 56% of the total). It 
must be said, however, that US borrowers' share of the market has been eroded over the 
past few years, as it had been as high as 68 % in 1994. The weight of European 
borrowers has almost doubled between 1993 and 2001, from 14 to 26%. Within the 
region, the largest amounts in 2001 were directed to the UK ($156 bn), France ($56 bn), 
Germany ($46 bn) and Italy ($32 bn). 
The share of borrowers from emerging markets was 10% of the total (or $56 bn) in 
1993, and has not grown since. The region that obtained the highest amount in 2001 was 
Latin America, ($38 bn), followed by the Asia and Pacific region25 ($20 bn), the Middle 
East and Africa ($20 bn) and Eastern Europe ($16 bn). Rankings were comparable for 
the previous years, with the highest amounts going either to Latin America or Asia. 
Offshore centres26 have represented 2-4% of global syndications during the 1993-2001 
period; activity in these centres is driven by foreign-owned special purpose vehicles 
through which funds are channelled for tax efficiency purposes. The syndicated credits 
25 This excludes Australia and New Zealand , accounting for $24 bn in 2001. 
26 We have used the BIS definition for the list of offshore centres: Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados. 
Bermuda, Cayman Islands , Hong Kong, Lebanon, Liberia, Netherlands Antilles , Panama, Singapore, 
Vanuatu, UK West Indies, Virgin Islands. 
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market in Japan has been traditionally weak, with borrower-lender relationships being 
bilateral to a large extent. Only in the past three years has the volume of syndications 
exceeded $30 bn in that country. 
3.2.2. Borrower rating 
Figure 5: Syndicated lending by borrower rating, US$ bn equivalent 
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Figure 5 shows that more syndicated credits have been extended to investment grade 
borrowers than to non-investment grade ones during the 1993-2001 period, but it also 
highlights the fact that the majority of borrowers (60%) have been unrated. As already 
suggested in Table 1, being rated is less of a requirement for a borrower wanting to tap 
the syndicated credits market than for a counterpart wishing to issue a bond27 • 
3.2.3. Borrower league tables 
Tables 3 and 4 below display the ten most active borrowers on the market in terms of 
number of facilities and total amounts. It is interesting to note that the first ranking is 
dominated by emerging market borrowers who appear to have arranged a large number 
27 It should be noted that in the past couple of years, ratings agencies have started attributing ratings to 
syndicated loans (in a similar way to bonds), not the borrowers themselv.es. The ~umbe.r of rated Io~ns 
however is small at the moment (less than 5% of the total). The recent dnvers behInd thIS type of ratmg 
are the strong global growth in global syndicated loan markets, unparalleled M&A activity, the increased 
role played by institutional investors, increased secondary trading of syndicated loans, as well as bank ' 
increased appetite for asset selection, pricing and portfolio management. 
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of facilities with a lower total US dollar amount, while the largest participants in dollar 
terms are from industrialised countries. 
Table 3: Borrowers with the largest number of facilities, 1993-2001 
Table 4: Borrowers with the largest US dollar amounts of facilities, 1993-2001 
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..... " .... , .. """ ................... ,,, .. ,, .... ,,,... . ..... ", ..... ,... ..; .... ,"',.............. . ................ :-t---_., ...................... , ...... . 
IBM ! United States 12[ 43,540 
... ······~······-·--'-···-·· .... ······ .. -·"·-···-· .. --·t .... ~-.--.--.-.. -....... , 
· Netherlands 7 
, .............. , ......................................................................... ,. 
KPN (Koninklijke KPN) 
....... -....•• 
34,929 
.... ..... . ........ ~ .......... ~.A~_. __ ~~~.A~_.~._.~ __ .+_~ ___ ~._,,_~,,_ ............... ,."", .... _ ..... 
American Express Co ,United States 10 33,400 
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British Telecommunications PLC (BT) : United Kingdom 4. 32,796 
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Source: Dealogic Loanware, author's calculations, 
3.3 Lender characteristics: nationality of arrangers and fund providers 
Figures 6 and 7 below show syndicated lending by nationality of the arrangers and the 
junior fund providers. 
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Figure 6: Syndicated lending by group Figure 7: Syndicated lending by group 1 
nationality of the arranger banks nationality of the junior fund providers 
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US banks have been on top of the league as arrangers during the 1993 - 2001 period, 
arranging 52% of syndicated facilities, followed by their counterparts from Continental 
Europe (24%), the UK and Japan (7% each). Although the relative scores of Continental 
European and Japanese banks have edged up over the past couple of years, these results 
still suggest a dominant role of US bulge bracket investment banks. Indeed, as pointed 
out in § 2.3, despite the blurring of lines between investment and commercial banking, 
the arranger position within a syndicate still corresponds to an investment bank-type 
activity, while that of junior fund provider is more akin to commercial banking type 
behaviour. 
The picture is slightly different when looking at the breakdown of deals by nationality 
of the junior participants, a role that is more akin to commercial banking within a 
syndicate. While the ranking is still the same, European and Japanese banks ' share of 
the total market is somewhat higher here, averaging, respectively, 29% and 10%, 
against 44% for US institutions. 
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3.4 Loan characteristics: instrument types, currencies, purpose and 
maturities 
3.4.1 Facility types 
Every year since 1993, at least 60% of syndicated credit facilities issued globally have 
been revolving credits - as described in § 1.4, these offer a great deal of flexibility to 
their users in terms of total or partial drawdowns, repayments and redrawings. Term 
loans, representing 33% of all facilities between 1993 and 2001, have been the second 
most popular instrument. 
3.4.2 Currencies 
The split of syndicated lending by currencies (see Figure 8 below) shows that the US 
dollar has been the currency of choice for arranging syndications during the past few 
years, used for 71 % of facilities in 2001. 
Figure 8: Syndicated lending by currency Figure 9: Syndicated lending by purpose 
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However, this share has been dropping since 1993 (when it was 86%), to the benefit of 
Sterling (whose share has risen slightly, from 5 to 7% since 1993) and even more 
importantly, the euro and its legacy currencies, used for 5% of deals in 1993 and 12% in 
2001. Not more than 2% of facilities have been denominated in Japanese yen between 
1993 and 2001, in line with the lack of well-established presence of Japanese borrower 
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in the market, as pointed out in § 3.2.1. The preceding analysis confirms the status of 
the US dollar and, to a lesser extent, of the euro, as international currencies, bearing in 
mind that they are commonly used both for domestic and international transactions. 
3.4.3 Facility purposes 
Facilities signed for capital structure purposes (recapitalisation, share repurchases, 
standby commercial paper support or refinancing) have been most widel y used between 
1993 and 2001, followed by corporate control (mergers and acquisitions, leveraged 
buyouts, management buyouts, employee stock option plans) and general corporate 
purpose facilities. 
3.4.4 Maturities 
In 2001, 65% of syndicated loans had a maturity of not more than 5 years, slightly 
higher than, but comparable to previous years. The most popular maturity within the 1-5 
year bucket has been the one below one year. The 5-10 year bracket contributed to 
another 28% of total amounts in 2001, down from 25% in 1993. Between 1993 and 
2001, less than 5% of commitments had maturities longer than 10 years. This suggests 
that syndicated lending is geared to cover mostly borrowers' short-term financing 
needs, as a complement to securities markets, which cater for more medium and long-
term financing requirements. 
3.5 Evolution of pricing 
A detailed discussion of the margin and fees to be paid by the user of a syndicated credit 
facility is featured under § 1.3 and summarised in Table 1. The following pricing 
information can be calculated: 
• 
• 
• 
Average pricing: this is the weighted average margin plus the facility fee. 
Average drawn cost: the average pricing, but adding the annualised front-end 
(participation) fees. 
A verage undrawn cost: weighted average facility fee plus commitment fee plus 
annualised front-end participation fee. 
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• Fees: total fees, participation upfront fees, facility fee, commitment fee, 
utilisation fee, underwriting fee. 
Figure 10: Weighted average drawn cost for syndicated credits 
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Figure 10 above shows that the cost of syndicated credits granted to borrowers from 
industrialised countries to finance mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has been higher 
than that of non M&A or buyout related deals in industrialised countries. The average 
cost of all deals to borrowers residing in emerging markets has itself been generally 
higher than that of deals arranged for industrialised country borrowers. 
The cost of all types of credits decreased between 1993 and 1996-97, then shot up, in 
the second quarter of 1999, in the aftermath of the Russian and Latin American 
financial crises. Loan costs stabilised at lower levels at the beginning of 2001. 
If one were to consider that the loan price (the margin over LIBOR plus fees) charged to 
a borrower on a syndicated loan ought to reflect the borrower's riskiness, then the 
logical pricing equation for a syndicated loan would look like as follows, as shown on 
Diagram B below. 
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Diagram B: The logical pricing model for syndicated credits. 
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However, reality is very different, and the pncmg of syndicated credits IS also 
influenced by the following factors: 
• The lender's relationship with the borrower. 
• Any existing or expected ancillary business with the borrower (these first two 
points can entice lenders to underprice credits in return for the borrower 
rewarding them with lucrative investment banking or advisory business, 
although such subsequent or parallel business does not always materialise). 
• The borrower's industry. Risk will be different in lending to a supermarket chain 
to, say, a coal mine. 
• The loan's purpose (e.g. loans arranged to finance mergers and acquisitions obey 
a different logic from general corporate purpose ones). 
• The loan's transferability (the possibility to transfer the loan to different lender 
on the secondary market can be of value and hence influence the price). 
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• The syndication strategy (different pricing strategies can arise according to the 
number of banks invited to lend). 
These effects are analysed extensively in a risk-return framework in the remainder of 
this thesis. 
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Developing country economic structure and the 
pricing of syndicated credits 
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Developing Country Economic Structure and the Pricing of 
Syndicated Credits 
ABSTRACT 
WE USE A HEDONIC pricing model to analyse in an extensive risk-return framework 
the determinants of the pricing of a sample of S,OOO-plus syndicated credits granted 
to developing country borrowers between 1993 and 200 1. We come to the 
conclusion that syndicated loans with riskier characteristics or granted to riskier 
borrowers are more expensive than others, although the effect of purely micro-
economic price determinants is in several instances weaker when variables reflecting 
macro-economic conditions in borrowers' countries are also introduced into the 
model. In addition to individual loan or borrower considerations, lenders seem to 
focus more on macro-economic country risk factors to determine the pricing of their 
loans, such as the level of exports relative to debt service in the developing countries 
where the borrowers are located. For some, this means restricted access to external 
financing. Indeed, we detect possible evidence of lenders exploiting their market 
power when lending to developing country borrowers. Certain banks appear to 
charge a premium to change initially agreed loan terms. Furthermore, discounts are 
granted on developing country loans provided by small groups or clubs of 
relationship banks rather than on facilities with participation by a large number of 
institutions. 
JEL classification: F20, F34 
Keywords: syndicated loans, developing countries, debt 
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1. Introduction 
GRINOLS AND BHAGWATI (1976) REPORT that some developing countries are excessively 
dependent on foreign funds or aid, which leaves them unable to escape the poverty trap 
by their own means. Balassa (1986) notes differences in the response of inward- and 
outward-oriented countries (i.e. countries relying or not on international trade for their 
economic growth) to external economic shocks, partly because the former depend 
excessively on foreign funds and do not have the right policies to make use of these 
funds, which eventually results in lower economic growth rates and reduces their 
creditworthiness. Economic problems in developing countries - such as the Mexican 
crisis of 1982, and more recently, the financial crises of South-East Asia (1997) and 
Russia (1998) - have often triggered major international financial crises over the past 
three decades. Several recent papers discuss bank lending to emerging markets (Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001; Goldberg, Dages and Kinney, 2000; Goldberg, 2001) 
and crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). The sustained availability of foreign credit 
to developing countries is viewed as one means for deepening capital markets in these 
countries and potentially reducing the severity of crises, when they occur (Goldberg, 
2001). 
For all these reasons, international financing flows to developing countries and their 
determinants are worthy of our study. The determinants of bank lending to developing 
countries have been analysed in the existing academic literature within a risk-return 
framework, but the conclusions of earlier articles have often been only partial or 
contradictory. The availability of a comprehensive database of individual syndicated 
credit facilities allows us to apply the risk-return framework to study the determinants 
of syndicated lending to developing countries in a more systematic manner. This is the 
analysis we undertake in this paper. 
One stream of academic literature, which started to appear in the late 1970s/early 1980s 
with the Latin American financial crisis, examines the effects of sovereign borrowers' 
macro-economic characteristics on the financing conditions obtained by them. More 
recent papers on secondary bond spreads study the determinants of spreads including 
local and global factors, (Mauro, Sussman and Yafeh, 2002; Forbes and Rigobon, 
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2002). Other papers on market discipline analyse the interest rates charged to different 
banks according to bank characteristics and macro-economic variables (Martinez Peria 
and Schmukler, 2001). 
Hanson (1974), Harberger (1980), Sachs (1981,1984), Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a, b) 
and Edwards (1983) report that sovereign borrowers' declining solvency - the 
restriction of their ability to fulfil their obligations in the long run - results in higher 
sovereign loan spreads. Sovereign borrowers' deteriorating liquidity - a proxy for their 
worsening short-to-immediate-term debt service capacity - is expected to reduce the 
borrower's degree of creditworthiness and to result in higher spreads (Feder and Just, 
1977; Edwards, 1983; Eichengreen and Mody, 2000). However, Gersovitz (1985) 
argues that in a willingness-to-pay framework28 , higher international liquidity reserves 
may reduce creditworthiness and lead to an increase in the country risk premium. 
Several authors (Boehmer and Megginson, 1990; Gooptu and Brun, 1992) have 
examined the effects a sovereign debt rescheduling history or debt repudiation and 
come to the conclusion that these factors result in higher prices for sovereign debt. High 
investment relative to economic output enhances a sovereign borrower's perspectives 
for future growth. As shown in Sachs (1984) and Edwards (1983), it is negatively 
related to sovereign spreads. However, again in keeping with the willingness-to-pay 
framework, Gersovitz (1985) argues that if borrowers use foreign funds to undertake 
risk-reducing investment, they will reduce the cost of the penalty in case of default. 
Therefore, higher investment to output ratios will reduce creditworthiness and increase 
spreads. As far as actual economic growth is concerned, Eichengreen and Mody (2000) 
find that high country growth rates enhance the ability to repay debt and reduce spreads, 
provided they do not spill over into unsustainable credit booms. 
Do riskier loan facilities or borrowers incur more expensive or restrictive funding than 
safer ones? The main theoretical issues pertaining to this question can be found in the 
information asymmetry literature of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The risk-price 
relationship has also been analysed in more recent empirical articles. Eichengreen and 
Mody (2000) present an extensive theoretical summary on these issues. Information 
asymmetry theory (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Fama, 1985; 
28 The willingness-to-pay theory can be summarised as a sovereign borrower's use of national funds as a 
war-chest to survive international economic sanctions instead of paying down external debt. 
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Diamond, 1991) suggests that financial contracts should be formulated in such a way as 
to address the problems of adverse selection (supply of credit such that the less risky 
projects drop out of the market) and moral hazard (risk of non-repayment by the 
borrower, who has been prompted by a higher interest rate to choose a riskier project). 
Comparing a loan contract to a sale-leaseback with an option to repurchase the assets, 
Smith (1980) suggests that firms with higher asset values enjoy cheaper pricing on their 
credits, although the volatility of these assets raises the pricing. He also argues that 
banks should charge more for larger loans as they represent more risk - and possibly 
more risk concentration - on their books. However, he does not demonstrate the 
maturity of the loans to influence their pricing in an unambiguous way, although the 
effect might be expected to be positive purely from a risk perspective (the bank uses its 
balance sheet for a longer period of time). Smith (1980), Bester (1985) and Besanko and 
Thakor (1987) demonstrate that borrowers can signal better creditworthiness through 
their willingness to offer collateral, and so need not be charged high spreads. Yet Smith 
and Warner (1979) argue that collateralisation is costly and that benefits to securing the 
loan must exceed the cost for a particular loan to be secured. In a cross-section of loans 
this means that riskier loans will be collateralised. Berger and Udell (1990) also 
document that collateral typically is associated with riskier loans. If collateral's main 
purpose is to solve moral hazard problems, then riskier borrowers or those who need 
more monitoring will post more collateral. 
Two recent articles (Kleimeier and Megginson, 2000; Eichengreen and Mody, 2000) 
investigate the micro-economic determinants of loan spreads. Regarding the borrower's 
business sector, Eichengreen and Mody find that when financial institutions from 
developing countries borrow on the syndicated loan market, they seem to be able to 
obtain lower spreads than non-financial borrowers. This is consistent with the emphasis 
some observers have placed on tacit or explicit guarantees provided to financial 
institutions by monetary authorities (lenders of last resort). Concerning the purpose of 
the loans, a borrower needing large sums of money quickly (for example, to finance a 
takeover) may have to pay a premium for liquidity. Kleimeier and Megginson present 
empirical evidence of this by showing that syndicated credits arranged for merger and 
acquisition purposes are relatively more expensive than others. Eichengreen and Mody 
find that spreads on loans to finance infrastructure projects are usually higher than on 
other types of loans. Kleimeier and Megginson document the fact that spread and 
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maturity and loan Slze are significantly and negatively related for most types of 
syndicated credits. As far as risk mitigants are concerned, Kleimeier and Megginson 
find the presence of a third-party guarantee to reduce the spread on most syndicated 
credits. The effects of the presence of collateralisable assets are found to vary 
according to the purpose of the loans. 
The approach presented in this paper follows Kleiemeier and Megginson (2000) and 
Eichengreen and Mody (2000) and contributes to the literature in the following respects: 
• Two different measures for whether the loans are guaranteed or not are used: the 
notion of implicit and explicit guarantees. Our loan pricing measure 
systematically incorporates the full economic cost of loans, including fees (in 
addition to spreads, which are used by most previous studies). 
• Our study seeks to answer the following question: how is the pnCIng of 
syndicated credits granted to sovereign, but also non-sovereign borrowers In 
developing countries influenced by macro-economic conditions prevailing In 
their countries of location? We combine this analysis with that of the effects of a 
large number of individual, essentially qualitative, risk characteristics of every 
loan and borrower, such as loan purpose and borrower business sector. To our 
knowledge, the effects of these factors have not been measured in a combined 
and extensive manner. Our contribution also consists in evaluating the relative 
importance of macro- and micro-economic determinants of loan pricing. 
• The implications on syndicated loan pricing of a variety of market structure 
indicators for this loan market are also evaluated to answer the following 
questions: are loans granted by smaller syndicates to developing country 
borrowers cheaper than those granted by larger ones, and are borrowers who 
have used the market more extensively able to obtain cheaper rates than others? 
Does a transferable loan (this characteristic is a proxy for the liquidity of the 
secondary loan market) command a price discount? 
Our data sample on developing country loans is more comprehensive in terms of 
information content and the number of facilities than in most previous studies and also 
covers the years corresponding to the Asian and Russian financial crises. Our analysis 
of micro-economic variables shows that most individual characteristics of borrowers 
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and loans influence the pricing of credits in the expected way (i.e. riskier loans or 
borrowers correspond to higher pricing). However, this effect is in several instances 
weaker when macro-economic conditions prevailing in the countries of the borrowers 
are also controlled for. Lenders seem to attach at least as much importance to macro-
economic conditions prevailing in borrowers' countries (e.g. ratio of debt service to 
exports, debt rescheduling, IMF adjustment programme) as to the characteristics of the 
borrowers or loans themselves. Our findings concerning the structure of the market for 
syndicated loans granted to developing countries point to lending institutions potentially 
exploiting their market power. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief historical 
perspective on syndicated lending to developing countries. We present our dataset and 
methodology in Section 3. Section 4 describes and discusses our regression results. We 
conclude in Section 5. 
2. Historical perspective 
Syndicated loans have always been an important source of international financing for 
developing countries and indeed were in the limelight during the Mexican debt 
moratorium of August 1982, since most Latin American debt then consisted of 
syndicated credits. In fact the international market for syndicated credits saw its first 
large wave of development in the 1970s with lending to developing country borrowers, 
followed by a dominance of bond markets over loans in the 1980s, until syndicated 
credits again became an indispensable source of finance in the 1990s and largely 
complementary to securities. Syndicated lending has been as significant as bond 
financing since the first half of the 1990s (Table 1). While international developing 
country bond issues rose from negligible levels at the beginning of the 1990s to more 
than $120 bn in 1997, before falling back to $82 bn in 2000 after the Asian crisis, loan 
commitments have followed pace, reaching levels comparable to bond issues. Signings 
of international developing country loan facilities actually exceeded bond issuance just 
about every other year, totalling $96 bn in 2000. Robinson (1996) notes that "the 
56 
rapidity with which [the Latin American syndicated loans] market has recovered from 
the problems [of the Mexican crisis], its growing size and increasing breadth of 
participation indicate that this market has staying power". As Table 2 below shows, in 
times of financial crises in developing countries, syndicated lending generally tended to 
fall quite rapidly (refer to the statistics for 1985 and 1998) and took some time to pick 
up again. This form of lending thus seems very much market-oriented and determined 
by lenders' short-term considerations, based on macro-economic conditions in the 
borrowers' countries. This provides an important justification for the inclusion of 
Inacro-economic variables into our analysis of the determinants of syndicated lending to 
emerging markets. 
countries, $bn 
1997 1998 1999 2000 
76.6 89.3 140.1 75.8 56.7 95.7 
International bonds 20.6 47.1 38.1 36.9 103.3 120.9 77.3 76.6 81.6 
International equities 6.7 7.7 17.3 8.9 15.1 26.0 10.1 22.7 44.0 
Source: Dealogic Loanware; Bank for International Settlements, various years. 
2001 
71.1 
105.6 
11.6 
Table 2: Announcements of international syndicated credit facilities by regions, $bn 
f ,.' } ,", 1~80 198<2 1984 1985 1986 1988 19891992 1994 1996 1998 2000 __ 20?: 
Industrialised countries 39.9 41.0 16.1 9.5 18.1 91.1 122.6 159.9 44l.6 729.6 821.0 1,332.2 1,280.1 
Developing countries 41.9 45.8 13.5 9.3 10.4 10.5 26.2 26.5 46.6 89.3 75.8 95.7 71.1 
Other29 1.0 1.4 0.5 0.2 1.1 0.2 0.2 7.8 13.7 20.3 8.5 37.8 37.7 
Total 
82.8 88.2 30.1 19.0 29.6 101.8 149.0 194.0 501.9 839.3 905.3 1,465.4 1,388.8 
Source: Bank of England (Allen, 1990), Bank for International Settlements, various years ; Dealogic 
Loanware 
29 Including offshore centres and international organisations. 
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3. Data and methodology 
We work with a sample of 10,304 syndicated credit facilities granted to developing 
country borrowers from 1993 to 2001. These data were extracted from the Dealogic 
Loanware database, a primary market information provider on individual syndicated 
credit facilities, in particular the characteristics of the loans (amount, maturity, currency, 
pricing) and the borrowers (name, nationality, business sector). A large part (80%) of 
the facilities were contracted in US dollars. 
We also use macro-economic data for our study, corresponding to characteristics of the 
borrowers' countries. Our data sources for these variables were the BIS-IMF-OECD-
World Bank Joint Statistics on external debt, the IMF's International Financial 
Statistics, the IMF's World Economic Outlook database and the International Institute 
of Finance's developing country database. We linked the macro-economic variables and 
the micro-economic information contained in the loans database to the country over 
time. For instance, for a loan granted to an Argentine borrower in 19953°, our real GDP 
growth variable represents Argentina's real economic growth for 1995. 
3.1 Loan pricing 
In our sample of 10,304 syndicated loan contracts, the spread charged to the borrower 
(over Libor, Euribor or another pricing reference) is available for 6,831 deals. Several 
research articles (Cantor and Packer, 1996; Kamin and von Kleist, 1999; Kleimeier and 
Megginson, 2000) have analysed this indicator. However, spreads are only one 
component of the true economic cost of a syndicated credit facility that the borrower has 
to pay, with the rest corresponding mostly to a variety of fees. The pricing structure of a 
syndicated credit is described in detail in Appendix 2. In our loan pricing analysis we 
look at the so-called drawn return, a proxy for the full economic cost of loans priced 
30 In case of loan facilities that have already been funded by the lenders but not yet signed, we took the 
funding date as a reference. 
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over Libor. The drawn return, which can be calculated for 5,01031 observations in our 
sample, is the annual return expressed in basis points (spread plus utilisation fee, 
participation fee, facility fee, underwriting fee) that will accrue to a senior fund provider 
if the facility is drawn throughout its life. 
3.2 Explanatory variables 
3.2.1 Macro-economic explanatory variables 
Our macro-economic variables can be classified into six subgroups: indicators of (1) 
solvency, (2) liquidity, (3) economic growth and its sustainability, and (4) economic 
openness for the country of the borrower; (5) outside economic factors and (6) 
sovereign ratings. 
• 1. Solvency of the borrower's country: 
The ratios of external debt to GDP32 and of debt service to exports of goods and 
services are solvency measures that gauge the burden of a country's debt relative 
to its earnings. The higher this ratio, the more likely the country is to be 
distressed and therefore to default. Hanson (1974), Harberger (1980), Sachs 
(1984), Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a, b) and Edwards (1983) discuss how higher 
debt to export or debt to output ratios result in higher sovereign loan spreads. 
Boehmer and Megginson (1990) further find that developing countries' 
deteriorating solvency can reduce the secondary market price of their debt. We 
expect the ratio of external debt to GDP to raise the pricing of syndicated 
credits, therefore. We also employ an indicator of whether the borrower's 
country has received assistance from the IMF - defined as use of Fund credit by 
operating the General Resources Account (GRA) during the year when the 
syndicated credit was granted - as a proxy for potential problems in the 
economy of the country concerned. We expect this indicator to be positively 
31 This sample size is considerably larger than in several other studies analysing the determinants of 
developing country credit spreads: Edwards (1986) and Kamin and von Kleist (1999) use 113 and 358 
loan spread observations, respectively. 
32 This includes both private and public debt. 
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related to the pricing of loans. The use of this variable is equivalent to testing the 
effects on pricing of a sovereign debt rescheduling history or debt repudiation, 
which several authors have done. Gooptu and Brun (1992) find that the 
declaration of a moratorium on commercial bank debt service payments has a 
negative impact on the availability of short-term trade credit lines. Besides, the 
existence of a current World Bank or IMF adjustment programme lS a 
significant determinant of the amounts of short-term trade credit lines that are 
available during a given year from commercial banks. Boehmer and Megginson 
(1990) find that the level of incurred payment arrears, the unilateral debt 
moratoria by Brazil and Peru and the loan-loss provisions by US banks have a 
significantly negative impact on secondary loan prices on these borrowers' debt. 
The adoption of legislation for debt-conversion programmes is associated with a 
decline in secondary market loan prices for the sovereign debt of the countries 
concerned. 
• 2. Liquidity of the borrower's country: 
Relatively high values of the ratio of short term external debt to total external 
debt indicate that a country can be the victim of a liquidity crisis if it cannot roll 
over existing credits - especially if its short-term debt exceeds its foreign 
currency reserves - we expect this ratio to be positively associated with the 
pricing of syndicated loans. The ratio of reserves to debt or reserves to short-
term debt is also used as an indicator of such vulnerability. The ratio of 
international reserves to GDP measures the relative level of international 
liquidity held by a sovereign borrower and is determined to have a negative 
effect on spreads (Edwards, 1983). However, Gersovitz (1985) argues that in a 
willingness-to-pay framework, a country can choose not to use reserves for debt 
service, if it can protect them from seizure. The very liquidity of resources in the 
form of reserves may make them ideal for surviving sanctions after default. The 
first period after repudiation may find the country most vulnerable since it will 
take time to set up alternatives to the banks for facilitating international trade. A 
foreign exchange war chest can be especially important in this transition period. 
In the early 1980s, rumours that developing countries were choosing to rebuild 
reserves rather than service debts were viewed as particularly ominous in this 
context. Argentina, for instance, appeared prepared to threaten its creditors with 
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having to classify its loans as non-performing rather than use its increased 
reserves for debt service (Gersovitz, 1985). Therefore under a willingness-to-pay 
approach to foreign borrowing, higher international reserves may reduce 
creditworthiness and will result in an increase in the country risk premium. 
High values of the ratios of investment to GDP and credit to GDP can forecast a 
future improvement in the country's general economic situation and are also 
signs of confidence on behalf of banks and investors, provided they do not spill 
over to an unsustainable credit boom (see below). The investment to GDP ratio 
captures the country's perspectives for future growth. As shown in Sachs (1984) 
and Edwards (1983), it is negatively related to spreads. However, in the 
willingness-to-pay framework, Gersovitz (1985) argues that borrowers may use 
foreign funds to make investments that reduce the cost of the penalty in case of 
default. Thus, higher investment ratios will reduce creditworthiness and increase 
spreads. As for the ratio of credit to GDP, it can be best thought of, in a cross-
section, as an indicator of financial depth or development. 
• 3. Economic growth and its sustainability: 
Real GDP growth is an indicator of the evolution of the country's wealth and 
relatively high values can point to the debt burden becoming easier to bear in the 
future. Eichengreen and Mody (2000) find that high country growth rates 
enhance the ability to repay and reduce spreads; highly variable export growth, 
on the other hand, raises the risk of non-payment and increases the spread. At 
low levels of financial development and low growth rates, policy measures to 
improve financial intermediation bring value and reduce the costs of external 
borrowing. Even so, when they spill over to unsustainable credit booms, they are 
regarded by the markets with alarm and worsen the terms of access to external 
funds. To all intents and purposes, high values of the real GDP growth variable 
are supposedly associated with relatively cheaper syndicated credits, then, unless 
they reach unsustainable levels. In order to control for the sustainability of 
growth, we also included inflation as an explanatory variable into our model. As 
Cantor and Packer (1996) explain, "a high rate of inflation points to structural 
problems in the government's finances. When a government appears unable or 
unwilling to pay for current budgetary expenses through taxes or debt issuance, 
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it must resort to inflationary money finance [i.e., to printing money]. Public 
dissatisfaction with inflation may in turn lead to political instability." According 
to Barro (1997), business and households perform poorly when inflation is high 
and unpredictable, both because the average rate of inflation and its variability 
and uncertainty. We expect the inflation rate to be positively associated with the 
pricing of syndicated credits. 
• 4. Economic openness: 
Relatively high values of the ratio of imports to exports and import to GDP can 
point to excessive foreign dependence of the country in the sense that it has to 
import a relatively high amount of goods and services in order to export a given 
amount of goods and services or to generate a unit of domestic economic wealth. 
As suggested by Frenkel (1983) and Balassa (1986), to the extent that more open 
economies are more vulnerable to foreign shocks, we expect that higher values 
of the ratio of imports to GDP will raise spreads. Balassa (1986) notes that 
between 1973 and 1983, outward-oriented countries suffered considerably larger 
external shocks than inward-oriented ones in the first instance33 • 
• 5. Outside economic factors: 
We included as explanatory variables the country's purchasing power parity 
share of world GDP: this is an indicator of the country's economic weight in the 
world. We also controlled for growth in world trade: if world trade is booming, 
one could expect that there is more competition for funds as these are more 
difficult and therefore more expensive to come by. Finally, we included the yield 
on the three-year US Treasury bill in our regression models in order to control 
for the price of the alternative, risk-free investment available to the lenders. The 
extent to which lenders are willing to extend funds to potentially riskier 
borrowers from developing countries instead of investing in US Treasuries is an 
indicator of their appetite for risk. In a study of the evolution and determinants 
of US bank's claims on developing countries, Goldberg (2001) suggests that 
foreign claims of US banks are correlated with real US interest rates, but 
33 Nevertheless, Balassa also demonstrates that while outward-oriented countries accepted a temporary 
decline in economic growth in the immediate aftermath of external economic shocks in order to limit 
reliance on foreign borrowing, their economic growth accelerated subsequently, owing to the output-
increasing policies applied. 
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generally uncorrelated with foreign real interest rates. Tighter real lending 
conditions in the United States are associated with lower real claims on 
industrialised countries and higher claims on Latin American countries. 
• 6. Sovereign ratings: 
Cantor and Packer (1996) find that a number of rated countries ' macro-
economic characteristics are reflected in their sovereign ratings, especially per 
capita income, GDP growth, inflation, external debt, level of economic 
development, and default history. Because of the correlation of sovereign ratings 
with most macro-economic indicators, we analysed separately the effects of 
these two sets of variables on the pricing of syndicated credits. For the purposes 
of econometric analysis, we converted the Standard and Poor's sovereign ratings 
into five rating classes, from best to default, using the conversion table shown in 
Appendix 3. We associated these rating classes with the credits based on the 
nationality of the borrower and the date of the loan facility. The resulting 
distribution is shown in Table 3 below. We expect the good ratings classes to be 
negatively associated with the pricing of syndicated credits and vice versa. 
Table 3: number of syndicated loan facilities corresponding to each sovereign rating 
class 
-~-=::--
Number of observations 
--........ """"""......",;;. ........ ~ ....... ----...-.---.... -------
mISSing 
default or not rated or not disclosed SD, NR, R 
poor CC to BB-
281 
1,257 
1,823 
speculative BB to BBB- 2,832 
investment grade BBB to A 2,856 
best A+ to AAA 1,255 
- ;r-o-t'~i-'-------'----"-'---""'-'-----"--'--- --- '-·--· -------W-t;j\AA--·-----··-·----···--···--··io;30-4-----------.-... ----------.-
Source: Standard and POOfS, Dealogic Loanware, author's calculations. 
3.2.2 Micro-economic explanatory variables 
Our micro-economic explanatory variables pertain to loan maturity and SIze, the 
existence of risk mitigants, business sector and loan purpose, as well as the structure of 
the market for syndicated loans granted to developing countries. 
34 See Appendix 3 for more detail. 
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• 
• 
Maturity indicates the lifetime of the loan, expressed in years, and hence the 
period for which the lender is exposed to credit risk. Kleimeier and Megginson 
(2000) report that loan maturity and spread are significantly and positively 
related, except for project finance loans. The effect of maturity on the pricing of 
loans is generally not found to be uniform in the academic literature (see, for 
instance, Smith, 1980). 
We also included the natural logarithm of loan size (and the resulting bank 
exposure) expressed in millions of US dollars. Kleimeier and Megginson 
confirm a negative and significant relationship between loan prices and size for 
most syndicated credits in their sample, except for project finance loans. This 
could point to the ability of more creditworthy borrowers being able to arrange 
larger loans or to the presence of economies of scale when banks arrange 
syndicated credit facilities. 
• We computed dummies to indicate the presence of risk mitigants, such as the 
loan being secured (notably on an asset or receivables the borrower might have), 
sponsored or explicitly guaranteed by a third party. Eichengreen and Mody do 
not control for the presence of risk mitigants. Kleimeier and Megginson do 
include dummies for the existence of a third-party repayment guarantee or of 
collateralisable assets; these are explicit guarantees, though. While the authors 
find the presence of a third-party guarantee to reduce the spread on most 
syndicated credits, the effect of collateralisable assets depends on the type of 
credit. As an innovation on this previous article, we distinguish between explicit 
guarantees (written pledges from a third party to guarantee the loan) and 
implicit guarantees (e.g. when the borrower is a developing country subsidiary 
of a multinational firm from an industrialised country) and examine their effects 
separately. In the rest of the existing empirical literature, the findings about the 
effects of risk mitigants on the pricing of loans are mixed (Smith, 1980; Bester, 
1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987; Smith and Warner, 1979; Berger and Udell, 
1990). 
• Dummy variables are also included to identify subsamples within our dataset 
that correspond to particular borrower business sector and loan purpose groups 
that we might expect to have different risk characteristics and therefore incur 
different pricing of their loans. Our control for the borrower business sectors and 
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the industrial structure of borrowing countries is more refined than in Kleimeier 
and Megginson who determine a dummy variable for the existence of 
collateralisable assets based on the borrower's industry, and Eichengreen and 
Mody, who control for only four industrial sectors: manufacturing, financial 
services, other services, government. The authors report that when financial 
institutions borrow on the syndicated loan market, they seem to be able to obtain 
lower spreads than non-financial borrowers. This is consistent with the emphasis 
some observers have placed on tacit or explicit guarantees provided to financial 
institutions by monetary authorities (lenders of last resort). We created ten 
business sector subcategories: construction and property, financial services 
(banks), financial services (non banks), high-tech industries, infrastructure 
related industries, services provided to the population, services provided by the 
state, traditional industry, transportation and utilities firms, based on the 188 
groups described in Appendix 4. Our loan purpose classifications are partially 
based on Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), who notably report that merger and 
acquisition-purpose loans are relatively more expenSIve than others. 
Eichengreen and Mody further find that spreads on loans to finance 
infrastructure projects are usually higher than on other types of loans. We 
distinguished between the following loan purposes: corporate control, capital 
structure, general corporate purpose, project finance, property, transport, other or 
not available, multi-purpose. For a full list of purpose codes included in the 
various groupings, please refer to Appendix 5. 
• We finally included variables to control for the structure of the loan market, an 
approach which has not been adopted so far in the literature on the pricing of 
developing country syndicated credits. Firstly, we included a dummy variable 
showing whether the credit facility is transferable or not. This is an indicator of 
the market's liquidity, i.e. the extent to which the loan can be traded on the 
secondary market. It may be easier for a bank to offload loans from its balance 
sheet and manage its exposure to certain developing country borrowers if the 
loans concerned are transferable35 • This may have an impact on the pricing of the 
loans. Secondly, we used a dummy to indicate if the amount of the loan has been 
increased from the original amount. When this dummy is equal to 1, it can 
35 Although this may not be an indispensable condition if credit derivatives are used. 
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indicate that the market had a positive reaction to the deal during syndication or 
that the banks have shown flexibility in adapting their financing package to a 
change in the borrower's needs. Thirdly, we controlled for the size of the 
syndicate of lending banks for each facility. We defined a first dummy to 
indicate the case when the number of fund providers was greater than two, and a 
second one to indicate that the deal is a club deal or a bilateral deaP6. The 
conditions of bilateral or club deals are expected to reflect the relationship of the 
borrower with its core banks and may therefore be more favourable than on 
other deals. Fourthly, we included among our control variables the share of the 
borrower's country in total lending to all countries during the year concerned: 
this ratio indicates the relative presence of the country on the market for 
syndicated credits relative to others. A high country share may indicate 
relatively high financing needs for a nation, possibly leading to more expensive 
credits, but also, on the contrary, to an established presence on the market, 
resulting in more favourable financing conditions. 
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
As an exploratory analysis, we now present some descriptive statistics to understand the 
characteristics of our sample37 , which covers the 1993-2001 period. Table 4 shows that 
with the exception of 1996, the mean and the median of the drawn return in our sample 
has been following a generally upward trend, peaking in 1999 - the mean was then 252 
basis points, possibly reflecting higher risk premia demanded from developing country 
borrowers in the aftermath of the Asian and Russian financial crises of 1997 and 1998. 
Spreads subsequently levelled off. The mean and the median are quite close to each 
other, suggesting a symmetrical statistical distribution of the data. Higher drawn returns 
have generally been associated with higher dispersion. Table 5 further suggests that loan 
size has been increasing over time; even so, the relatively high standard deviation 
indicates dispersion in loan sizes, although the coefficient of variation is relatively 
stable. 
36 A club deal is reserved for a limited number of insider banks instead of being widely sold down on the 
market; in a bilateral deal, there is only one participant bank. 
37 Our comprehensive sample is approximately equal to the population. 
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Table 4: Evolution of drawn return (bp) over time 
Year N Mean Median Standard deviation 
1993 317 120.4 100.0 74.7 
Coefficient of variation 
0.62 
1994 400 125.3 11 1.2 74.7 0.60 
1995 615 124.0 95.0 105 .7 0.85 
1996 945 11 1.9 79.5 95.0 0.85 
1997 1,132 132.5 92.8 116.5 0.88 
1998 558 180.4 145.0 137.6 0.76 
1999 412 252.2 225 .0 181.0 0.72 
2000 552 190.6 150.0 133.1 0.70 
2001 * 79 204.8 187.5 139.1 0.68 
Total 5,010 149.0 106.7 125.3 0. 84 
Source: Dealogic Loanware, author's calculations. * first quarter data only 
. Table 5: Evolution of loan size ($m equivalent) over time 
Year N .:Mean Median Standard deviation Coefficient of variation 
1993 317 62.2 . 35 .0 ' . 104.2 1.68 
1994 400 84 .1 42.6 166.2 1.98 
1995 615 83 .7 50.0 167.0 2.00 
1996 945 77 .8 44.3 123.1 1.58 
1997 1,132 107.4 50.0 244.4 2.28 
1998 558 126.7 66.3 209.9 1.66 
1999 412 129.2 77.6 217 .1 1.68 
2000 552 140.8 99.3 172.7 1.23 
2001 * 79 162.7 75.0 390.2 2.40 
._-_ .••.. _ .. __ ... _--_ ... __ .-. __ .. _ ... __ ..... __ ...... _ ....... _ .. _. __ ....... - ...... _ ... __ .. _-_._._--_ ... _ ..... _ .......... __ ... _ ... -... _ ..... _ .... _ ............ __ ..... __ ........ _ .............. _--_ .. _ .._ ... __ ._--_ .. _.-----_._-_._-----------------_._-_ .... _ ............... -... _ ... _-_ ... _.---_._--
Total 5,010 102.6 50.0 194.1 1.89 
Source: Dealogic Loanware, author's calculations. * first quarter data only 
Loan size and drawn return seem to differ significantly according to the borrower's 
industry (Table 6), with the highest median loan size associated to the utilities sector 
($91m) and the lowest one to the construction, property and the non-bank financial 
services sectors ($30m). We observe the highest median drawn returns for infrastructure 
and population related services38 , more than twice as high as the median return observed 
for the transport industry (the sector with the lowest median drawn return). Table 17 of 
Appendix 6 shows the correlation matrix of the variables. The analysis of this matrix 
provides an opportunity to detect relationships between the dependent and the 
independent variables as well as among the independent variables (Gujarati , 1995). The 
table suggests significant relationships in particular between the dependent and 
independent variables. 
38 E.g. hotels, healthcare. See Appendix 4 for full list of sectors included. 
67 
Table 6: Distribution of loan size and drawn return by industry, 1993-2001 
Loan size ($m) 
Industr~~_",,:"""" _______ ~~ ___ -,N~_.£M~e~an Median Standard deviation 
Construction and property 170 46.2 30.0 42.1 
Financial services - banks 897 83 .5 50.0 109.4 
Financial services - nonbanks 501 63.0 30.0 110.7 
High-tech industries 825 104.9 56.8 156.4 
Infrastructure 17 89. 1 70.0 70.0 
Population related services 149 86.9 50.0 123.0 
State-provided services 249 191.4 90.0 354.3 
Traditional industry 866 94.2 50.0 170.7 
Transport 521 75.7 39.7 207 .6 
Utilities 794 163.1 91.2 282.3 
Drawn return (bp) 
IndustrY. N Mean Median Standard deviation 
Construction and property 170 131.1 100.0 94.5 
Financial services - banks 898 140.6 96.2 134.3 
Financial services - nonbanks 501 124.0 100.0 96.2 
High-tech industries 826 150.3 105.0 132.1 
Infrastructure 17 233.0 188.0 163.1 
Population related services 149 258.6 203 .6 180.0 
State-provided services 249 139.0 100.0 113.5 
Traditional industry 866 171.9 130.8 126.6 
Transport 522 98.3 75.0 79.6 
Utilities 794 164.3 137.5 120.6 
Source: Dealogic Loanware, author's calculations. 
In Table 7 we notice that better borrower country sovereign ratings correspond to lower 
drawn returns. Besides, except for the worst Standard & Poor's ratings class, the median 
maturity of poor ratings classes (e.g. class 1 - "poor") is typically short (never above 2 
years between 1993 and 1999), potentially indicating that lenders are reluctant to extend 
funds to poorly rated borrowers for longer periods of time. This may leave these 
countries in a maturity trap, if the maturity of fresh loans is always only sufficient to 
refinance maturing credits. 
We now present the methodology used to further analyse these data. 
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Table 7: Summary statistics by borrower country sovereign rating and year 
:-=~~====~~~pdi~L1 .... gXflWQ L~tUl:D (9llj by"'p'.QfJ;.Q.W C IJ [Y spyereigl1.rating and year 
;Ratio!tclass .. q m" 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001* 
default or not rated or not disclosed .. u 150.0 160~0"172 : 3 150'.0 138~3 82~0 105.0 117.7 
poor 136.3 150.0170.0155.0182.5220.8250.0200.0 249.6 
speculative 142.8 138 .6120.6 90.0 76.4 158.0255.6190.0 236.0 
investment grade 97.5 100.0100.0 82.5 80.0 85.0132.5 106.6 74 .0 
best 70.8 66.0 55.0 61.1 53.2 63.0 85.0 73.7 77 .2 
.,.....- . . . 
t oOUn y. SOVe(elgn ratlOg and year 
7 ]998 1999 20002001 * 
default or not rated or not disclosed 
poor 
speculati ve 
investment grade 
best 
default or not rated or not disclosed 
poor 
speculati ve 
investment grade 
best 
32.0 
43 .5 
50.0 
29.0 
40.0 
5.0 
1.5 
5.0 
5.0 
3.0 
40.0 36.0 40.3 
50.3 80.8 60.0 
42.8 67.5 75.0 
31.0 40.0 40.0 
50.0 33.4 30.0 
5.0 4.0 5.0 
2.0 1.1 1.5 
2.5 4.2 5.0 
5.0 5.0 5.0 
5.0 5.0 3.0 
Source: Dealogic Loanware, author's calculations. * first quarter data only 
3.4 Methodology 
50.0120.0100.0100.0 
50.0 61.8 60.0 95.0 72.5 
50.0 75.0 83.0100.0 70.0 
48.4 52.7 86.5 91.9 95 .0 
56.3 60.0 
1* 
5.0 7 .0 8.4 7.0 
1.0 1.0 2.0 3.3 3.0 
5.0 3.0 4.5 3.3 4.0 
5.0 5.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
5.0 5.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 
As many of our independent variables are qualitative dummies, a hedonic (i.e. quality-
adjusted) model seems particularly useful for the task at hand. Hedonic prices are the 
implicit prices of attributes of a differentiated product. Following the approach of 
Linneman (1980)39, our equations are of the form: 
where: 
In DRA WN j represents the natural logarithm of the drawn return on loan i, 
a is a constant, 
39 Linneman estimates property values and rental payments for the urban housing market that are hedonic 
functions of neighbourhood (non structural) and structural traits associated with each site. The partial 
derivative of these hedonic functions with respect to any trait describes the marginal change in the total 
site valuation associated with a change in that trait when all other trait levels are held constant. These 
partial derivatives reveal the same marginal information as do prices in standard market analyses; for this 
reason partial derivatives are often referred to as the shadow prices of the underlying locational traits. 
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(x 1, ... , Xk) is a vector of k continuously measurable micro-economic characteristics of 
the loan or the borrower (e.g. maturity, natural logarithm of loan size), 
(YI, ... , Ym) is a vector of m continuously measurable macro-economic measures for the 
performance of the borrower's country (e.g. ratio of debt to GDP, of debt service to 
export of goods and services), 
(ZI, ... , zn) is a vector of n qualitative characteristics (e.g. loan purpose dummies, 
borrower business sector dummies). 
Ui = is a random disturbance. 
(/31, ... , fly.), (J1, ... , rm) and (¢l, ... , ¢n) are parameters to be estimated. 
¢1 U = 1, ... , n) can then be interpreted as the hedonic price attached to qualitative 
characteristic j. 
To perform our modelling, we first considered variables that were likely to influence 
loan pricing in theory. We then looked at the literature to corroborate our selection of 
variables, and we examined the relation of each of them to loan pricing by means of 
bivariate analysis. Finally, progressing from the specific to the general, we ran stepwise 
regressions of the drawn return using various combinations of the independent variables 
described above. This technique has, among other things, the advantage of reducing the 
effects of multicolinearity. We used the so-called forward stepwise method, which starts 
with an empty model, adds variables one by one provided they are significant below a 
certain level (10% in our case), re-estimates the model and subsequently removes any 
variables that are then only significant at or above a certain level (11 % in our case). 
The results of our regressions are presented and interpreted in section 4. 
4. Results and discussion 
Insofar as sovereign ratings are expected to be correlated with the other indicators of 
countries' macro-economic performance, we analysed the effects of these two sets of 
independent variables separately. We first discuss our models containing only macro-
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economic independent variables, then the one containing only micro-economic 
independent variables. We conclude with combinations of the two. 
4.1 The effect of sovereign ratings 
Table 8 shows that the drawn return is statistically different for each ratings class from 
'poor' to 'best' (the 95% confidence intervals for the mean do not overlap). In 
accordance with Kamin and von Kleist (1999) we find that spreads on loan issues 
increase as sovereign ratings deteriorate, suggesting that lenders price sovereign ratings 
properly into their loan offerings. This is the straightforward result one would expect. 
Borrowers from countries with a 'poor' sovereign rating are having to pay a drawn 
return of 238.3 bp on their loans on average, almost four times the average drawn return 
of the borrowers from countries with the 'best' sovereign ratings (65.7 bp). 
default or not rated or not disclosed 324 169.4 
poor 860 238.3 
speculati ve 1,617 166.0 
investment grade 1,509 106.1 
best 614 65.7 
Source: Dealogic Loanware, author's calculations. 
147.3 
182.5 
125.0 
93.3 
60.0 
159.4 
134.7 
67.0 
27.7 
95% conf. 
interval 
156.6 182.1 
227.7 249.0 
159.4 172.6 
102.8 109.5 
63.5 67.9 
4.2 The effect of maturity combined with indicators of countries' 
macro-economic performance 
We then investigate the relationship between the pricing of syndicated credits and their 
maturity plus measures of economic performance for the borrowers' countries. The 
results are displayed in Table 9. 
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Table 9: The effect of maturity combined with indicators of countries' macro-
economic performance 
We estimated the following equation using the forward stepwise technique, with an entry criterion of 10% 
and a removal criterion of 11 %: 
In drawn = /30 Intercept + /31 maturity + /32 debtgdp + /33 growth + /34 sCtdebt + /35 cpi + /36 pppsh + 
/37 restogdp + /38 tdstoxgs + /39 c_share_ w + /310 gra + /311 impexp + /312 invgdp + /313 credgdp + 
/314 trade + /315 trsyld + £ 
where: 
• In drawn = natural logarithm of drawn return, in bp 
• maturity = maturity of loans, in years 
• debtgdp = ratio of debt to GDP for country of the borrower, for year concerned (end-year) 
• growth = real GDP growth in borrower's country, for year concerned 
• sCtdebt = ratio of short-term external debt to total external debt for borrower's country, for year 
concerned (end-year) 
• cpi = inflation in borrower's country, for year concerned 
• pppsh = purchasing power parity share of world GDP of the borrower's country for year 
concerned (end-year) 
• restogdp = ratio of reserves to GDP for country of the borrower, for year concerned (end-year) 
• tdstoxgs = ratio of debt service to exports of goods and services for country of the borrower, for 
year concerned 
• c_share_ w = share of the borrower's country in world syndicated lending, for year concerned 
• gra = dummy for assistance received by the country of the borrower from the IMF - use of Fund 
credit by operating the General Resources Account (GRA) - during the year concerned 
• impexp = ratio of imports to exports for country of the borrower, for year concerned 
• invgdp = ratio of investment to GDP for country of the borrower, for year concerned 
• credgdp = ratio of bank credit to GDP for country of the borrower, for year concerned 
• trade = growth in world trade for year concerned 
• trsyld = yield on the three-year US Treasury Bill, for month concerned 
tdstoxgs 0.0076 11.42 0.000 
growth -0.0353 -9.85 0.000 
pppsh 0.0604 11.60 0.000 
gra 0.2119 6.81 0.000 
credgdp -0.0052 -7 .44 0.000 
debtgdp 0.0036 4.43 0.000 
trsyld -0.0493 -2.72 0.007 
restogdp 0.0125 5.63 0.000 
c_share_w 0.2342 4.91 0.000 
Cpl 0.0005 2.46 0.014 
trade -0.011 7 -2.32 0.020 
intercept 4.7856 45.57 0.000 
N = 4,198; Adj R2 =0.2000; F(11; 4,186) = 96.39 
The significant and positive coefficients on the ratio of the debt service to exports and 
the ratio of debt to GDP are in accordance with the results of the academic literature 
(Feder and Just, 1977; Sachs, 1984; Eichengreen and Mody, 2000): lenders seem to be 
concerned about the weight of countries' debt service as a proportion of their income 
and therefore charge higher spreads to borrowers from countries whose ratios of debt or 
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debt service to income are higher. The dummy controlling for assistance from the IMF 
is also positive and significant: likewise, Eichengreen and Mody (2000) find that loans 
granted to countries with a history of debt rescheduling are more expensive than those 
to countries with no such history. Lenders seem to regard with suspicion the necessity 
of the borrower's country to rely on assistance from the IMF. They impose a penalty for 
this40 • The significant and negative coefficients on real GDP growth and the ratio of 
domestic credit to GDP are also in accordance with Eichengreen and Mody (2000): 
investors seem to grant a discount on loans to borrowers from countries whose fortunes 
may be expected to improve, presumably at least as long as the situation does not spill 
over into an unsustainable inflationary credit boom (the coefficient on the inflation 
variable is significant and positive). The ratio of reserves to GDP is significantly and 
positively related to drawn returns: although sovereign borrowers normally default only 
in extreme circumstances, the willingness-to-pay argument developed by Gersovitz 
(1985) seems to prevail in creditors' eyes over any possible good impression conveyed 
by relatively high reserves about borrower countries' finances or prospects (Edwards, 
1983). 
Countries' share in syndicated lending to the whole world is significantly and positively 
related to the spreads in this regression: investors seem to interpret high country shares 
as relatively high and/or more urgent financing needs for a nation and therefore demand 
a higher price for extending credit. This could point to the market power of lenders 
being exploited or higher perceived concentration of risk being charged for extra. The 
yield on the three-year US Treasury bill, the alternative, risk-free investment to 
extending credit to potentially riskier borrowers from developing countries, IS 
significantly and negatively related to the pricing of syndicated credits. We interpret this 
as survival bias in the sense that only the best developing country borrowers are able to 
obtain credits in a time of higher industrialised country interest rates. 
Countries' purchasing parity power share of world GDP is significantly and positively 
related to the pricing of syndicated loans: lenders seem to extract a premium from 
relatively 'wealthier' borrowers. 
40 Surely the effects of this variable are not limited to the year of signature of the loan. The results 
reported in this paper use a GRA dummy equal to 1 if Fund assistance was received during the year of 
signature of the loan. An alternative model .specificati?n .cnot shown) with a dummy for Fund assistance 
preceding the year of signature of the loan gIves very SImIlar results. 
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Finally, although growth in world trade does show up as a significantly negative 
determinant of loan pricing, the ratio of imports to exports of the country of the 
borrower does not. This may point to the fact that (1) only a limited portion of 
syndicated loans granted to developing countries does in fact accompany their 
participation in world trade and that (2) the participation of developing countries in 
world trade is significantly lower than that of industrialised countries. Likewise, loan 
maturity, the ratio of short-term to total external debt, and the ratio of investment to 
GDP drop out of the regression. Other macro-economic factors seem to dominate these 
variables as determinants of loan pricing in lenders' eyes. 
4.3 The effect of micro-economic variables 
Next we examine the effects of micro-economic variables considered on their own on 
the pricing of syndicated credits. In particular, we include dummies for the borrower's 
business sector and the loan purpose. We leave out the sectoral dummy for utilities and 
the multiple-purpose loan purpose dummies as base cases, because including them 
would result in overspecifying the model. The results are shown in Table 10. 
The coefficient on loan SIze IS negative as III Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), 
suggesting either that banks extending syndicated credits to developing country 
borrowers are enjoying economies of scale, or that safer borrowers are able to arrange 
larger loans, or both. Longer loan tenors result in lower pricing; this is unusual, but in 
accordance with Fons (1994). In reference to the junk bond market, Fons argues that for 
good quality borrowers, the passage of time only offers an opportunity for a 
deterioration of creditworthiness, while very poor credit risks that survive during the 
tenor of the bond are likely to experience an improvement in their creditworthiness41 • 
In the same way as Eichengreen and Mody (2000), we find that banks enjoy cheaper 
pricing on their loans. 
41 This interpretation is also known as survival bias. 
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Corporate control loans are pncier than other loans, meanmg that the borrower is 
prepared to pay a premium if a facility is urgently needed for an acquisition - this is in 
accordance with the rest of the academic literature. Further, we find that loans arranged 
for transport finance, general corporate, project finance and capital structure purposes 
are cheaper than others (cf. definition of these purposes in Appendix 5), with transport 
finance loans carrying the steepest discount. In accordance with Kleimeier and 
Megginson, our results also indicate that loans sponsored or explicitly guaranteed by a 
third party cost less, although the ones that are secured actually carry a premium, 
potentially because they are very riskl2. This latter finding is in accordance with Smith 
and Warner (1979) and Berger and Udell (1990) on collateral. The presence of implicit 
guarantees attached to syndicated credits does not seem to lower spreads, possibly 
because lenders regard them as insufficient (non-binding). 
Bilateral loans and club deals are relatively cheaper than others, possibly reflecting 
more favourable conditions stemming from borrowers' relationship with their core 
banks. Large syndicate sizes do not appear to reduce loan pricing (the NBPROV3 
variable does not show up as being significant), indicating that competition among 
banks bidding for the loans does not lower the pricing of loans43 • Loans whose amount 
has been increased from the original amount are relatively more expensive, possibly 
because banks have found their pricing attractive. The causality may also play in the 
opposite direction, with the interpretation then being that if the borrower needs to 
increase the original amount of the loan because of increased financing needs, the 
lenders may raise the price. 
42 Collateral has a cost (Bester, 1985) so it may also be the case that the cost of arranging or warehousing 
the collateral is charged for in the loan price (Freixas and Rochet, 1997). Otherwise, financing constraints 
facing the borrower may be such that he accept.s bot~ collateral and ~ high~r spread: Inspection .of ~ur 
data sample indicates that borrowers from countrIes wIth poorer sovereIgn ratmgs reqUIre collaterahsatlOn 
more often. 
43 Furthermore, the dummy for large syndicate sizes is significant and positive when macro-economic 
conditions are also controlled for - see Table 11. 
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Table 10: The effect of micro-economic variables 
We estimated the following equation using the forward stepwise technique, with an entry criterion of 10% 
and a removal criterion of 11 %: 
In drawn = fJo Intercept + fJi Insize_1 + fJ2 maturity + fJ3 nbrov3 + fJ4 clubilat + fJs secured + 
fJ6 transferable + fJ7 spgtr + fJB g_implicit + fJ9 increased + fJlO constrpty + fJll finservbk + 
fJn finservnb + fJl3 high-tech + fJJ4 infrastruct + fJlS popserv + fJl6 state + fJl7 tradind + fJIB transport 
+ fJl9 cc + fJ20 CS + fJ2J gen + fJ22 oth +fJ23 prj + fJu pty + fJ2S tr + £ 
where: 
• In drawn = natural logarithm of drawn return, in bp 
• lnsize_l = natural logarithm of loan size, in millions of US dollars 
• maturity = maturity of loans, in years 
• nbprov3; clubilat = dummies for deals with more than two provider banks; for club or bilateral 
deals 
• secured, transferable = dummies for secured and transferable deals 
• spgtr, g_implicit = dummy for deals explicitly guaranteed or sponsored by a third party; dummy 
for implicitly guaranteed deal (e.g. borrower is a developing country subsidiary of a major US 
concern) 
• increased = dummy to indicate that the original amount of the deal has been increased 
• constrpty, finservbk, finservnb, high-tech, infrastruct, popserv, state, tradind, transport = sectoral 
dummies for construction and property, financial services (banks), financial services (non-banks), 
high-tech industry, infrastructure, population-related services, state, traditional industry, transport. 
Note that the dummy for the utilities sector was excluded from the equation as the case by default as 
its inclusion would have overspecified the model. 
• cc, cs, gen, oth, prj, pty, tr = purpose dummies for corporate control, capital structure, general 
corporate purpose, other, project finance, property, transport finance. Note that the multi-purpose 
dummy has been excluded from the equation as the case by default as its inclusion would have 
overspecified the model. 
,Yruiw Coefficient "":sr~li£ f>-vaLtL 
tr -0.7420 -13.50 0.000 
oth -0.4643 -10.82 0.000 
secured 0.2764 10.00 0.000 
popserv 0.5277 8.65 0.000 
maturity -0.0127 -3.70 0.000 
cs -0.3153 -6.65 0.000 
tradind 0.1223 4.34 0.000 
clubilat -0.1722 -6.25 0.000 
lnsize_l -0.0649 -6.54 0.000 
increased 0.2129 5.78 0.000 
cc 0.1423 2.00 0.046 
finservbk -0.1272 -4.25 0.000 
spgtr -0.0759 -3.00 0.003 
gen -0.1663 -3.71 0.000 
prj -0.1384 -2.94 0.003 
infrastruct 0.4304 2.42 0.016 
intercept 5.2748 87.58 0.000 
N = 4,921; Adj R2 =0.1463 ; F(16; 4,904) = 53.69 
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In keeping with Eichengreen and Mody, we find that loans granted to borrowers 
involved in infrastructure projects carry a premium44 , although this is also case for the 
traditional industry and population-related services sectors. The sectoral dummy for the 
high-tech industry did not turn up as a significant variable. This seems to indicate that 
the presence of high-tech industries in developing countries' economies is not sufficient 
enough to make a difference on the pricing of their loans. The insignificance of the 
sectoral dummies for state45 and transport may be related to the insufficiency of state, 
public and transport services provided in these countries and the unwillingness of 
international lenders to grant relatively better conditions on loans geared to fund such 
servIces. 
4.4 The effect of micro-economic variables combined with indicators of 
countries' macro-economic performance46 
As can be seen from Table 11, when we combine micro-economic variables with 
indicators of countries' macro-economic performance, the signs of the coefficients are 
the same as when these two sets of independent variables are not combined (cf. Tables 9 
and 10). As already noted, the dummy for large syndicate sizes of three banks or more 
now shows up as being significant and positive, indicating that large syndicate sizes do 
not lower loan pricing. We must note that a number of purpose and sectoral dummies 
(construction and property, high-tech industry, state, traditional industry, project 
finance, property development finance) are insignificant in this model, possibly because 
indicators of macro-economic performance for the borrowers' countries take away some 
of their information content, at least in the eyes of the lenders. 
44 In the past, some developing countries have increased their external debt to finance infrastructure 
projects: some of the dams, roads, towns, just to name a few examples, eventually turned out to be "white 
elephants" which did not directly or indirectly result in additional economic growth. Barro (1997) also 
argues that non-productive government expenditure is bad for growth. 
45 See Appendix 4 for full list of sectors included. 
46 We did not include indicators of countries' macro-economic performance together with the sovereign 
ratings as independent variables into our regressions because they were highly correlated with one 
another. 
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Table 11: The effect of micro-economic variables combined with indicators of 
countries' macro-economic performance 
We estimated the following equation using the forward stepwise technique, with an entry criterion of 10% 
and a removal criterion of 11 %. Variable names as in Tables 9 and 10. 
In drawn = fJo Intercept + fJI lnsize_l + fJ2 maturity + fJ3 nbrov3 + fJ4 clubilat + fJs secured + 
fJ6 transferable +fJ7 spgtr + fJ8 g_implicit + fJ9 increased + fJIO constrpty + fJll finservbk + 
fJ12 finservnb + fJJ3 high-tech + fJ14 infrastruct + fJIS popserv + fJI6 state + fJ17 tradind + fJI8 transport 
+ fJI9 cc + fJ20 CS + fJ2J gen + fJ22 oth + fJ23 prj + fJu pty + P2S tr + fJ26 debtgdp + fJ27 growth + 
fJ28 st_tdebt + fJ29 cpi + fJ30 pppsh + fJJI restogdp + fJJ2 tdstoxgs + fJJJ c_share_ w + fJJ4 gra + 
fJ3S impexp + fJ36 invgdp + fJ37 credgdp + fJJ8 trade + fJJ9 trsyld+ £ 
~le Coefficient -yalu~ 
tdstoxgs 0.0064 0.000 
growth -0.0344 -9.97 0.000 
secured 0.1978 7.16 0.000 
tr -0.3997 -9.57 0.000 
pppsh 0.0463 9.12 0.000 
gra 0.2210 7.38 0.000 
popserv 0.3746 6.37 0.000 
oth -0.2866 -9.39 0.000 
c_share_w 0.2577 5.53 0.000 
cs -0.2659 -7 .29 0.000 
lnsize_l -0.0887 -8.63 0.000 
c1ubilat -0.1844 -6.97 0.000 
cc 0.2184 3.43 0.001 
increased 0.1662 4.46 0.000 
gen -0.1463 -4 .21 0.000 
trade -0.0140 -2.89 0.004 
credgdp -0.0047 -7 .01 0.000 
restogdp 0.0094 4.35 0.000 
finservnb 0.0929 2.70 0.007 
finservbk -0.1106 -3.78 0.000 
transferable 0.1201 3.36 0.001 
spgtr -0.0810 -3.29 0.001 
nprov3 0.0772 2.80 0.005 
debtgdp 0.0023 2.94 0.003 
trsyld -0.0294 -1.70 0.089 
intercept 5.2356 46.49 0.000 
N= 4,195; Adj R2 = 0.2807; F(25; 4,169) = 66.48 
The dummy for non-bank financial sector borrowers as well as the dummy for loan 
transferability appear significant and positive in this model. We surmise that loan 
transferability seems unattractive in lenders ' eyes once macro-economic conditions 
prevailing in the borrower's country are taken into consideration. Moreover, macro-
economic indicators may deteriorate lenders' perception of the riskiness of non-bank 
financial institutions. Monetary authorities of developing countries experiencing 
economic difficulties may be expected only to a limited extent to perform their lender of 
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last resort functions and bailout insolvent financial institutions that are critical to the 
country's financial system. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we estimated hedonic models to analyse the macro- and micro-economic 
determinants of the pricing of syndicated credits granted to a sample of developing 
country borrowers. The following conclusions can be drawn from our findings. 
We report that indicators of countries' economic weakness (high ratios of debt to GDP, 
of debt service to exports, assistance from the IMF) raise the cost of borrowing, while 
indicators of economic strength (high real GDP growth, high ratio of domestic credit to 
GDP) lower financing costs. This is in accordance with the existing academic literature. 
We further find that higher reserves to GDP ratios raise the pricing of loans granted to 
developing country borrowers, in keeping with the willingness-to-pay approach 
developed by Gersovitz (1985). 
Corporate control loans granted to developing country borrowers are found to be more 
expensive than other loans. In accordance with Kleimeier and Megginson, our results 
also indicate that loans sponsored or explicitly guaranteed by a third party cost less, 
although those that are secured actually carry a premium, potentially because they are 
very risky. This latter finding is in accordance with Smith and Warner (1979) and 
Berger and Udell (1990) on collateral. The presence of an implicit guarantee attached to 
syndicated credits does not lower spreads, possibly because lenders regard these as 
insufficient (non-binding). 
We come to the conclusion that certain micro-economic characteristics of developing 
country syndicated loans generally affect their pricing in the expected way (i.e. more 
risk raises pricing), albeit more weakly when macro-economic conditions are also 
controlled for. In particular: 
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• Firstly, like Eichengreen and Mody (2000), we find that banks enjoy cheaper 
pricing on their loans than borrowers from other sectors. However when we 
explicitly control for macro-economic conditions prevailing in the borrowers' 
countries, we find that loans to non-bank financial institutions cost more than 
other loans. Macro-economic indicators may deteriorate lenders' perception of 
the riskiness of non-bank financial institutions. Furthermore, monetary 
authorities of developing countries experiencing economic difficulties may be 
limited from performing their lender of last resort functions. This result can be 
related to the findings of Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) who note that 
market discipline is present among insured depositors in selected Latin 
American countries, demonstrating that deposit insurance schemes are not 
always fully credible. 
• Secondly, the absolute values of the coefficients on the micro-economic 
variables are often lower when macro-economic variables are present in the 
model. This suggests that loan purpose and the borrower's business sector seem 
to have a weaker effect on the pricing of syndicated credits granted to 
developing country borrowers once indicators of macro-economic performance 
are controlled for. 
• Thirdly, loan transferability appears to raise loan pricing once macro-economic 
conditions prevailing in the borrower's country are taken into consideration. 
Regarding the structure of the market for developing country loans, we can make the 
following conclusions based on the research described in this paper: 
• Borrowers from 'wealthier' developing countries (countries with relatively 
higher purchasing power parity shares of world GDP), or countries that use the 
world market for syndicated loans more intensely, are having to pay more for 
their credits. This could be a result of lender market power being exploited, 
lender brand name recognition, or (in the case of the share of the borrower in 
world syndicated lending) penalties being charged for higher perceived 
• 
concentration of risk. 
Discounts are granted to developing country borrowers on bilateral or club deals 
rather than on deals where a large number of lending institutions bid (compete) 
for the loan. 
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• Syndicated credits whose initial amount has been increased may not be priced 
competi ti vel y. 
Lastly, our results reflect the relatively low participation of developing countries in 
world trade, or at least the low contribution of syndicated credits to support such 
participation. The weak or nonexistent discounts on the pricing of loans intended to 
fund state-provided or transport services may not help improve the quality of such 
services, let alone enhance the relatively limited role of the state in some developing 
countries. Some of the most poorly rated developing countries further face a maturity 
trap because they are only able to obtain short-term loans which they can then only use 
to refinance existing lines of credits instead of genuinely improving state services. 
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Appendix 1: The literature 
availability of bank credits 
about the • • prIcIng and 
by variable 
Variable Effect on I Literature references 
spread 
macro-economic characteristics 
Debt to output ratio + Hanson (1974), Harberger (1980), Sachs (1984), Eaton and 
Debt to export ratio Gersovitz (1981a) and Edwards (1983) 
(solvency) 
Current account to GNP ratio - Sachs (1981) 
(solvency) 
Debt service to exports + Feder and Just, (1977), Eichengreen and Mody (2000) 
(liquidity) 
Ratio of international reserves to - Edwards (1983) 
GNP (liquidity) 
Ratio of international reserves to + Gersovitz (1985) [willingness-to-pay] 
GNP (liquidity) 
History of rescheduling + Eichengreen and Mody (2000) 
Investment to GNP ratio - Sachs (1984), Edwards (1983) 
Investment to GNP ratio + Gersovitz (1985) [willingness-to-pay] 
Imports to GNP ratio + Frenkel (1983) 
Rate of growth per capita - Feder and Just (1977) 
Economic growth - Eichengreen and Mody (2000) 
Variance of export growth + Eichengreen and Mody (2000) 
Bank creditiGNP - Eichengreen and Mody (2000) 
(Bank creditlGDP)*(Economic + Eichengreen and Mody (2000) 
growth rate), 
[(Bank creditlGDP)*(Economic 
growth rate)]2 
micro-economic characteristics 
Financial institutions - Financial institutions seem able to obtain syndicated credit 
facilities at lower spreads than borrower from other sectors, 
Eichengreen and Mody (2000) 
Firm riskiness + Measured by variance of firm assets, Smith (1980) 
Firm value - Smith (1980) 
Infrastructure projects + Loans to fund infrastructure projects tend to have higher 
spreads than loans with other purposes, Eichengreen and 
Mody (2000) 
Acquisition facility + Borrower is prepared to pay a premium if facility is 
urgently needed for an acquisition. 
Facility's maturity +/- Negative effect for project finance loans, positive for other 
loans, Kleimeier and Megginson (2000). Ambiguous effect 
on spread, Smith (1980). 
Revolving facility + Because of higher take-down risk, Angbazo, Mei and 
Saunders (1998). 
Loan size +/- Negative effect on spreads according to Kleimeier and 
Megginson (2000) - except for project finance loans -
positive effect according to Smith (1980), because of higher 
resulting bank exposure. 
Third party guarantee - Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) 
Collateralisable assets +/- Depending on type of loan, Kleimeier and Megginson 
(2000) 
Collateral - Smith (1980), Bester (1985), Besanko and Thakor (1987) 
Collateral + Smith and Warner (1979), Berger and Udell (1990) 
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Appendix 1 (continued): The literature about the 
pricing and availability of bank credits 
by main empirical studies 
Authors 
Edwards (1986) 
Boehmer and Megginson 
(1990) 
Gooptu and Brun (1992) 
Berger and Udell (1995) 
Kamin and von Kleist 
(1999) 
MethodoloJ!Y and data 
OLS pricing regression on 113 
developing country bank loans 
and 167 bonds (1976-80) 
Fuller-Battese generalised least 
squares method for testing the 
determinants of the secondary 
market values of 10 developing 
countries over 32 months 
Cross-section study of thirty-
two highly indebted and low 
Income countries, for which 
trade finance and macro-
economic data is available as of 
December 1987. 
OLS pricing regression on 863 
credits issued to small 
businesses In the US, Logit 
regression for the probability of 
collateral being required on the 
loans 
OLS pricing regression on 662 
developing country bank loans 
and bonds issues (1991-97) 
Kleimeier 
Megginson (2000) 
and OLS pricing regresslOn on a 
Loanware sample comprising 
slightly over 5% of project 
finance loans 
Eichengreen and Mody OLS pricing regression on a 
(2000) Loanware sample comprIsIng 
of 4,000-plus loans granted to 
developing country borrowers 
(with sample correction) 
Main results 
Both on loan and bond markets, the country risk 
premium is a positive function of the debt to output 
ratio and a negative function of the investment to 
GNP ratio. Some of the coefficients are significantly 
different across bond and loan markets. 
Secondary market values of developing countries' 
debt are significantly related to variables which are 
proxies for nations' economic solvency but not to 
the variables that are proxies for their liquidity. 
The declaration of a moratorium on commercial 
bank debt service payments has a negative impact on 
the availability of short-term credit lines. 
Small firms with longer banking relationships 
borrow at lower rates and are less likely to pledge 
collateral than are other small firms. 
While the responses of bond and loan prices to price 
determinants are different, the list of determinants 
themselves is quite similar for these two types of 
financing. Investors have charged Latin American 
and Eastern European borrowers more over time 
than borrowers from Asia and the Middle East, all 
other factors constant. There IS no statistically 
significant relationship between various measures of 
industrial country interest rates and emerging market 
new-issue bond spreads. 
Project finance loans are fundamentally different by 
their characteristics from other loans 
At low levels of financial development and low 
growth rates, policy measures to improve financial 
intermediation bring value and reduce the costs of 
borrowing, but when they spill over into 
unsustainable credit booms, thy are regarded by the 
markets with alarm and worsen the terms of access 
to external funds. 
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Appendix 2: Pricing structure of syndicated credits: 
spreads and fees 
As well as earning a margin over Libor (or any other benchmark) when the loan is 
drawn, banks in the syndicate receive various fees (described in Allen, 1990; Rhodes, 
1996). The arranger and other members of the lead management team, who may be 
responsible for various aspects of the preparation of the deal and its documentation, 
generally earn some form of upfront fee. This is often called praecipium or 
arrangement fee. The underwriters similarly earn an underwriting fee for guaranteeing 
the availability of funds. Other participants (those at least on the 'manager' and 'co-
manager,47 level) may expect to receive a participation fee for agreeing to join the 
facility - the actual size of the fee generally varies with the size of the commitment. 
Once the credit is established and as long as it is not drawn, the syndicate members 
often receive an annual commitment or facility fee (to compensate for the cost of tying 
up regulatory capital that needs to be set aside against the commitment) again 
proportional to their commitments. As soon as the facility is drawn, the borrower may 
have to pay a utilisation fee, as often as not a means of concealing from the market part 
of the spread that he is paying. There is also an agency fee, usually payable annually, to 
cover the costs incurred by the agent to run the loan and the responsibility for 
supervising the conditions. Loan documents sometimes incorporate a penalty clause, 
whereby the borrower agrees to pay a prepayment fee or otherwise compensate the 
lenders in the event that it pre-pays its debt prior to the specified term. Finally, the 
conduit fee is the remuneration of the so-called conduit bank48 and the legal fee, that of 
the legal adviser to the deal. The commitment, utilisation and agency fees are payable 
per annum; all other fees are one-off fees. 
47 These two titles correspond to senior participants, to establish the fact that they commit to larger 
amounts and hence receive bigger fees, but they do not actually manage anything. 
48 Institution through which payments are channelled with a view to avoiding payment of withholding tax. 
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Appendix 3: Conversion of the Standard and Poor's 
sovereign ratings into rating classes 
NB we gave preference to the Standard and Poor's sovereign ratings over Moody's 
because Dealogic Loanware has a live feed from S&P that is better linked to its 
borrower database than Moody's. 
SD 
NR 
R 
CC 
CCC-
CCC 
CCC+ 
B-
B 
B+ 
BB-
BB 
BB+ 
BBB-
BBB 
or not rated BBB+ 
or not disclosed A-
poor 
speculative 
A 
A+ 
AA-
AA 
AA+ 
AAA 
Note: SD = selective default, NR = not rated, R = rated. 
investment 
grade 
best 
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Appendix 4: Full list of borrower business sectors 
contained in each broad grouping 
Our groupings are based on the 188 business sectors provided by Loanware. 
Construction and property: ConstructionlBuilding, Products-Commercial Building, 
ConstructionlBuilding Products-Maintenance, ConstructionlBuilding Products-
Miscellaneous, ConstructionlBuilding Products-Residential Building, 
ConstructionlBuilding Products-RetaillWholesale, PropertylReal Estate, Property/Real 
Estate-Development, Property/Real Estate-Diversified, Property/Real Estate-
Operations, Property/Real Estate-REIT, ConstructionlBuilding. 
Financial services (bank): Finance-Commercial & Savings Banks, Finance-Student 
Loan, Finance-MortgageslBuilding Societies, Finance-Investment Bank, Finance-Credit 
Cards, Finance-Development Bank. 
Financial services (non-bank): Insurance, Finance-Investment Management, 
Insurance-Property & Casualty, Insurance-Multi-Line, Insurance-Life, Insurance-
Brokers, Insurance-Accident & Health, Holding Companies-Conglomerates, Finance-
Leasing Companies, Finance-Brokers & Underwriters, Finance, Holding Companies-
Special Purpose Financial Vehicles, Holding Companies. 
High-tech: Aerospace & Defence-Aircraft, Chemicals-Fibers, Chemicals-Diversified, 
Chemicals, Agribusiness-Agriculture, Aerospace & Defence-Products & Services, 
Aerospace & Defence, Healthcare-Genetics/Research, Chemicals-Plastic, Agribusiness, 
Services-Management Consulting, Telecommunications-Wireless/ Mobile, 
Telecommunications-Telephone, Telecommunications-Services, Telecommunications-
Satellite, Electronics, Telecommunications, Computers, Services-IT, Healthcare-
Products, Computers-Internet, Telecommunications-Equipment, Computers-Hardware, 
Healthcare-Medical/ Analytical Systems, Computers-Software, Electronics-Electrical 
equipment, Healthcare-Drugs/Pharmaceuticals, Healthcare-Instruments/Surgical 
supplies. 
Infrastructure: Transportation-Airport, Transportation-Logistics/Distribution, 
ConstructionIB uilding Products-Infrastructure 
Population services: Dining & Lodging-Hotels & Motels, Healthcare-Nursing Homes, 
Automobile-Repair, Automobile-Sales, Dining & Lodging, Services-Funeral & Related, 
Retail-Home Furnishings, Retail-Jewellery Stores, Retail-Mail Order & Direct, Dining 
& Lodging-Restaurants, Retail-Pharmacy, Healthcare-Professional Services/Practices, 
Retail-Supermarkets, Services, Retail-Department Stores, Services-
Advertising/Marketing, Retail-MiscellaneouslDiversified, Services-Legal, Services-
Personnel, Services-Printing, Services-SchoolslUniversities, Services-
Security/Protection, Services-Travel, Telecommunications-Cable Television, 
Telecommunications-RadiolTV Broadcasting, Services-Accounting, Heal thcare-
Miscellaneous Services, Healthcare, Healthcare-Hospitals/Clinics, Retail-Specialty, 
Healthcare-Management Systems, Retail-Convenience Stores, Healthcare-Outpatient 
care/Home care, Leisure & Recreation, Leisure & Recreation-Film, Leisure & 
Recreation-Gaming, Leisure & Recreation-Services, Publishing, Publishing-Books, 
89 
Publishing-Diversified, Publishing-Newspapers, Publishing-Periodicals, Retail, Retai 1-
Apparel/Shoe, Retail-Computers & Related, Leisure & Recreation-Products 
State: Finance-Export Credit Agencies, Government-Provincial Authority, 
Government-Local Authority, Government-Central Bank, Government-Central 
Authority , Finance-Multilateral Agencies, Government. 
Traditional Industry: Air Conditioning and Heating, Forestry & Paper, Automobile, 
Automobile-Manufacturers, Automobile-Mobile Homes, Automobile-Parts, Chemicals-
Fertilizers, Metal & Steel-Products, Forestry & Paper-Packaging, Forestry & Paper-
Pulp & Paper, Forestry & Paper-Raw materials, Machinery, Machinery-Electrical, 
ConstructionlBldg Prods-Cement/Concrete, Machinery-General Industrial, Food & 
Beverage-Wholesale Items, Machinery-Material Handling, Machinery-Printing Trade, 
Food & Beverage-Miscellaneous, Metal & Steel-Distributors, Machinery-Farm 
Equipment, Mining, Mining-Excavation, Oil & Gas-Equipment & Services, Oil & Gas-
Exploration & Development Onshore, Oil & Gas-Exploration & Development Offshore, 
Textile, Textile-Apparel Manufacturing, Textile-Home Furnishings, Textile-Mill 
Products, Textile-Miscellaneous, Metal & Steel, Consumer Products-Footwear, 
ConstructionlBldg Prods-Engineering, ConstructionlBuilding Prods-Wood Products, 
Machinery-Machine Tools, Consumer Products-Cosmetics & Toiletries, Food & 
Beverage-Sugar & Refining, Consumer Products-Furniture, Consumer Products-Glass, 
Consumer Products-Home Improvement, Consumer Products-Miscellaneous, Consumer 
Products-Office Supplies, Consumer Products-Precious Metals/} ewellery, Consumer 
Products-Rubber, Consumer Products-Tobacco, Consumer Products-Tools, Food & 
Beverage, Food & Beverage-Alcoholic Beverages, Food & Beverage-Canned Foods, 
Food & Beverage-Confectionery, Food & Beverage-Dairy Products, Food & Beverage-
Flour & Grain, Food & Beverage-Meat Products, Food & Beverage-Non-Alcoholic 
Beverages, Consumer Products-Soap & Cleaning Preps, Consumer Products. 
Transport: Transportation, Transportation-Ship, Transportation-Road, Transportation-
Airline/Aircraft, Transportation-Equipment & Leasing, Transportation-Rail. 
Utilities: Utility-Water Supply, Oil & Gas, Oil & Gas-Diversified, Oil & Gas-
PipelinelDistribution, Oil & Gas-Refinery/Marketing, Utility & Power, Utility-
Diversified, Utility-Electric Power, Utility-Hydroelectric Power, Utility-Nuclear Power, 
Utility-Waste Management. 
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Appendix 5: Full list of loan purposes contained in 
each broad grouping 
Corporate control: LBO I MBa, employee stock option plan, Acquisition, Acquisition 
line 
Capital structure: Refinancing, Debtor in Possession Financing, Recapitalisation, 
Receivable backed financing, Debt repayment, Securitisation, Standby/CP support 
General: General corporate, Private placement, Public finance, Trade financing, 
Working capital 
Project: Project financing 
Property: Mortgage lending, Property 
Transport: Shipping, Aircraft 
Other: Spin-off, Empty purpose code 
Multiple purpose code: more than one purpose for the same loan. 
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Appendix 6: Additional summary statistics 
1993 2001* 
Corporate control 120.0 100.0 102.5 67.0 90.0 125.6 387.5 212.7 70.5 
Capital structure 91.3 133.1 85.0 80.0 102.5 125.0 228.8 150.0 175.0 
General 100.0 115.0 100.0 85.8 125.0 133.9 183.5 135.0 213.3 
Other (spin-off, empty code) 100.0 94.8 80.0 77.5 86.2 145.0 225.0 181.3 250.0 
Project finance 102.2 128.5 120.1 92.5 91.6 145.0 225.0 182.5 206.3 
Property 50.0 350.0 87.9 80.1 95.0 200.0 78.3 315.0 
Transport 104.2 86.0 79.3 73 .7 79.9 180.9 132.5 125.0 200.0 
Multiple purpose 95.0 150.8 200.0 80.1 96.5 150.8 247.5 170.3 200.0 
PUfQ,ose 
Corporate control 45.0 60.0 25.0 46.0 58.8 100.0 65.0 75.0 
Capital structure 31.3 48.0 50.0 50.0 60.0 72.0 85.0 111.0 100.0 
General 35.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 50.0 60.8 70.0 100.0 81.5 
Other (spin-off, empty code) 30.0 40.0 48.3 41.1 50.0 67.5 84.3 87 .5 48.0 
Project finance 40.0 45.0 50.0 50.0 48.4 55.0 60.0 77.6 40.0 
Property 10.0 25.0 28.1 24.5 26.5 45.0 250.0 32.2 
Transport 40.0 41.5 42.0 30.0 50.0 50.0 73 .1 106.1 15.0 
Multiple purpose 31.2 50.0 30.0 33.5 70.5 75 .0 100.0 96.3 50.0 
2001* 
Corporate control 3.0 7.0 3.0 5.0 3.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Capital structure 3.2 3.5 4.8 4.5 5.0 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.0 
General 3.0 2.1 3.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Other (spin-off, empty code) 4.5 3.0 4.0 3.5 4.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.8 
Project finance 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.4 3.0 
Property 5.0 10.0 5.0 4.4 3.0 5.0 3.0 15.0 
Transport 4.0 5.0 3.0 5.0 5.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 4.0 
Multiple purpose 3.0 5.0 3.0 3.5 4.0 3.0 3.9 3.0 4.0 
Source: Dealogic Loanware, author's calculations. * first quarter data only 
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Table 13: Drawn return, loan size and maturity by borrower country sovereign rating and 
loan e 
U3t:'9<;\d tating category 
o (borrower default or 
rated or not disclosed) 
1 (poor) 
2 (speculative) 
3 (investment grade) 
4 (best) 
rated or not disclosed) 
1 (poor) 
2 (speculative) 
3 (investment grade) 
4 (best) 
o (borrower default or 
not rated or not disclosed) 
1 (poor) 
2 (speculative) 
3 (investment grade) 
4 (best) 
control structure 
88.2 158.4 
305.0 200.0 
145.0 108.3 
70.0 91.4 
63.0 57.5 
20.0 75.0 
70.0 75.0 
80.0 86.8 
70.0 50.0 
40.0 38.0 
5.0 5.0 
2.5 2.0 
3.8 4.0 
5.0 4.8 
5.0 4.5 
Source: Dealogic Loanware, author's calculations. 
135.0 
177.5 
150.0 
90.0 
70.0 
80.0 
55.0 
80.0 
60.0 
41.0 
5.0 
1.0 
3.0 
4.0 
3.0 
finance 
139.2 175.0 
173.3 175.0 
90.0 141.6 
86.2 109.2 
57.0 56.7 
finance 
37.3 75 .0 
65.0 52.0 
50.0 58 .0 
39.9 44.7 
34.4 40.0 
5.0 7.5 
1.0 4.5 
4.5 5.0 
5.0 5.0 
3.3 5.0 
and Joan purpose 
Property Transport Multiple 
purpose 
150.0 145.0 150.6 
172.5 225.0 
124.7 100.0 173.5 
125.0 93.0 104.1 
54.6 68.5 60.0 
purpose 
23 .0 35.5 112.5 
50.0 70.0 
32.5 55.0 80.0 
26.0 33.0 50.0 
21.8 38.9 32.0 
purpose 
2.0 5.0 5.0 
1.0 1.0 
4.4 4.0 4.0 
5.0 5.0 5.0 
5.0 7.0 3.0 
Table 14: Evolution of mean maturity (years) and drawn return (bp) 
loan size and 
4.2 3.3 
5.1 4.4 
4.5 
[0; 25[ 121.2 122.1 
[25; 50[ 119.9 126.7 
[50; 1O0[ 123.8 118.0 
[100; oc[ 116.0 134.8 
4.3 4.2 4.1 
5.6 4.3 4.4 
4.6 
128.0 107.7 115.7 
113.3 110.2 149.2 
117.5 118.9 143.7 
135.6 111.6 126.1 
Source: Dealogic Loanware, author's calculations. * first quarter data only. 
4.4 5.0 5.0 
4.0 4.9 4.8 
4.8 
201.1 259.7 264.6 
200.8 273.3 203.5 
177.3 263.7 188.0 
162.3 236.0 168.6 
2.5 
4.4 
216.2 
217.0 
209.8 
191.0 
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Table 15: Mean drawn return by loan size and purpose 
I M.ean draw!} retl![n (QR) loan~ size and"purpo~~ _ ,~ -
Loan purpose Corporate Capital General Other Project Property Transport Multiple 
control structure finance purpose 
Loan size ($m) 
[0; 25[ 187.3 138.7 187.6 111.3 158.9 119.1 114.3 197.6 
[25; 50[ 155.6 149.7 183.8 120.0 161.3 194.7 109.4 209.6 
[50; 100[ 159.8 154.7 182.9 123.9 165.0 115.0 122.2 180.1 
[100; oo[ 185.4 158.9 156.7 130.0 161.4 117.0 121.3 176.7 
Source: Dealogic Loanware, author's calculations. 
Table 16: Distribution of mean drawn return (bp) by loan size and industry 
it Loa~ size (Sm) 
..... ;I_nd_u_str_'P __ • _______ --::..rO""';,_25 25; 50[ [50; 100 
Construction and property 
Financial services - banks 
Financial services - nonbanks 
High-tech industries 
Infras tructure 
Population related services 
State-provided services 
Traditional industry 
Transport 
Utilities 
Source: Dealogic Loanware, author's calculations. 
107.9 126.2 165.5 
187.1 170.9 
116.5 
130.9 
181.3 
242.3 
173.2 
143.5 
101.6 
178.7 
111.8 
139.1 
177.5 
231.2 
136.5 
179.8 
92.4 
177.4 
124.4 
118.6 
177.5 
217.7 
254.8 
150.0 
183.7 
95.4 
159.9 
[100; 001 
152.0 
104.1 
170.8 
152.6 
293.9 
292.8 
127.7 
185.5 
103.0 
157.8 
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Table 17: Correlation matrix between variables 
*: significant at the 10% level 
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Comparison of developing and industrialised 
countries' access to bond and loan markets in the 
1990s 
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Comparison of developing and industrialised countries' access to bond 
and loan markets in the 1990s 
ABSTRACT 
THIS PAPER ANALYSES the determinants of the pricing of loans and bonds during the 
1990s, extending previous work in this area by focusing simultaneously on two 
types of borrowers (from industrialised and developing countries) and two types of 
instruments (bonds and loans). On average, we find that developing country bonds 
have been riskier than developing country loans and industrialised country loans 
riskier than industrialised country bonds. We analyse how contagion may have taken 
place from one market segment to the other in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. 
We also compare the influence of market structure on the respective market 
segments and find that market access appears to have been more difficult for 
developing country borrowers in loan markets. This is the market segment where 
banks and investors may have exercised their market power to the greatest extent 
and where the penalising effect of higher perceived risk concentration may have 
been most pronounced. 
JEL classification: D40, F34, G20 
Keywords: Loan and bond pricing, debt 
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1. Introduction 
"EXCESSIVE BORROWING BY COMPANIES, households or governments lies at the root of 
almost every economic crisis of the past two decades, from Mexico to Japan and from 
East Asia to Russia. The past two months [leading up to January 2002] alone have 
witnessed the largest-ever foreign debt default, in Argentina, and the biggest-ever 
corporate bankruptcy, of Enron." (The Economist, 26 January 2002, page 23). 
Following the financial crises in Mexico (1995) and South-East Asia (1997 and 1998) 
the determinants of bond and loan financing to developing countries and the pricing of 
these instruments have been analysed widely in the academic literature (see, for 
instance, Hernandez and Rudolph; 1995, Eichengreen and Mody, 1997 and 1998; 
Kamin and von Kleist; 1999, Chowdhry and Goyal, 2000). As stressed by Hale (2001), 
bonds and loans compete in the market for emerging market finance and it is important 
to gauge the relative importance of each instrument for planning purposes by lenders 
and borrowers alike. Indeed, while banks can cancel loans relatively easily - posing 
more potential liquidity threats to emerging market borrowers - bonds are harder to 
restructure, not least because of the dispersion of the bondholders. The comparison of 
the prices of the two instruments can also provide an indication of the degree to which 
the relevant markets have matured and become liquid. However, in today's globalised 
financial environment, emerging and industrialised country borrowers compete for 
funds. Cline and Barnes (1997) make the argument in the context of developing country 
loans and bonds competing with US junk bonds to attract investors' funds. Vine (2001) 
stresses that emerging market bonds lend themselves particularly well to the analysis 
applied to US domestic high-yield investors to domestic high-yield borrowers. Finally, 
the comparison of the determinants of developing and industrialised country loan and 
bond characteristics is important in order to gauge the phenomena of flight to quality or 
contagion from one market to another during times of crises or financial stress: financial 
crises in emerging markets may have made investors more wary or selective about 
lending to industrialised country borrowers as well. As summarised in the Economist (6 
July 2002, page 69), "After Thailand devalued the bath on July 2nd 1997, capital rushed 
out of the region's economies, and in rapid succession most of them collapsed. The 
resulting panic soon spread beyond East Asia to other emerging markets and for a while 
it posed a serious threat to the world economy". While most of the earlier loan and bond 
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pricing literature has focused on developing countries or on industrialised countries 
separately, this paper makes a first attempt (as far as we know) to combine the two. 
On average, we find that developing country bonds have been riskier than developing 
country loans and industrialised country loans riskier than industrialised country bonds. 
We analyse how contagion may have taken place from one market segment to the other 
in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. We also compare the influence of market 
structure in the respective market segments (i.e. bonds, loans, industrialised and 
developed countries) and find that market access appears to have been more difficult for 
developing country borrowers in loan markets. This is the market segment where banks 
and investors may have exercised their market power to the greatest extent and where 
the penalising effect of higher perceived risk concentration may have been most 
pronounced. 
2. Some historical and theoretical background 
In the case of emerging market borrowers, syndicated lending has been as significant as 
bond financing since the first half of the 1990s (see Table 1 on page 55). While 
international developing country bond issues rose from negligible levels at the 
beginning of the 1990s to more than $120 bn in 1997 (before falling back to $82 bn in 
2000 after the Asian crisis) loan commitments have grown at a similar pace, reaching 
levels comparable to bond issuance. In fact developing country loan facilities actually 
exceeded bond issuance just about every other year, totalling $96 bn in 2000. 
Figures published by the Bank for International Settlements (see Table 1 below) 
indicate that in 2001, international syndicated credit facilities granted to borrowers from 
industrialised countries were worth $1.3 trillion, while gross international bond 
issuance by industrialised country issuers represented $1.9 trillion and equity issuance 
$133bn. 
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Table 1: Various sources of international financin for industrialised countries, $bn 
Gross announcements 1992 1993 1994 1995 ]996 1997 1998 ]999 2000 2001 
International syndicated credit facilities 159.9 254.1 441.9 609.9 730.0 908.7 822.0 961.0 1,333.1 1,280.1 
International bonds n.a. 374.3 345.4 353.4 625.6 673.1 863.7 1,415.7 1,499.2 1,948.1 
International equities 17 .6 32.7 44.3 43.1 59 .1 87.6 111.8 177.8 257.0 132.5 
Source: Oealogic Loanware; Bank for International Settlements, various years. 
In order to understand how the choice between intermediated and disintermediated 
finance in developing and industrialised countries has been determined over the past 
decade, one first needs to consider a series of differences between the two types of 
financing (see Table 2 below for a summary): 
• The costs of arranging a syndicated loan are lower than those of issuing a bond 
(Allen, 1990). 
• The syndicated loan market generally allows borrowers to raise larger sums than 
they would be able to obtain through either the bond or the equity markets under 
a time constraint49 • 
• Syndicated credit facilities can be arranged quickly and discreetly, which may be 
of value with certain transactions such as takeovers. 
• Commitments to lend can be cancelled relatively easily, while it would be 
difficult to cancel borrowing in the securities markets without reducing investor 
confidence. 
49 Indeed, in order to bid for third generation mobile phone licenses in 2000 auctioned off by various 
European countries' governments, many European telecommunications firms tapped th~ ~~ndicated 
credits market for large amounts in the first instance, subsequently aiming to refinance the InItIal short-
term debt by later issuing medium or long term securities. 
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Table 2: Characteristics of syndicated credits compared to bonds 
~ .. ('llaracteristi<~ Syndicated loans Bonds 
Maturity 
Minimal amount 
Targeted investor population 
A verage completion time 
of programme 
Rate type 
Short to medium term 3-10 years for Eurobonds 
(typically less than 3 years) 
As low as $1 m 
Banks 
Development banks 
Export credit agencies 
5-10 years for US bonds 
$30 m for Eurobonds, higher 
for US bonds50 
Banks 
Insurance companies 
Pension funds 
Multilateralorganisations (e.g. Fund managers (unit trusts, 
IFC) 
5-12 weeks 
Floating (rarely fixed) 
mutual funds) 
Indi vid uals 
Corporates 
Eurobonds: 6-15 weeks 
US bonds: 6-20 weeks 
Eurobonds: fixed or floating 
US bonds: mostly fixed 
Flexibility (i.e., diversity of High (e.g. multiple currency Low 
financing options, possibility to 
options) 
change them if needs of borrower 
change) 
Information disclosure and issuance Low (no US GAAP, no rating, Eurobonds: medium (rating & 
costs no compulsory disclosure to the disclosure to market) 
market) US bonds: high (US GAAP, 
rating, disclosure to market) 
....•........ -.~- ... -.... -................ , ....................... -............................. " ............................................. ................................................................................................................................... - ................................... , .... _ ............•..... , ...•................ -............................•... _ ..... _ ..•........... -
Liquidity of secondary market Low, but improving in the US Eurobond market reasonably 
liquid, US market highly liquid 
Source: ComplIed by author 
J 
There are a number of theoretical and empirical justifications for companng the 
characteristics of loan and bond instruments: 
To begin with, the characteristics of bonds and loans are extensively compared in the 
information asymmetry literature from a monitoring/incentives perspective (Sachs and 
Cohen, 1982; Berlin and Loeys, 1988; Berlin and Mester, 1992; Bolton and Freixas, 
2000). Eichengreen and Mody (1998) note that the determinants of risk and pricing 
behaviour differ between bank loans and bonds, principally because of the differences 
50 Minimal amounts also tend to be higher for bonds than for loans because of the higher costs involved, 
which would make it uneconomical to issue bonds for low amounts . 
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in seniority between the two instruments and the different extent to which they lend 
themsel ves to restructuring; 
Secondly, a homogenous pool of loans can lend itself well to securitisation (i.e., 
removal of the claims from the bank's balance sheet and purchase by a special purpose 
vehicle (SPV) which issues securities that are subsequently serviced by the cash-flow 
from the loans), allowing some tranching of the risk in the process. The characteristics 
of the underlying pool of loans are derived (in terms of maturity, pricing, currency, 
quality) from those of the securities issued, with the SPY often engaging in some kind 
of transformation (by means of a currency swap or risk enhancementS!) to make the 
securities more marketable to the targeted investor population. Therefore securitisation 
is an example where financiers directly relate the characteristics of loans and bonds to 
one another for financial engineering purposes. As an ultimate solution to the Mexican 
sovereign default of 1982, some developing countries' non-performing loans were 
transformed into 'Brady bonds' - instruments secured on US Treasuries and purchased 
by creditors. This was accompanied by partial debt forgiveness. 
Thirdly, the issuance of certain securities is often subordinated to the arrangement of a 
liquidity backstop/backup loan facility - in fact, some rating agencies require this in 
order to rate the bond issue. Besides, the repayment of many syndicated loans is 
predicted on a bond takeout within 6-12 months (or sooner) of signing the loan. Many 
of the largest acquisition loans arranged in 1999 - such as the ones for Olivetti 
(€22.S bn), Mannesmann (€9 bn and £8 bn), Vodafone ($10.5 bn) and Repsol ($9 bn) -
were subsequently refinanced in the bond markets (Rhodes, 2000). In such financing 
decisions, borrowers directly compare the cost of intermediated and disintermediated 
financing to determine their interest expense. 
Fourthly, the emergence of a relatively liquid secondary market for loans in the United 
States (which had a turnover of $8 bn in 1991, $40 bn in 1996 and $118 bn in 2001 
according to the Loan Pricing Corporation, a US-incorporated loan data vendor) has 
allowed some institutional investors - such as high-yield bond/leveraged loan mutual 
51 This can for instance be a guarantee written by an insurance company. 
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funds - to arbitrage between loans and bonds, picking the asset that presents the best 
risk/return profile (Coffey, 2000). This practice has been dominant particularly in the 
area of leveraged loans52• In contrast to banks which have typically been using loans to 
build customer relationships, these cross-over institutional investors have effectively 
been treating loans as an asset class. They weigh the attributes of bonds and loans 
against their yield, and will purchase the asset with the better fit. If there is a significant 
relative value mismatch between the two assets, investors will buy the more attractive 
investment and avoid the less attractive one (often forcing a repricing of the unattractive 
asset). In order to attract investors, many loans have been repriced - worth about $11 bn 
in 1998 and $23 bn in 1999 according to Coffey (2000) - in order to bring them back 
into relative value alignment. Again, this constitutes an example of investors directly 
comparing the characteristics of loans and bonds in order to make investment decisions. 
The growing trend of institutional investors to compare relative value in the loan and 
bond markets is mirrored within banks' own pricing models. 
Finally, Kamin and von Kleist (1999) note that bonds and loans are very different types 
of financial instruments. Bond issues tend to have fixed interest rates, while most loans 
are floating rate instruments (i.e., have interest rates which are at a fixed initial spread 
over LmOR). Additionally, many facets of the credit contract differ substantially 
between bonds and loans. Finally, borrower-lender relations are very different for bonds 
and loans. These considerations, taken together, would suggest that bond and loan 
spreads behave so differently that it would be inappropriate to analyse them together. 
Yet, one of the most surprising results of the authors' research is that emerging market 
bonds and loans appear to differ only in the level of their spreads, not in the response of 
their spreads to changes in other factors such as credit rating or maturity. 
52 Angbazo, Mei and Saunders (1998) define as Highly Leveraged Transaction (HLT) loans all loan 
financings: 
• which are used for buyouts, acquisitions, recapitalisations, 
• which (i) double the borrower's liabilities and result in a leverage ratio (total liabilities/total 
assets) higher than 50% or (ii) increase the leverage ratio higher than 75%, 
• that are designated as HLT by the syndication agent, 
• granted to subsidiaries of HL T companies, even when the subsidiary does not meet the HL T 
definitions above. 
Dealogic Loanware applies the term leveraged in case of lending to non-investment grade companies 
where the ratio of debt to net worth is often high. Typically in the US and Canadian markets, HL T 
corresponds to a LIBOR pricing of 250bp or above. For European borrowers, the notion of leveraged 
loans applies to a LIBOR pricing of 150bp or above. 
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We now present some comparative visual analysis of bond and loan issuance over the 
past decade by industrialised countries and some selected developing countries that 
have been affected by serious financial crises. The analysis allows us to make inferences 
about linkages between financing for developing and industrialised country borrowers. 
To begin with, analysis of volumes shows that syndicated lending was sharply curtailed 
in 1998 to South-East Asia in the aftermath of the financial crises that hit the region. 
The crises were accompanied by a reduction of lending to borrowers in the United 
States and in Western Europe (Figure 1). The collapse of bond issuance by Asian crisis 
countries in 1998 and 1999 was followed by a reduction in Western European bond 
issuance from 1999 onwards (Figure 6). 
Furthermore, looking at the evolution of pricing, we note that LmOR spreads on 
syndicated credit facilities granted to Asian developing countries hit by financial crises53 
peaked in 1998-99. So did launch spreads (i.e. spreads at issuance) on their bonds - for 
those still able to tap bond markets. These peaks were accompanied by a peaking of 
LmOR loan spreads for US and Japanese borrowers (Figure 2) and to a lesser extent of 
bond spreads in 1999 for Japanese issuers (Figure 7). One could interpret this as a 
possible sign of contagion in financial markets, which we will test statistically later in 
the paper. Latin American loan and bond spreads peaked in 1999, while spreads 
demanded on Russian and Turkish bonds and loans started edging up sharply in 2000. 
Lastly, the evolution of loan maturities may also provide possible evidence of contagion 
(Figure 3). The abrupt reduction of new average facility maturities that occurred for 
Turkish, Russian, South Korean and Indonesian borrowers in particular, as lenders 
shunned further long-term exposure to crisis-hit countries, was accompanied by a less 
abrupt but generally protracted reduction of weighted average maturities on 
industrialised country syndicated loan facilities. Interestingly, as average maturities on 
facilities to South Korean borrowers fell in 1998 to about one third of their average of 
1997, average maturities on facilities granted to Japanese borrowers shrank by 50% 
53 Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand. 
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between 1997 and 1998. To a lesser extent, the sharp reduction in maturity for emerging 
country bonds issued from 1997 onwards, first in Asia and subsequently in Latin 
America, was accompanied by a trough in US bond maturities in 1998 (Figure 8). 
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Figure 1: Evolution of syndicated lending to industrialised countries and selected developing 
countries affected b-'y financial crises, in billions of US dollars 
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Figure 2: Evolution of average LmOR spreads weighted by facility amounts on syndicated credits 
granted to industrialised countries and selected developing countries affected by financial crises, in 
basis points 
600 
--Western Europe 
--Industrialised 
countries 
-Japan - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 450 
--United States 
~ - ~ ---- - -- ------ --- ------ --- 300 
------ --- ------ --- 150 
o 
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 
600 
--Argentina 
450 
300 
150 
o 
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 
I I I 
--Russia 
1993 1995 1997 
Sources: Dealogtc Loanware, author's calculations. 
600 
--Eastern Europe 
--Developing countries 
- Latin America and Caribbean 
- Africa and Middle East 
-- - - - - - 450 
--*- Asia and Pacific 
300 
150 
o 
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 
600 
--Indonesia 
--South Korea 
-Malaysia 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 450 
300 
150 
o 
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 
600 
o 
1999 2001 
108 
Figure 3: Evolution of average maturities weighted by facility amounts on syndicated credits 
granted to industrialised countries and selected developing countries affected by financial crises, in 
ears 
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Figure 4: Evolution of lending and average LmOR spreads weighted by facility amounts on 
syndicated loans arran~ed for various business sectors in developing countries 
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Figure 5: Evolution of lending and average LIBOR spreads weighted by facility amounts on 
syndicated loans arranged for various business sectors in industrialised countries 
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We detect similar relationships in developing and industrialised countries between the 
concentration of the locus of financing on the one hand and the pricing of funds on the 
other. Borrowers that arranged the largest loan or bond issues for a particular year often 
faced higher spreads and obtained lower maturities than median size issues (Figures 11 
and 12 in Appendix 4). This may reflect penalties imposed for countries highly 
dependent on external financing. For instance, Brazil, the emerging country with the 
highest ratio of debt service to exports of goods and services in 1997 in our data sample, 
also had the highest amount of bond issuance among emerging countries that year, 
facing among the highest launch spreads (see Figures 6, 7 and 12). 
Finally, comparison of the sectoral breakdown of developing and industrialised country 
loan and bond financing allows us to highlight a few major tendencies. 
In developing countries, the bulk of bank lending was channelled to banks, the high-
tech industry and the utilities sector. The infrastructure and population-related service54 
sectors had to pay among the highest spreads on loans and the transport sector among 
the lowest (Figure 4). The bulk of developing country bond issuance was made by the 
state sector, followed by banks and traditional industries. The construction and property 
sector faced among the highest bond spreads, with a peak in 1998 which could have 
corresponded to the peak of the Asian property bubble, while banks and the transport 
sector paid the lowest bond spreads (Figure 9). 
In industrialised countries, non-bank financial intermediaries and the high-tech industry 
were the most active arrangers of syndicated loans. In 1999 and 2000, borrowing by the 
high-tech sector peaked, boosted by large loan facilities arranged for mainly European 
telecoms firms to support the purchase of third-generation mobile phone licenses. The 
state and banking sectors obtained among the lowest bond and loan spreads while the 
construction and property and population-related sectors faced the highest. Banks and 
the state sector were the most active bond issuers. Spreads on loans written to and on 
bonds issued by the high-tech industry were the highest in 2000 when telecoms 
borrowing peaked (Figures 5 and 10). 
54 E.g. Media & Publishing, Hotels & Leisure, Retailing. 
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Figure 6: Evolution of bond issuance by industrialised countries and selected developing countries 
affected by financial crises, in billions of US dollars 
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Figure 7: Evolution of average launch spreads* weighted by facility amounts on bond issues for I 
industrialised countries and selected developing countries affected by financial crises, in basis 
points 
I I I I I I 
--Western Europe 
--Japan 
- United States 
- Industrial ised countries 
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 
------ --- ------ ---~~--- ~­
r~<:r--
------ - ~~---lt 
_ "'gentina ~;;'-l\!'v/ 
--Brazil 
-Mexico 
I I I I 
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 
800 
600 
400 
200 
o 
800 
600 
400 
200 
o 
--Eastern Europe 
--Latin America and Caribbean 
- Africa and Middle East 
- Asia and Pacific 
~ Developing countnes - - - - - -
~ 
-~o,-I ---~ -:; --.tV'-- --"'~-
__ ~kZ ~~:...j.-J 
1993 1995 
-- Indonesia 
--South Korea 
-Malaysia 
- Thailand 
-" - --
" 
1993 1995 
1997 1999 2001 
1997 1999 2001 
-Rn"ia / 
800 
600 ------ --- ------
____ ~_~~key ~~vj\v __ _ 
....... 
400 
200 
o 
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 
* Spreads at Issuance 
Sources: Dealogic, author's calculations. 
800 
600 
400 
200 
o 
800 
600 
400 
200 
o 
114 
Figure 8: Evolution of average maturities weighted by facility amounts on bond issues for 
industrialised countries and selected developing countries affected by financial crises, in years 
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Figure 9: Evolution of issuance amounts and average launch spreads* weighted by facility 
amounts on bonds issued by various business sectors in developing countries 
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Figure 10: Evolution of issuance amounts and average launch spreads* weighted by facility 
amounts on bonds issued by various business sectors in industrialised countries 
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In order to prepare our statistical analysis of the abovementioned issues arising from 
visual inspection of the figures, we now review some of the academic literature dealing 
with loan and bond pricing issues. 
3. The loan and bond pricing literature 
3.1 Industrialised country loans are supposedly riskier than bonds 
Following the logic of the "pecking order theory" of finance, companies use internal 
money (retained profits) in the first instance to finance their development and when they 
subsequently seek external funds, they graduate from bank finance to bond finance as 
information about their creditworthiness becomes more complete (Myers, 1984; Myers 
and Majluf, 1984; Diamond, 1991; Carey, Prowse, Rea, and Udell, 1993; Bolton and 
Freixas, 2000). Monitoring of private debt is most efficiently delegated to a financial 
intermediary rather than collected directly by many intermediaries (Diamond, 1984). 
Bank loans tend to be relatively short-term, involve extensive covenants, and are 
frequently renegotiated. The majority of public-debt contracts are longer-term, involve 
relatively loose covenants and are almost never renegotiated. These contractual 
characteristics are extensively examined in the literature by Berlin and Loeys (1988), 
Berlin and Mester (1992), and Rajan and Winton (1995). Berlin and Loeys (1992) 
develop a model in which bond contracts - enforced by indicators observable to anyone 
- tend to be either too harsh (too many good projects are liquidated) or too lenient (too 
many bad projects are allowed to mature). Hiring the services of a delegated monitor 
ensures a more efficient liquidation policy (loan contract), providing the monitor with 
proper incentives is costly. The choice of contract depends on the trade-off between the 
inefficiencies of rigid bond covenants and the costs of hiring a delegated monitor. This 
trade-off depends on the firm's production technology and the information technology. 
Bolton and Freixas (2000) derive an equilibrium where (i) the riskiest firms (which are 
often start-ups) are either unable to obtain funding or are constrained to issue equity, (ii) 
somewhat safer firms are able to take out bank loans, which provide the cheapest form 
of flexible financing required and (iii) the safest firms prefer to tap securities markets 
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and thus avoid paymg the intermediation cost. This theoretical segmentation IS 
consistent with practice, especially with European reality where only the safest firms are 
able to issue bonds on securities markets and no highly developed junk-bond market 
exists, as in the US. 
Research conducted by Melnik and Plaut (1991) underpins the pecking order theory. 
Their investigation of lending to industrialised country borrowers on the short-term 
Eurocredit market provides evidence that the market seems to be segmented in such a 
way that the highest-quality borrowers issue securities in their own names (in other 
words do not require monitoring) while others have recourse to finance in the form of 
bank loans (i.e. are monitored). On a sample of credit contracts consisting of Note 
Issuance Facilities (NIPs, instruments closer to securities than to loans) and loans - that 
were executed for financial and non-financial borrowers in 1986, loans have a riskier 
average credit rating and a higher average spread over LIBOR than NIPs combined with 
a higher average facility amount (possibly indicating higher leverage and greater risk). 
Logit regression analysis shows that riskier credit ratings increase the likelihood that 
borrowers obtain financing through a conventional loan rather than a NIP. The inclusion 
of a third-party guarantee also significantly increases the likelihood that the financing is 
in the form of a NIP. 
3.2 Developing country bonds could be riskier than loans 
The above considerations apply to lending to industrialised countries, but a different 
analysis is warranted for developing countries. Edwards (1986) argues that the levels of 
risk involved in international bank loans and bonds are different. There is somewhat 
greater risk involved in bonds. As a result of implicit or explicit central bank guarantees 
on bank deposits and loans, spreads on loans would not reflect the real risk of default. 
Bonds, on the other hand, supposedly reflect the risk more accurately. Sachs and Cohen 
(1982) have argued that while bank lending is implicitly lending with an option to 
renegotiate, bond lending excludes the possibility of rescheduling. Consequently, in 
their model, bond lending is more risky - that is, for the same amount of debt, spreads 
are higher on bonds than on bank loans. 
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Monetary authorities have traditionally guaranteed bank deposits and loans. Nowadays, 
bank loans and deposits are, in most countries, implicitly or explicitly insured: in a way, 
central banks have agreed to become lenders of last resort. McKinnon (1984), Folkerts-
Landau (1985) and Eichengreen and Mody (2000) have argued, among others, that the 
moral hazard factor has become increasingly important in bank lending. According to 
this view, spreads charged on bank loans do not reflect the real risk of the borrower. The 
bond market, on the other hand, has not been affected by the broadening of this implicit 
insurance scheme. Indeed, Folkerts-Landau (1985) argues that while bank loan spreads 
reflect the probability of rescheduling, bond spreads mirror the probability of default. 
The empirical investigations of these issues in the existing academic literature confirm 
that spreads on developing country bonds are higher than on developing country loans 
(Kamin and von Kleist, 1999; Eichengreen and Mody, 1997, 1998,2000), although the 
determinants of loan and bond spreads are similar. 
We now analyse the determinants of the availability of intermediated and 
disintermediated finance for developing and industrialised country borrowers for the 
1993-2001 period. 
4. Analysis of lending to developing countries 
We now explore in a more systematic fashion which factors determine the pricing of 
developing and industrialised country bonds and loans during 1993-2001, our period 
under study. We focus on primary market spreads, i.e. launch spreads for bonds and 
LmOR spreads for loans issued on the primary market. It is important to note that the 
behaviour of spreads on secondary markets, which can be quite different from that of 
primary spreads, is not analysed here. In particular, as underscored by Eichengreen and 
Mody (1997 and 1998), in poor market conditions when secondary spreads rise, launch 
spreads generally fall. One justification of our approach is that we are comparing loan 
and bond pricing and the secondary market for loans is much less developed than the 
secondary market for bonds. 
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We regress the pricing of 2,772 developing country loans and 530 developing country 
bonds issued or granted between 1993 and 2001, on a series of macro- and micro-
economic variables with a view to comparing the determinants of the pricing of these 
two instruments. Descriptive statistics of our sample can be found in Appendix 5. 
Our macro-economic55 variables include the following measures of the economIC 
performance of the country of the borrower: 
• solvency, such as the ratios of external debt to GDP, debt service to exports, 
assistance from the IMF, a history of debt rescheduling (see Hanson, 1974; 
Harberger, 1980; Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Edwards, 1983; Sachs, 1984; 
Cantor and Packer, 1996, Cline and Barnes, 1997); 
• liquidity, such as the total or short-term external debt positions and their relation 
to foreign currency reserves (Edwards, 1983; Gersovitz, 1985; Cline and Barnes, 
1997; Eichengreen and Mody, 2000); 
• economic growth and its sustainability: economic growth rate and its variance, 
ratios of investment to GDP and domestic credit to GDP (Feder and Just, 1977; 
Edwards, 1983; Sachs, 1984; Gersovitz, 1985; Cline and Barnes, 1997; 
Eichengreen and Mody, 1998, 2000); 
• economic openness: ratio of exports to import (Frenkel, 1983; Balassa, 1986); 
SS Our data sources for the macro-economic variables were the BIS-IMF-OECD-World Bank Joint 
Statistics on external debt, the IMF's International Financial Statistics, the IMF's World Economic 
Outlook database, the International Institute of Finance's developing country database, the OECD's 
World Economic Outlook, and national statistical offices. We linked the macro-economic variables and 
the micro-economic information contained in the loans and bonds databases on the country and the date, 
considering both the year the loan was signed or the bond was issued, and the previous year. We thus 
distinguish between long-term and short-term effects. In fact we expect investors and banks to ha\'e 
incorporated some kind of macro-economic forecasting into their pricing models. For instance, for a loan 
granted to an Argentine borrower in 1995, our real GDP growth variables represent Argentina's real 
economic growth for 1995 (noted as growth) and for 1994 (noted as growth. I )· 
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• business climate, for which we use as a proxy the corruption index compiled by 
Transparency International56• The corruption index is standardised on a scale of 
o to 10 with a score of 0 corresponding to the highest degree of corruption, and a 
score of 10 to the lowest. To the extent that lenders may be expected to charge a 
premium on funding to countries where a corrupt business climate prevails, we 
expect to find a negative coefficient on the corruption index variable in our loan 
and bond pricing regressions. 
We also control for general economic factors like the country's purchasing power parity 
share of world GDP, growth in world trade and the yield on the risk-free investment 
alternative to the loan or bond in question (the three-month US Treasury bill). We 
generally expect that the market will penalise borrowers from countries with weak 
macro-economic fundamentals by charging them higher spreads and vice-versa. 
Our micro-economic variables include issue size, maturity, borrower business sector, 
the existence of guarantees, the currency of issue and market structure. 
• Issue size and maturity can lower or increase pricing (Smith, 1980; Fons, 1994; 
Eichengreen and Mody, 1997 and 1998; Kamin and von Kleist, 1999; Kleimeier 
and Megginson, 2000). 
• Likewise, the effect of the presence of collateral and third-party guarantees are 
uncertain (Smith and Warner 1979; Smith 1980; Bester, 1985; Besanko and 
Thakor, 1987; Berger and Udell, 1990, Kleimeier and Megginson, 2000). 
• Eichengreen and Mody (2000) report that when financial institutions borrow on 
the syndicated loan market, they seem to be able to obtain lower spreads than 
non-financial borrowers. This is consistent with the emphasis some observers 
have placed on tacit or explicit guarantees provided to financial institutions by 
monetary authorities (lenders of last resort). 
• We included dummies for facilities or bonds denominated in US dollars, 
Japanese Yen and euro (or any of its twelve predecessor currencies). We expect 
56 Transparency International assigns a score of 0 to 10 to most countries of the world, standardising a 
number of corruption surveys conducted by public and private institutions and consisting of questions 
about issues such as bribing of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, or embezzlement of 
public funds. For a description of the methodology, and the full dataset, please refer to 
www.transparency.org. 
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instruments denominated in Yen and euro to have relatively lower pricing than 
others, due to the low funding costs for yen-based investors and declining 
margms In European banking (Eichengreen and Mody, 2000) and lower 
benchmark yields in non-dollar currencies than comparable US Treasuries 
(Kamin and von Kleist, 1999). 
• Our indicators of market structure include a dummy to indicate if the original 
amount of the loan has been increased. When this dummy is equal to 1, it can 
hint that the market had a positive reaction to the deal during syndication or that 
the banks have shown flexibility in adapting their financing package to a change 
in the borrower's needs. We also controlled for the number of fund providers 
(jor loans) or arranger banks (jor bonds). The conditions on issues with a lower 
number of participants or issue arrangers are expected to reflect the relationship 
of the borrower with its core banks and may therefore be more favourable than 
on other deals. Finally, we included among our control variables the shares of 
the borrower's country and business sector in total lending or bond issuance to 
all countries and all sectors during the year concerned: these ratios indicate the 
relative presence of the country or the industry in the market for syndicated 
credits and bonds relative to others. A high country or industry share may 
indicate relatively high financing needs for a nation or an industry, possibly 
leading to more expensive funding, but also, on the contrary, to an established 
presence on the market, resulting in more favourable financing conditions. 
For a summary of the academic literature about the mlcro- and macro-economIC 
determinants of the pricing and availability of foreign funds, see Appendix 1. 
Since the macro-economic characteristics of the various countries in our sample are 
different, a fixed-effect panel regression model is appropriate to control for these 
effects. Baltagi, Griffin and Xiong (2000) argue that in case of panel data, if inter-group 
heterogeneity is strong, then one can just run a timeseries regression for each group. If 
on the other hand it is believed that the long-run model corresponds to cross-sectional 
variation then a between-group approach can be employed. While pure cross-section 
studies cannot control for group-specific effects, pure time-series studies cannot control 
for unobservable changes occurring over time. The authors suggest that even when used 
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on relatively long time-series of panel data, heterogeneous models for individual groups 
tend to produce implausible estimates with inferior forecasting properties. The 
explanation for why pooled models outperform heterogeneous ones is based on the 
relative variability of data between time-series and individual panels. Efficiency gains 
measured by root mean square errors (particularly when we are faced with a relatively 
short time-series) from pooling appear to more than offset the biases due to inter-group 
heterogeneities. 
The estimation results of the model are displayed in Table 3. Next, we discuss the 
results. 
Most of our results regarding the effects of micro-economic factors on loan and bond 
pricing are in line with the existing academic literature. Maturity is significantly and 
positively related to the pricing of developing country loans and bonds, with the 
coefficient about twice as high in the case of loans than in the case of bonds. The 
premium for a risk of change in the borrower's creditworthiness for longer-term 
instruments is thus integrated into the pricing of developing country loans than bonds. 
The result is in accordance with the findings of Kamin and von Kleist (1999). Pricing is 
negatively and significantly related to size in the case of developing loans (this is the 
same result as found by Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) for a sample containing both 
developed and industrialised country loans), although this is not found for bonds. 
Overall, these results suggest that there are economies of scale for banks issuing loans 
or that better risks are created with larger loans, or both. No such effect seems to exist in 
the case of bonds where banks do not monitor borrowers and do not appear to derive 
economies of scale from carrying out that activity. We fail to detect the negative effect 
of issue size on developing country bond spreads found by Eichengreen and Mody 
(1997 and 1998) arising from economies of scale in the distribution of large issues and 
liquidity of the secondary market. Explicit guarantees appear to significantly lower the 
pricing of loans while the pricing of secured developing country loans carries a 
premium, possibly because they are deemed too riskl7; conversely, guarantees or 
collateral seem to have no effect on bond pricing. These differences may be related to 
57 Examination of our data sample confirms that borrowers with poorer ratings are more likely to require 
collateralisation. 
124 
the greater seniority of loans over bonds. Other authors (see above) who have analysed 
the effects of collateral and guarantees on the pricing of bonds and loans have also 
failed to identify a systematic relationship. 
The sensitivity of bond and loan pncmg to borrower sectors appears to be quite 
different: while several sectoral dummies seem to influence loan spreads, no sectoral 
dummy is significantly related to the pricing of bonds. Investors may consider 
developing country bonds as an asset class in themselves and therefore show less 
sensitivity than in the case of loans to the borrower's industry for determining the 
pricing (while banks seem to pay more attention to borrower industry when granting 
loans). The significant and positive coefficients on the construction and property as well 
as the high-tech sectors in the loan pricing regression may reflect the high risk-return or 
speculative profile of these industries. Like Eichengreen and Mody (2000), we find that 
loans granted to banks are relatively cheaper than others, possibly because of the 
implicit or explicit lender .of last resort guarantees enjoyed by these institutions. 
Turning to the macro-economic determinants of loan and bond pricing, we detect no 
relationship between the yield on the risk-free alternative investment and the primary 
market pricing of developing country bonds and loans: this is in accordance with Kamin 
and von Kleist (1999)58. As noted by these two authors, the implication for 
policymakers is that an upturn in industrialised country interest rates may lead to a 
smaller than expected upturn in developing country spreads. The negative and 
significant coefficient on the dummy for loans denominated in Japanese yen indicates 
that Japanese banks' low funding costs could have resulted in lower spreads on 
developing country loans (Eichengreen and Mody, 2000) - this underpricing could 
reflect a search-for yield attitude on Japanese banks' behalf. 
We find a posItIve and significant coefficient for growth in world trade for our 
developing country loan pricing regression (indicating that when world trade is 
booming, more economic agents are competing for foreign funds which are then harder 
to come by) and a negative one on growth in world GDP. The absence of a significant 
58 For the purposes of comparability with bond pricing, we only looked at the LIBOR spread in the case of 
loans, not fees. When including fees, Eichengreen and Mody (2000) do find a significant relationship. 
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coefficient on either of these two variables in our bond pricing regressions underscores 
the important role that banks still play in supporting developing countries' participation 
in world trade. For policymakers, who have put forth world trade as a means of 
improving developing countries' economIC condition, the availability of 
disintermediated foreign funds to these countries' participation in world trade therefore 
seems of particular relevance. Besides, the negative effect on bond pricing of a high 
penetration of trade into the economy of the borrower (measured by the ratio of imports 
plus exports divided by GDP) and its positive effect on loan pricing suggests that the 
financing of the participation of developing countries in world trade can be more 
optimal through bonds than loans, provided the former channel is available. 
The effect of market structure on pricing appears to be different depending on whether 
loans or bonds are considered. On the one hand, the positive coefficient on country 
share in world syndicated lending seems to lead to higher developing country loan 
spreads in our regressions, suggesting banks charge higher than normal spreads to 
borrowers from countries which are excessively dependent on bank lending for their 
economic development. This could reflect that either the banks are exercising market 
power or loans are becoming pricier as greater concentration of risk is perceived by 
investors. On the other hand, the opposite effect seems to prevail for bonds (higher 
country shares are associated with lower bond spreads) where banks, as underwriters 
and distributors of securities rather than ultimate bearers of risk, have less scope to 
exercise market power. Instead, a country's established presence as an issuer, be it of 
junk bonds, seems to result in lower bond spreads (reputation effect). Meanwhile the 
negative and significant coefficient on sector share in world syndicated lending 
indicates that particular industries' established presence on the market can lower loan 
spreads. In the loan regression, we obtain a positive coefficient on the contemporaneous 
value of the purchasing parity share of world GDP of the borrower's country and a 
negative sign on the lagged value of the same variable. We interpret this as a time-effect 
phenomenon. Investors may regard high values of the contemporaneous share of world 
wealth indicator as a licence to charge sub-optimal spreads while they are more enticed 
to regard its value from the previous year as a warranty of reputation, allowing cheaper 
loans. 
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We could not analyse the effects of the corruption index in the panel regression because 
the index itself uniquely identifies each developing country. But in the non-panel 
version of this regression with robust standard errors shown in Table 9 of Appendix 8, 
this variable is negatively associated with developing country bond and loan pricing -
the lower the level of corruption, reflected by higher values of the corruption index, the 
lower the price - confirming that for the purposes of determining the pricing of foreign 
funds, investors are sensitive to the quality of the business climate and the presence of 
corruption in developing countries and penalise those countries' borrowers where there 
is a relatively high level of perceived corruption by charging them relatively higher 
spreads. 
A greater number of macro-economic variables influence developing country loan 
pricing than bond pricing, again confirming that developing country bonds may be 
considered by investors as an asset class in themselves, with less sensitivity to the 
macro-economic conditions prevailing in the borrowers' country. Other coefficients 
have the expected signs, favourable macro-economic indicators (favourable current 
account position, high ratio of investment to GNP, of domestic credit to GDP) are 
generally associated with lower spreads and unfavourable indicators (high ratio of debt 
service to exports, of government debt or deficit to GDP; assistance from the IMF) with 
higher spreads. 
The significant and positive bond dummy in the regression where bonds and loans are 
pooled together (see Appendix 7) shows that spreads tend to be higher on emerging 
market bonds than on loans, confirming, on average, the riskier nature of the former as 
compared to the latter. This finding is in accordance with Sachs and Cohen (1982), 
Eichengreen and Mody (1997, 1998, 2000) and Kamin and von Kleist (1999) and of 
course also with our figures shown in section 2. 
The tests of the panel regression also indicate that loan spreads differ among countries: 
country effects are significant in determining the pricing of developing country bonds 
and loans (The F-test makes us strongly reject the hypothesis that there are no country 
effects). 
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Table 3: Loan and bond pricing regressions for developing countries 
We estimated the following fixed effects panel regression, considering each borrower country as a group: 
In(spread) = /30 Intercept + /31 maturity + /32 In_size + /33 nbrov + /34 ~explic + /35 g_implic + 
/36 secured + /37 increase + /38 constrpt + /39 tradind + /310 finservb + /311 finservn + /312 high-tech + 
/313 infrastr + /314 popserv + /315 state + /316 transpor + /317 debtgdp + /318 debtgdp_t + /319 brent + 
/320 brent.l + /321 treas + /322 treas_l + /323 pppsh + /324 pppsh_t + /325 growth + /326 growth_t + /327 wrgdp 
+ /328 wrgdp_I + /329 trade + /330 trade_l + /331 cty_shar + /332 cty_shar_t + /333 bus_shar + /334 bus_shaLl 
+ /335 res to deb + /336 restodeb_l + /337 gra + /338 defiGDP + /339 defiGDP_t + /340 curacGDP + 
/341 curacGDP_t + /342 invGNP + /343 invGNP_t + /344 tdstoxgs + /345 tdstoxgS_t + /346 iegdp + /347 iegdp_t 
+ /348 credgdp + /349 credgdp_l + /350 corrupt + /351 usd + /352 jpy + /353 eur + £ 
where: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
In (spread) = natural logarithm of spread (over LIBOR for loans, over benchmark security for bonds) 
maturity = maturity of loan or bond, in years 
In_size = natural logarithm of loan or bond issue size, in millions of US dollars 
nbprov = number of provider banks (for loans), or arranger banks (for bonds) 
g_explic, 8-implic = dummies for explicitly, resp. implicitly guaranteed instrument (implicit guarantee in the 
sense for instance that borrower or issuer is the subsidiary of another concern) 
secured = dummy for secured instrument 
increase = dummy to indicate that the original amount of the bond or the loan has been increased 
constrpt, tradind, finservb, finservn, high-tech, infrastr, popserv, state, transpor = sectoral dummies for 
construction and property, traditional industry, financial services (banks), financial services (non-banks), high-
tech industry, infrastructure, population-related services, state, transport. Note that the dummy for the utilities 
sectors was excluded from the equation as the case by default as its inclusion would have overspecified the 
model. For the full list of base sectors included in each category, see Appendix 3. 
debtgdp = ratio of debt to GDP for country of the borrowerlissuer, for year concerned (end-year), -1 for 
previous year 
brent = price of one barrel of Brent crude oil at time of signing (in US$), _lone year before 
treas = yield on the three-month US Treasury Bill, for month concerned, _lone year before 
pppsh = purchasing power parity share of world GDP of the borrower's/issuer's country for year concerned 
(end-year), -1 for previous year 
growth = real GDP growth in borrower' s/issuer' s country, for year concerned, -1 for previous year 
wrgdp = growth in world GDP for year concerned, -1 for previous year 
trade = growth in world trade for year concerned, -1 for previous year 
cty_shar = share of the borrower's (issuer's) country in world syndicated lending (bond issuance) for year 
concerned, _I for previous year 
bus_shar = share of the borrower's (issuer's) business sector in world syndicated lending (bond issuance), for 
year concerned, -1 for previous year 
restodeb = ratio of external reserves to debt in borrower's/issuer's country for year concerned (end-year), -1 
for previous year 
gra = dummy for assistance received by the country of the borrowerlissuer from the IMF - use of Fund credit 
by operating the General Resources Account (GRA) - during the year concerned 
defiGDP = ratio of government deficit to GDP in borrower'slissuer's country for year concerned (end-year), 
-1 for previous year 
curacGDP = ratio of current account to GDP in borrower' s/issuer' s country for year concerned (end-year), -1 
for previous year 
invGNP = ratio of investment to GNP in borrower' s/issuer' s country for year concerned, -1 for previous year 
tdstoxgs = ratio of debt service to exports of goods and services for country of the borrowerlissuer, for year 
concerned, -1 for previous year 
iegdp = ratio of imports plus exports over GDP for country of the borrowerlissuer, for year concerned, -1 for 
previous year 
credgdp = ratio of bank credit to GDP for country of the borrower or issuer, for year concerned, -1 for 
previous year 
corrupt = corruption index ofthe country of the borrowerlissuer (assigned by World Transparency) 
usd, jpy, eur = dummies for instrument denominated, respectively, in US dollars, Japanese yen and euro (or 
any of its 12 predecessor currencies) 
lOis a random disturbance 
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Table 3 (continued): Loan and bond pricing regression for 
developing country borrowers 
Fixed effects panel regression, considering each borrower country as a group. 
variable Loan spreads Bond spreads 
maturity 0.0253:1: (0.003) 0.0099:1: (0.002) 
In_size 
-0.1029:1: (0.012) 
-0.0001 (0.033) 
nbprov 0.0025 (0.001) 
-0.0088t (0.004) 
g_explic 
-0.2824:1: (0.030) 
-0.0165 (0.068) 
g_implic 0.0086 (0.045) 
-0.0648 (0.069) 
secured 0.1958:1: (0.028) 
-0.2536 (0.320) 
mcrease 0.0227 (0.040) 
-0.1126 (0.073) 
constrpt 0.2036:1: (0.067) 0.0847 (0.173) 
tradind 0.1355:1: (0.042) -0.0242 (0.091) 
finservb 
-0.1382:1: (0.043) 0.0360 (0.530) 
finservn 0.1888:1: (0.049) -0.0581 (0.151) 
high-tech 0.1665:1: (0.039) 0.1388 (0.107) 
infrastr 0.4906t (0.213) 0.2346 (0.463) 
popserv 0.3492:1: (0.071) 0.0671 (0.131) 
state -0.0586 (0.063) -0.1809 (0.125) 
transpor 0.1190t (0.053) 0.1349 (0.206) 
debtgdp 0.0052t (0.002) 0.0097 (0.012) 
debtgdp_l -0.0035 (0.003) -0.0152* (0.008) 
brent -0.0086* (0.004) -0.0532:1: (0.014) 
brentl -0.0227:1: (0.004) 0.0179 (0.013) 
treas -0.0582 (0.037) -0.1680 (0.127) 
treas_l 0.0052 (0.029) -0.0030 (0.124) 
pppsh 2.465l:j: (0.694) -2.3399 (2.599) 
PPPSh_l -1.6127t (0.672) 2.5049 (2.302) 
growth -0.0137 (0.011) 0.0434 (0.050) 
growth_l 0.0039 (0.004) -0.0036 (0.036) 
wrgdp -0.2297:1: (0.081) -0.1319 (0.346) 
wrgdp_l -0.4112:1: (0.083) 0.3025 (0.338) 
trade 0.0976:1: (0.018) 0.0371 (0.109) 
trade_l 0.0838:1: (0.019) 0.0119 (0.100) 
cty_shar 0.2303* (0.135) 0.0823 (0.230) 
ctyshaLl 0.2285* (0.123) -0.2702t (0.112) 
bus_shar -0.0346* (0.018) -0.0215 (0.014) 
busshaLI 0.0049 (0.019) 0.0167 (0.014) 
restodeb 0.0001 (0.000) 0.0036 (0.002) 
resdeb_l 0.0003 (0.000) -0.0005 (0.000) 
gra 0.0946* (0.051) 0.5579:1: (0.177) 
defiGDP 0.0155:1: (0.005) -0.0078 (0.027) 
defigdp_l 0.0246:1: (0.009) 0.0377 (0.040) 
curacGDP -0.0144* (0.007) 0.0453 (0.029) 
Curgdp_l -0.0237:1: (0.009) 0.0048 (0.030) 
invGNP -0.0612:1: (0.009) -0.0248 (0.031) 
invgnp_l -0.0315:1: (0.009) 0.0705 (0.046) 
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Table 3 (continued): Loan and bond pricing regression for 
developing country borrowers 
Dependent variable: In(spread) 
Fixed effects panel regression, considering each borrower country as a group. 
variable Loan spreads Bond spreads 
tdstoxgs 0.0039* (0.002) 0.0105 
tdSXgS_l -0.0010 (0.002) -0.0064 
iegdp 0.0001 (0.000) -0.0001 
iegdp_l 0.0090+ (0.002) -0.0266t 
credgdp 0.0000 (0.000) -0.0000 
credgdp_l -0.0000* (0.000) -O.OOOot 
usd -0.2550+ (0.095) 0.1727 
jpy -0.3141 t (0.126) 0.0081 
eur -0.1320 (0.107) 0.1942 
intercept 7.0714+ (0.443) 5.4644t 
Note: standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations in loan spreads regression = 2,772, 
in bond spreads regression = 530. F-tests are significant at the I % level. 
*: significant at the 10% level; -r: significant at the 5% level; :j:: significant at the I % level. 
(0.009) 
(0.016) 
(0.000) 
(0.010) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.141) 
(0.273) 
(0.145) 
(2.709) 
5. Analysis of lending to industrialised countries 
We now compare the above results with a similar regression analysis of a sample of 
20,365 industrialised country syndicated loans and 5,086 bond issues. Our model and 
results are presented in Table 4 below. The descriptive statistics appear in Appendix 6. 
Again, the panel regression confirms that country effects are significant in the 
determination of the pricing of industrialised country loans and bonds. 
5.1 Comparison of industrialised and developing country loans 
We note several similarities in the pricing of industrialised and developing country 
loans. As for developing country loans, the coefficient on the maturity is significant and 
positive on industrialised country loans, meaning a premium is demanded by lenders for 
being exposed to a risk for a longer period of time. This is a verification, for 
industrialised country loans, of the results found in Kamin and von Kleist (1999). 
Moreover, in accordance with Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), we find a significantly 
negative relationship between loan size and spreads, although the coefficient is higher in 
absolute terms for industrialised loans than for developing country loans, suggesting 
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that banks in our sample could have more expenence III monitoring industrialised 
country borrowers than developing country ones, deriving more economies of scale 
from that activity. Lastly, most sectoral dummies on industrialised country loans are 
significant and have the same signs as in the case of developing countries, with the 
absolute values of the coefficients on the construction and property, traditional industry, 
high-tech, population-related services and transport sectors higher in the case of 
industrialised countries. 
Still, despite the above similarities, the pricing of industrialised and developing country 
loans appears to differ in several respects. First, the number of fund provider banks had 
no effect on the pricing of developing country loans; here we detect a significantly 
positive relationship, possibly because industrialised country loans requiring the 
presence of a high number of providers could represent more complex deals, on 
average, than comparable emerging market deals. Melnik and Plaut (1991) also detect a 
link between deal complexity and the number of managers. Second, for industrialised 
country loans, implicit and explicit guarantees can lower spreads; only explicit 
guarantees had this effect for developing countries, possibly because only they were 
considered binding enough. As in the case of developing countries, secured loans are 
more expensive than others, potentially because they are very riski9• Third, the dummy 
for increased deals - in the sense that the amount of a facility has been increased from 
its original amount - has a negative effect on industrialised country loan spreads, not on 
emerging ones, suggesting banks wield less market power and show more flexibility to 
adapt to changes in industrials borrowers' financing needs. 
Regarding market structure, we find that contrary to developing countries, industrialised 
country borrowers with a high share of world syndicated borrowing are having to pay 
less for their loans relative to others. This could reflect pricing gains from the 
established presence of their countries on the loan market. 
Contrary to developing countries, the corruption index did not turn up as a significant 
variable for loan pricing (see also the OLS version of the regression with robust 
59 Berger and Udell (1990) also document that collateral typically is associated with riskier loans. 
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standard errors in Appendix 8, Table 10): lenders do not seem concerned about this 
issue in industrialised countries or consider at least that a legal framework exists for 
enforcing loan contracts. 
The negative coefficient on the ratio of government deficit to GDP is worth noting in 
the industrialised country loan pricing regression. Investors seem to trust that when the 
government of an industrialised country stimulates demand and economic activity 
through higher budget deficits, then this is beneficial for the fortunes of the borrowers 
that operate to meet the extra demand. This translates into cheaper loans for such 
borrowers. We find an opposite effect for developing countries: borrowers of countries 
with higher government deficits face higher loan prices, possibly because investors do 
not trust the ability of the governments concerned to stimulate economic activity 
through higher deficits. For instance, in undemocratic or corrupt regimes, members of 
the government can be seen to embezzle the extra government expense for their own 
personal benefit, or to spend the money on "white elephants". 
We find a negative relationship between the primary market pricing of industrialised 
country loans (and bonds) and the risk-free interest rate: like Kamin and von Kleist 
(1999) we failed to detect such a relationship in the case of developing countries. 
5.2 Comparison of industrialised and developing country bonds 
We note a number of differences between pricing mechanisms for industrialised and 
developing country bonds. 
To begin with, the negative and significant effect of the number of arranger banks on 
bond pricing is more than twice as high for industrialized country issues as for 
developing ones, suggesting there may be more competition between banks arranging 
the former, while a smaller number of banks may specialising in arranging issues for the 
latter. 
Regarding the micro-economic factors that influence bond prices, secured industrialised 
issues are relatively cheaper than others; securing developing country bonds or loans 
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had either no effect or a positive effect on pncmg. The significant and positive 
coefficient on the presence of implicit guarantees is surprising in the case of 
industrialised country bonds, but again not incompatible with Smith and Warner (1979). 
Issuer sectors seem to be taken into account more for industrial country bonds than for 
developing country ones, suggesting that investors consider the former as an asset class 
in itself to the a lesser extent than developing country bonds. 
As far as macro-economic factors are concerned, world economic growth. world trade 
and the share of trade in the GDP of the country of the issuer significantly affect the 
pricing of industrialised country bonds, which was not the case for developing country 
bonds, suggesting that the financing of trade in industrialised countries tends to rely 
both on loans and bonds while it tends to rely more exclusively on loans in the case of 
developing countries. 
Regarding currency effects, we note that contrary to developing country bond issues 
denominated in euro, industrialised country issues denominated in euro are relatively 
cheaper than others, suggesting the liquidity of euro-denominated bond markets catering 
for industrialised country issues may be higher than for developing country issues6o• The 
significant coefficients for issues denominated in yen and US dollar (respectively 
negative and positive) can be accounted for by benchmark or cheap funding effects in 
the case of bonds. 
Finally, as in the case of industrialised country loans and contrary to developing country 
bonds and loans, the corruption index did not turn up as a significant explanatory 
variable of spreads in the case of industrialised country bonds61 • It is interesting to relate 
this result to Bilson, Brailsford and Hooper (2002) who present evidence that political 
risk is important in explaining stock return variation in individual emerging markets, but 
not in developed markets. 
60 According to the Dealogic database, developing country bond issuance in euro represented less than 
half of developing country bond issuance in US dollars during the 1993-2001 period. 
61 This can be seen in the OLS version of the industrialised country bond regression with robust standard 
errors presented in Table 10 of Appendix 8. Again, the corruption index was dropped from the panel 
regression for industrialised country bonds because it uniquely identified every country. 
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5.3 Analysis of the pooled loans and bonds sample 
The significant and negative bond dummy in the regression where industrialised country 
bonds and loans are pooled (see Appendix 7) shows that spreads tend to be lower for 
industrialised country bonds than on loans, confirming, on average, the riskier nature of 
the latter as compared to the former. This result is in contrast with our findings about 
developing countries, but consistent with the view (Diamond, 1991; Bolton and Freixas, 
2000) that riskier or "start -up" borrowers require monitoring and will use bank lending 
as a source of finance until they establish a credible repayment history and are able to 
issue securities in their name. Furthermore, this finding is also in accordance with the 
empirical results of Melnik and Plaut (1991). The comparison with developing countries 
confirms that, on average during the 1990s, developing country borrowers have been 
issuing "junk" -quality bonds, i.e. bonds where risk premia are higher than developing 
country loans, while industrialised country borrowers have predominantly been 
occupying the higher-quality end of the bond market, where spreads are lower than on 
loans. 
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Table 4: Loan and bond pricing regressions for industrialised countries 
We estimated the following fixed effects panel regression, considering each borrower country as a group: 
In(spread) = /30 Intercept + /31 maturity + /32 In_size + /33 nbrov + /34 !Lexplic + /35 g_implic + 
/36 secured + /37 increase + /38 constrpt + /39 tradind + /310 finservb + /311 finservn + /312 high-tech + 
/3/3 infrastr + /314 popserv + /315 state + /316 transpor + /317 debtgdp + /318 debtgdp_l + /319 brent + 
/320 brentl + /321 treas + /322 treas_l + /323 pppsh + /324 PPPSh_l + /325 growth + /326 growth_l + /327 wrgdp 
+ /328 wrgdp_l + /329 trade + /330 trade_l + /331 cty_shar+ /332 cty_shar_l + /333 bus_shar + /334 bus_shaCt 
+ /335 restodeb + /336 restodeb_l + /337 defiGDP + /338 defiGDP_1 + /339 curacGDP + /340 curacGDP_l + 
/341 invGNP + /342 invGNP_1 + /343 iegdp + /344 iegdp_l + /345 credgdp + /346 credgdp_t + /347 corrupt + 
/348 usd + /349 jpy + /350 eur + £ 
where: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
In(spread) = natural logarithm of spread (over LIBOR for loans, over benchmark security for 
bonds) 
maturity = maturity of loan or bond, in years 
In_size = natural logarithm of loan or bond issue size, in millions of US dollars 
nbprov = number of provider banks (for loans), or arranger banks (for bonds) 
g_explic, g_implic = dummies for explicitly, resp. implicitly guaranteed instrument (implicit 
guarantee in the sense for instance that borrower or issuer is the subsidiary of another concern) 
secured = dummy for secured instrument 
increase = dummy to indicate that the original amount of the bond or the loan has been increased 
constrpt, tradind, finservb, finservn, high-tech, infrastr, popserv, state, transpor = sectoral dummies 
for construction and property, traditional industry, financial services (banks), financial services (non-
banks), high-tech industry, infrastructure, population-related services, state, transport. Note that the 
dummy for the utilities sectors was excluded from the equation as its inclusion would have 
overspecified the model. For the full list of base sectors included in each category, see Appendix 3. 
debtgdp = ratio of debt to GDP for country of the borrower/issuer, for year concerned (end-year), 
-1 for previous year 
brent = price of one barrel of Brent crude oil at time of signing (in US$), _lone year before 
treas = yield on the three-month US Treasury Bill, for month concerned, _lone year before 
pppsh = purchasing power parity share of world GDP of the borrower' s/issuer' s country for year 
concerned (end-year), -1 for previous year 
growth = real GDP growth in borrower'slissuer's country, for year concerned, -1 for previous year 
wrgdp = growth in world GDP (for year concerned), -1 for previous year 
trade = growth in world trade (for year concerned), -1 for previous year 
cty_shar = share of the borrower's (issuer's) country in world syndicated lending (bond issuance) 
for year concerned, -1 for previous year 
bus_shar = share of the borrower's (issuer's) business sector in world syndicated lending (bond 
issuance), for year concerned, -1 for previous year 
restodeb = ratio of external reserves to debt in borrower' slissuer' s country for year concerned 
(end-year), -1 for previous year 
defiGDP, defiGDP = ratio of government deficit to GDP in borrower'slissuer's country for year 
concerned (end-year), -1 for previous year 
curacGDP = ratio of current account to GDP in borrower'slissuer's country for year concerned 
(end-year), -1 for previous year 
invGNP = ratio of investment to GNP in borrower'slissuer's country for year concerned, -1 for 
prevIOus year 
iegdp = ratio of imports plus exports over GDP for country of the borrowerlissuer, for year 
concerned, -1 for previous year 
credgdp = ratio of bank credit to GDP for country of the borrower or issuer, for year concerned, -1 
for previous year 
corrupt = corruption index of the country of the borrowerlissuer (assigned by World Transparency) 
usd, jpy, eur = dummies for instrument denominated, respectively, in US dollars, Japanese yen and 
euro (or any of its 12 predecessor currencies) 
£ is a random disturbance 
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Table 4 (continued): Loan and bond pricing regression for 
industrialised country borrowers 
Fixed effects panel regression, considering each borrower country as a group. 
variable Loan spreads Bond spreads 
maturity 0.0696:1: (0.001) 0.0274:1: (0.001) 
In_size 
-0.2461:1: (0.004) 
-0.1019:1: (0.012) 
nbprov O.OO13t (0.000) 
-0.0209:1: (0.001) 
!Lexplic 
-0.0578t (0.025) 
-0.0213 (0.031) 
g_implic 
-0.0931:1: (0.028) 0.2246:1: (0.028) 
secured 0.4116:1: (0.011) 
-0.2026:1: (0.063) 
Increase 
-0.1390:1: (0.040) 0.1708:1: (0.056) 
constrpt 0.4681:1: (0.027) 0.2776t (0.115) 
tradind 0.3197:1: (0.022) 0.2481:1: (0.077) 
finservb 
-0.1322:1: (0.033) -0.0050 (0.133) 
finservn 0.0593t (0.025) 
-0.1838t (0.072) 
high-tech 0.2857:1: (0.022) 0.5504:1: (0.078) 
infrastr 0.2860:1: (0.058) -0.0502 (0.233) 
popserv 0.4432:1: (0.023) 0.4473:1: (0.096) 
state -0.6109:1: (0.090) -0.31Ol:j: (0.075) 
transpor 0.2345:1: (0.033) 0.0423 (0.104) 
debtgdp -0.0068 (0.007) 0.0058 (0.006) 
debtgdp_l 0.0174t (0.006) -0.0001 (0.006) 
brent 0.0009 (0.001) -0.0199:1: (0.005) 
brent I -0.0042t (0.002) 0.0117t (0.005) 
treas -0.0368:1: (0.014) -0.1112:1: (0.029) 
treas_l -0.0268 (0.018) -0.1654:1: (0.043) 
pppsh 0.2381 (0.161) 0.1419 (0.183) 
pppsh_l -0.2890 (0.219) -0.0413 (0.205) 
growth 0.0062 (0.017) -0.0093 (0.022) 
growth.. I -0.0097 (0.016) -0.1255:1: (0.023) 
wrgdp -0.1670:1: (0.047) -0.2139t (0.088) 
wrgdp_l -0.2175:1: (0.051) -0.1576 (0.097) 
trade 0.0380:1: (0.010) 0.0542t (0.026) 
trade_l 0.0315:1: (0.010) 0.1604:1: (0.020) 
cty_shar -0.0282t (0.011) 0.0024 (0.005) 
cty_shaLl -0.0164:1: (0.005) 0.0110t (0.005) 
bus_shar 0.0136 (0.008) 0.0025 (0.004) 
bus_shar_l -0.0114 (0.009) -0.0080 (0.005) 
restodeb -0.0126 (0.008) -0.0000 (0.011) 
restodeb_l 0.0093 (0.007) 0.0177* (0.010) 
defiGDP -0.0423:1: (0.014) 0.0007 (0.022) 
defiGDP_l -0.0251 * (0.012) -0.0307* (0.016) 
curacGDP -0.0035 (0.012) -0.0254 (0.019) 
curacGDP_l 0.0034 (0.013) -0.0331 (0.023) 
invGNP -0.0677:1: (0.022) -0.0593* (0.031) 
invGNP_l 0.1154:1: (0.024) 0.1122:1: (0.033) 
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Table 4 (continued): Loan and bond pricing regression for 
industrialised country borrowers 
Dependent variable: In(spread) 
Fixed effects panel regression, considering each borrower country as a group. 
variable Loan spreads Bond spreads 
iegdp 0.0207:1: (0.004) 0.0057 (0.006) 
iegdp_I -0.0111 t (0.004) 0.0126t (0.006) 
credgdp 0.0105:1: (0.002) -0.0179:1: (0.003) 
credgdp_I -0.0011 (0.000) 0.0063* (0.003) 
corrupt -0.0107 (0.010) 
usd 0.0740t (0.030) 0.1935:1: (0.035) 
jpy 0.0061 (0.141) -0.9792:1: (0.101) 
eur -0.0229 (0.045) -0.1743:1: (0.036) 
intercept 6.7548t (2.644) 3.2922t ( 1.666) 
Note: standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations in loan spreads regression = 20,365, 
in bond spreads regression = 5,086. F-tests are significant at the 1 % level. 
*: significant at the 10% level; "\": significant at the 5% level; :j:: significant at the 1 % level. 
6. Analysis of contagion effects 
In order to determine statistically if contagion could have affected industrialised country 
borrowers in the aftermath of financial crises in developing countries, that is to say 
whether industrialised borrowers' terms of access to the primary market worsened 
following the crisis, we created a dummy variable in our industrialised country bond 
and loan sample taking the value of 1 in the possible instances of contagion identified 
during the visual inspection in Section 2. In other words we assigned the value of 1 to 
the dummy during years when industrialised country bond and/or loan spreads had 
peaked or maturities had bottomed out simultaneously with developing country bonds 
or loans. The facilities concerned were: 
• Japanese and US loans signed in 1999; (peaking of spreads during the Russian, 
Turkish and Latin American crises, see Figure 2); 
• Japanese bonds issued in 1999 (peaking of spreads and maturity trough, see 
Figures 7 and 8); 
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• 
• 
Japanese loans signed in 1998 (sharp reduction of maturities during the Asian 
crisis62 , see Figure 3); 
US bonds issued in 1998 (maturity trough, see Figure 8) . 
We then re-ran the industrialised country loan and bond pricing panel regressions 
incorporating this extra dummy variable on the right-hand side. We found the contagion 
dummy to be strongly significant and positive in case of loans and insignificant in case 
of bonds (see Appendix 9). This confirms the results of our visual analysis in Section 2 
where we had highlighted that the contagion phenomenon from developing to 
industrialised countries had appeared to have occurred to a lesser extent in the case of 
bonds than of loans. Another explanation is that contagion on the bond markets 
(especially affecting the low-quality end of the market for industrialised country bonds) 
is more likely to have taken place in the secondary markets. The secondary market for 
loans is still much less developed than the one for bonds. 
7. Conclusion 
While the academic literature suggests that it may be appropriate to apply the same 
model to analyse the pricing of bonds and loans, we have found differences in the way 
the two instruments react to price determinants. Furthermore, there are differences in the 
pricing of developing and industrialised country instruments. Based on the research 
described in this paper, we can draw the following conclusions. 
Firstly, in the 1990s, investors may have considered developing country bonds as an 
asset class in themselves, with less sensitivity of the pricing of such bonds to macro-
economic conditions and borrower business sector than developing country loans or 
industrialised country bonds issued during the same period. We verify that on average, 
developing country bonds have been riskier than developing country loans and 
industrialised country loans riskier than industrialised country bonds. This could be 
62 Korea, Malaysia, Thailand. 
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evidence of the fact that for the period under study, some industrialised country 
borrowers have been able to access the good quality compartment of the bond market 
where no financial intermediation or monitoring by banks is needed, while, on average, 
developing country borrowers have been able to issue junk bonds (i.e., bonds that are 
riskier than loans). 
Secondly, the corruption index in the borrower's country is significantly related to bond 
and loan pricing in developing countries, but not in industrialised countries, possibly 
mirroring the fact that in the latter, investors consider that the legal and regulatory 
infrastructure is sufficient to enforce financial contracts. This result can be related to 
Bilson, Brailsford and Hooper (2002) who present proof that political risk is important 
in explaining stock return variation in individual emerging markets, particularly in the 
Pacific Basin, but not in developed markets. Our paper helps partially answer the 
research issue raised by the aforementioned authors by presenting evidence that there is 
some political risk exposure in emerging markets that is different to any exposure in 
developed markets, and this has implications for asset pricing and portfolio decisions in 
these markets. 
Thirdly, like Kamin and von Kleist (1999) we fail to detect a significant relationship for 
the period under study between the primary market pricing of developing country bonds 
and loans and industrialised country interest rates. As noted by Kamin and von Kleist, 
the implication for policymakers is that an upturn in industrialised country interest rates 
may lead to a smaller than expected upturn in developing country spreads. However, we 
find a negative relationship between industrialised country interest rates and spreads on 
loans and bonds granted to industrialised country borrowers, which could reflect poorer 
credits dropping out of the market during a period of high interest rates. 
We also studied the structure of industrialised and developing country loan and bond 
markets during the 1990s. As far as the currency composition of these markets is 
concerned, we found that industrialised country bonds and developing country loans 
denominated in Japanese yen are relatively cheaper than others, possibly because of low 
interest rates in the Japanese economy (constituting low funding costs for investors 
based in Japanese yen). We also found industrialised country bonds denominated in 
139 
euro or its predecessor currencies relatively cheaper than others, which could reflect the 
higher liquidity of that market segment. We failed to detect a similar effect for 
developing country bonds denominated in euro, possibly suggesting relatively lower 
liquidity in that market segment. 
Five years after the Asian crisis, bond issuance by developing countries, particularly 
large corporations, is starting to pick up. As the Economist notes (6 July 2002, page 71): 
"The future will probably involve a continued shift away from bank borrowing by big 
companies [from emerging markets]. Having been burned once, the healthy ones have 
been raising capital in the equity and, even more eagerly, in the bond markets." The 
liquidity of markets for developing country bonds deserves policymakers' attention all 
the more because this research also provides evidence of the still relatively low reliance 
of developing countries on bonds - at the expense of loans - to finance their 
participation in world trade. Furthermore we detect potentially less than optimal pricing 
behaviour on banks' behalf when lending to developing country borrowers. This is 
shown by the positive coefficient in our loan pricing regressions on the share of the 
country concerned in world syndicated lending and by the absence of a positive reaction 
from the market in case of loan deals whose amount has been increased from the 
original facility amount. Finally, this research highlights the lower occurrence of 
contagion in financial markets from developing to industrialised country borrowers in 
the case of bonds than in the case of loans. 
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Appendix 1: The literature about the • • prIcIng and 
availability of external funds 
Summary of findings on the effects of borrowers' macro-economic characteristics on the pricing 
fd I' t I db db' 0 eve opmg coun ry oans an on s- )y varIable 
Variable Effect on Literature references 
spread 
External debt + Hanson (1974), Harberger ( 1980), Sachs 
Debt to output ratio (1984), Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Edwards 
Debt to export ratio (1983), Cantor and Packer (1996), Cline and 
(solvency) Barnes (1997) 
Current account to GNP ratio - Sachs (1981) 
(solvencJ0 
Current account deficit to exports + Cline and Barnes (1997) 
Debt service to exports + Feder and Just, (1977), Eichengreen and Mody 
(liquidity) (2000) 
Ratio of international reserves to - Edwards (1983) 
GNP (liguidi~ 
Ratio of international reserves to + Gersovitz (1985) [willingness-to-pay] 
GNP (liquidity) 
Reserves to imports - Cline and Barnes (1997) 
History of rescheduling or default + Cantor and Packer (1996), Eichengreen and 
Mody (1997, 1998,2000) 
Absence of Brady debt forgiveness - Cline and Barnes (1997) 
Dummy for industrialised country - Cline and Barnes (1997) 
borrower (vs. developing country) 
Investment to GNP ratio - Sachs (1984), Edwards (1983) 
Investment to GNP ratio + Gersovitz (1985) [willingness-to-pay] 
Imports to GNP ratio + Frenkel (1983) 
Rate of growth per capita - Feder and Just (1977) 
Per caQita income - Cantor and Packer (1996) 
Economic growth - Eichengreen and Mody (1997, 1998, 2000) 
Variance of eX...Q0rt growth + Eichengreen and Mody (1997, 1998,2000) 
Bank creditiGNP - Eichen~reen and Mody (2000) 
(Bank creditlGDP)*(Economic + Eichengreen and Mody (2000) 
growth rate), 
[(Bank creditlGDP)*(Economic 
growth rate)]2 
High inflation + Cline and Barnes (1997) 
Good sovereign rating 
-
Cantor and Packer - for sovereign spreads 
(1996), Kamin and von Kleist - for sovereign 
and non-sovereign spreads (1999) 
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Appendix 1 (continued): The literature about the pricing 
and availability of external funds 
Summary of findings on the effects of borrowers' micro-economic characteristics on the pricing 
0 f I db db· bI oans an on s - )y varIa e 
Effect on Remarks/reference 
Variable spread 
Financial institutions - Financial institutions seem able to obtain syndicated credit 
facilities at lower spreads than borrower from other sectors, 
Eichengreen and Mody (2000) 
Firm riskiness + Measured by variance of firm assets, Smith (1980) 
Firm value - Smith (1980) 
Infrastructure projects + Loans to fund infrastructure projects tend to have higher 
spreads than loans with other purposes, Eichengreen and 
Mody (2000) 
Acquisition facility + Borrower is prepared to pay a premium if facility is 
urgently needed for an acquisition. 
Facility's maturity +/- Negative effect for project finance loans, positive for other 
loans, Kleimeier and Megginson (2000). Positive effect on 
bond spreads, Kamin and von Kleist (1999). Ambiguous 
effect on spread, Smith (1980). Negative effect on bond 
spreads (Fons, 1994) - survival bias? 
Revolving facility + Because of higher take-down risk, Angbazo, Mei and 
Saunders (1998). 
Loan size +/- Negative effect on spreads according to Kleimeier and 
Megginson (2000) - except for project finance loans -
positive effect according to Smith (1980), because of higher 
resulting bank exposure. Negative effect on bond spreads 
according to Eichengreen and Mody (1997 and 1998): 
economies of scale in the distribution of large issues and 
liquidity of the secondary market 
Third party guarantee - Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) 
Collateralisable assets +/- Depending on type of loan, Kleimeier and Megginson 
(2000) 
Collateral - Smith (1980), Bester (1985), Besanko and Thakor (1987) 
Collateral + Smith and Warner (1979), Berger and Udell (1990) 
Dummy for private placement + Eichengreen and Mody (1997 and 1998): investors demand 
higher spreads to purchase a bond issued by a borrower 
about whom less is known. 
Bond dummy (= 1 when borrowing + Kamin and von Kleist (1999) 
instrument is a bond rather than a 
loan) 
Dummy for non-dollar Issue (as - Kamin and von Kleist (1999), due to the fact that non-dollar 
currency benchmark yields have been lower than US 
opposed to issue in dollars) Treasury yields. In Eichengreen and Mody (2000), loan 
facilities denominated in yen and deutsche marks are found 
to be relatively cheaper than others. 
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Appendix 2: The literature comparing the pricing and availability of loans and bonds 
Authors 
Edwards (1986) 
Melnik and Plaut (1991) 
Cantor and Packer (1996) 
Definition of pricing 
Depending on the currency of denomination of each bond, the 
spread is defined as the difference between their yields and the 
yield on the long-term US, German, Swiss or Japanese 
~verilment bonds. The ~ead over UBOR is taken for loans. 
Mark-up over UBOR 
Spread over US Treasuries for most actively traded Eurodollar 
bond of each as reported by Bloomberg LP on September 29, 
1995. This is a snapshot of secondary market spreads. 
Methodology and data 
OLS pricing regression on 113 
developing country bank loans and 
167 bonds (1976-80) 
201 syndicated Euroloans and 129 
Note Issuance Facilities (NIFs) 
originated in 1986 and 1987 
• Logit regression to examine 
the various explanatory 
factors affecting the choice of 
a particular form of contract 
(NIFs vs. loans) by borrowers 
• OLS regression of Log[1 + 
Number of Regular Managers 
/ Number of Lead Managers] 
on loan characteristics 
Log of 35 countries' bond spreads 
is regressed against their average 
ratings 
Main results 
Both on loan and bond markets, the country risk premium is a 
positive function of the debt to output ratio and a negative 
function of the investment to GNP ratio. Some of the coefficients 
are significantly different across bond and loan markets. 
• Riskier credit ratings increase the likelihood that borrowers 
obtain financing through a conventional loan rather than a NIF. 
The inclusion of a third-party guarantee significantly increases 
the likelihood that the financing is in the form of a NIF. 
• The spread increases the number of lead managers for NIFs, 
not necessarily for loans, suggesting that lead managers do 
indeed playa risk-bearing role in the syndicate, but that role 
seems confined to NIFs and the underwriting risks they 
involve, rather than the risks of lending. A riskier credit rating 
seems to reduce the number of regular managers for NIFs. 
Third party guarantees reduce the number of lead managers for 
NIFs. Longer contract maturity seems to primarily affect the 
number of regular managers, whereas additional options in the 
contract, such as a multi-currency option appear to be met by 
alteriflg the nuIllber of lead managers. 
• Ratings have considerable explanatory power for spreads. 
Sovereign spreads tend to rise as ratings become poorer. In 
addition, ratings appear to provide additional information 
beyond that contained in the standard macro-economic country 
statistics incorporated in market spreads. 
• Rating announcements appear to have a highly significant 
impact on speculative grade sovereigns but a statistically 
insignificant effect on investment grade sovereigns. Rating 
announcements that are more fully anticipated. at least by the 
authors' proxy measures, have a larger impact than those that 
are less antici.£ated. 
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Appendix 2 (continued): The literature about the pricing and availability of loans and bonds 
Authors 
Cline and Barnes (1997) 
Eichengreen and Mody (1997, 
1998) 
Kamin and von Kleist (1999) 
Definition of pricing 
Spreads are defined as the excess of the interest rate above that 
current on the US Treasury obligation of the same maturity. Brady 
bond spreads tend to be volatile because of their long maturities, 
their complex asset structure as restructured assets, and because 
their previous relative liquidity had made some of them designated 
assets in options and derivatives, making their prices and yields 
particularly sensitive to derivatives trading. The pricing of 
Eurobonds tends to be less influenced by such special factors and 
therefore the authors use Eurobonds rather than Brady bonds for 
their analysis. 
Primary market (launch) spread for all developing country bonds -
public and private - issued in the 1991-96 period, drawn from 
Dealogic, are considered. That these are launch spreads is 
important, since spreads at the time of issue behave differently 
than spreads on the secondary market. In particular, in poor 
market conditions when secondary spreads rise, launch spreads 
~enerally fall. 
Annualised yield on the emerging market debt instrument less the 
benchmark yield (i.e. the annualised yield on an industrial country 
government bond of the same currency denomination and maturity 
as the emerging market instrument). For loans, the spread over 
LIBOR is considered. The authors also briefly examine spreads on 
Brady bonds and simulate a yield curve based on their regression 
estimates of the determinants of credit spreads. 
Eichengreen 
(2000) 
and Mody I Spread over LIBOR plus fees. 
Methodology and data 
Quarterly secondary market 
spreads for 11 emerging market 
and 6 European industrial 
countries over the 1992-96 period 
are regressed on a series of macro-
and micro-economic variables. 
A model to explain simultaneously 
both the probability of emerging 
market bond issuance and the 
spread is estimated based on about 
2,000 emerging market country 
bonds issued between 1991 and 
1996. 
OLS pncmg regression on 662 
developing country bank loans and 
bonds issues (1991-97) 
OLS pncmg regression on a 
Loanware sample comprising of 
4,000-plus loans granted to 
developing country borrowers 
(with samQle correction). 
Main results 
Comparison of actual and predicted spreads shows that between 
1995 and 1997, the average spreads for emerging market 
economies with BB ratings fell by more than could be alone 
explained by macro-economic fundamentals, with the rest· 
attributable to rising global capital supply. The market's 
expectation about defaults can be inferred from spreads. The 
effects of various macro-economic variables on spreads are also 
analysed in detail. Loss-equivalent probabilities are also·' 
calculated. 
Poor credits drop out of the market when interest rates rise. In· 
addition, some, especially East Asian, fixed rate, bond issuers 
have been able to time their debt issuance to take advantage of 
favourable market conditions. However, the magnitude of the 
change in spreads following the movement of US interest rates is 
small. US interest rates do have a large impact in determining the 
volume of bond issuance. 
While the responses of bond and loan prices to price determinants 
are different, the list of determinants themselves is quite similar 
for these two types of financing. Investors have charged Latin 
American and Eastern European borrowers more over time than 
borrowers from Asia and the Middle East, all other factors 
constant. There is no statistically significant relationship between 
various measures of industrial country interest rates and emerging 
market new-issue bond ~eads. 
At low levels of financial development and low growth rates. 
policy measures to improve financial intermediation bring value 
and reduce the costs of borrowing, but when they spill over into 
unsustainable credit booms, thy are regarded by the markets with 
alarm and worsen the terms of access to external funds. 
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Appendix 3: Full list of borrower business sectors 
contained in each broad grouping 
Our groupings are based on the 188 business sectors provided by Dealogic Loanware 
(for loans) and the 49 sectors provided by Dealogic (for bonds). 
For loans: 
See Appendix 4 in Paper 2. 
For bonds: 
Construction and property: Real Estate, Construction 
Financial services (bank): Banking & Financial services, Building Society 
Financial services (non-bank): Financial corporate, Insurance, Investment 
trust/company, Leasing company, Financial re-packaged 
High-tech: Electronics/Electrical, Rubber & Plastics, Healthcare & Pharmaceuticals, 
Computers/Software, Chemicals, Consultancies/ Agencies/Services, 
Telecoms/Communications, Biotechnology, Agribusiness, Aerospace 
Infrastructure: Public workslPublic services 
Population services: Luxury goods, Media & Publishing, Hotels & Leisure, Retailing 
& Consumer goods, Education 
State: Central Bank, State Authority/Government, US Agency, Local authority 
Traditional Industry: Food & Drink, Textiles & Clothing, Trading & Dealing, 
Tobacco, Mining, Iron & Steel, Engineering, Oil, Coal & Gas, Metals & Ores, 
Manufacturing, Glass & Ceramics, Forest products/Packaging, Automotive, Industrials 
& Conglomerates 
Transport: Railways, Transport & Shipping, Airline 
Utilities: EnergylUtility 
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Appendix 4: Concentration, spreads and maturities 
Figure 11: Evolution of median maturity and pricing on syndicated loans granted to all 
industrialised and developing countries and countries with largest amounts of borrowings for year 
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Figure 12: Evolution of median maturity and launch spreads* on bond issues for all industrialised 
and developing countries and countries with largest amounts of issuance for year concerned 
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Appendix 5: Descriptive statistics for the developing 
country bond and loan sample 
Table 5: Distribution of loan sizes and s 
N 
Construction and property 167 
Financial services - banks 877 50.0 110.3 
Financial services - nonbanks 493 61.9 30.0 110.1 
High-tech industries 802 104.6 55 .0 157.4 
Infras tructure 15 71.0 55 .0 51.0 
Population related services 132 89.4 50.0 128.7 
State-provided services 245 188.0 90.0 352.6 
Traditional industry 846 94.5 50.0 172.5 
Transport 518 75.9 39.8 208.1 
Utilities 777 162.5 91.0 284.2 
Spread (bp) 
IndtistI ., N Mean Median Standard deviation 
Construction and property 167 121.4 87 .5 93.4 
Financial services - banks 878 107.6 75 .0 102.0 
Financial services - nonbanks 493 95.8 75 .0 68 .2 
High-tech industries 803 130.8 100.0 99.4 
Infrastructure 15 179.8 150.0 94.0 
Population related services 132 203 .8 163.8 130.3 
State-provided services 245 119.2 87.5 94.2 
Traditional industry 846 152.9 120.0 108.2 
Transport 519 89.1 70.0 68 .5 
Utilities 777 150.0 128.0 104.2 
Source: Dealogic Loanware, author's calculations. 
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, Table 6: Distribution of bond sizes and spreads by industry (developing countries) 
Industry 
Construction and property 
Financial services - banks 
Financial services - nonbanks 
High-tech industries 
Infrastructure 
Population related services 
State-provided services 
Traditional industry 
Transport 
Utilities 
N 
25 
213 
150 
77 
3 
24 
391 
136 
11 
71 
Industu_ ... 1l!_, _ .............. '* __ -.... ___ ......;.;.. _____ -.:.N.;.... 
Construction and property 25 
Financial services - banks 213 
Financial services - nonbanks 150 
High-tech industries 77 
Infrastructure 3 
Population related services 24 
State-provided services 391 
Traditional industry 136 
Transport 
Utilities 
Source: Dealogic, author's calculations, 
11 
71 
Bond size ($m) 
Mean Median Standard deviatior. 
205A 150,0 137.9 
177.2 115.0 163.7 
234.3 200.0 193.0 
207.8 200.0 139.2 
200.0 200.0 75 .0 
16l.0 138A 77.1 
486.9 35l.8 475.7 
200.2 150.0 14l.6 
l71A 150.0 108 .2 
228.1 170.0 195 .3 
Spread (bp) 
Mean Median Standard deviation 
363.0 375.0 150.8 
27l.8 270.0 167A 
323.9 319.0 192A 
346.8 340.0 248.9 
426.5 387.5 125.6 
42l.1 425.0 85.1 
349A 337.5 182.8 
308.6 293.8 168.7 
29l.9 275.0 150.0 
257.7 248.0 167.6 
153 
Appendix 6: Descriptive statistics for the industrialised 
country bond and loan sample 
, Table 7: Distribution of loan sizes and s~reads by industry (industrialised countries) 
Loan size ($m) 
N Mean Median Standard deviation 
Construction and property 1,850 140.4 78 .1 181.7 
Financial services - banks 941 397.2 128.7 824.9 
Financial services - nonbanks 2,274 387.4 150.0 842.8 
High-tech industries 5,076 248.2 64.8 754 .0 
Infrastructure 210 186.5 50.0 545.9 
Population related services 5,746 191.7 70.1 418.0 
State-provided services 89 710.6 200.0 1,471.8 
Traditional industry 6,031 205 .8 73.2 483.2 
Transport 961 202.0 80.0 366.5 
Utilities 2,024 310.1 150.0 508.8 
Spread (bp) 
N Mean Median Standard deviation 
Construction and property 1,853 182.9 175 .0 92.3 
Financial services - banks 944 94.5 55.0 98.1 
Financial services - nonbanks 2,275 126.2 87 .5 108 .2 
High-tech industries 5,087 196.0 200.0 119.3 
Infrastructure 211 188 .8 200.0 105.2 
Population related services 5,758 205.1 213.8 108 .1 
State-provided services 89 45.5 25 .0 52.4 
Traditional industry 6,038 184.9 200.0 109.8 
Transport 966 153.1 127.9 103 .0 
Utilities 2,025 119.6 100.0 94.1 
Source: Dealogic Loanware, author's calculations. 
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Table 8: Distribution of bond sizes and spreads by industry (industrialised countries) 
Industry. 
Construction and property 
Financial services - banks 
Financial services - nonbanks 
High-tech industries 
Infrastructure 
Population related services 
State-provided services 
Traditional industry 
Transport 
Utilities 
lndustr 
Construction and property 
Financial services - banks 
Financial services - nonbanks 
High-tech industries 
Infrastructure 
Population related services 
State-provided services 
Traditional industry 
Transport 
Utilities 
Source: Oealogic, author's calculations. 
N 
109 
3,470 
2,311 
525 
13 
201 
803 
577 
144 
239 
N 
109 
3,470 
2,312 
525 
13 
201 
803 
577 
144 
239 
Bond size ($m) 
Mean Median Standard deviatior 
183.9 160.0 143.5 
396.4 252.0 462.3 
308.1 200.0 39l.4 
557.4 320.4 628.0 
236.2 191.9 158.9 
353.3 250.0 355.6 
1,076.0 500.0 1,34l.6 
326.5 243 .2 334.6 
270.6 200.9 198.9 
363.7 300.0 259.1 
Spread (bp) 
Mean Median Standard deviation 
119.5 90.0 121.1 
49.6 30.0 56.0 
88.7 68 .0 89.5 
230.3 115.0 245.5 
37.7 28.0 30.1 
175.5 106.0 184.1 
44.0 38 .5 29.1 
120.4 85 .0 128.5 
99.6 52.3 140.2 
82.1 60.0 77 .3 
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Appendix 7: Pooled bond and loan pricing regressions 
(effect of the bond dummy) 
Dependent variable: In(spread). Independent variables as in Table 3 (developing countries) and Table 4 
(industrialised countries). bond = dummy that takes the value of 1 if instrument is a bond, 0 otherwise. 
Fixed effects panel regression with each borrower country considered as a group. 
variable Developing countries variable Industrialised countries 
maturity 0.0144+ (0.001) Imaturity 0.0433+ (0.001) 
In_size 
-0.0900+ (0.011) In_size 
-0.2096+ (0.003) 
nbprov 0.0009 (0.001) nbprov 
-0.0041+ (0.000) 
g_explic 
-0.2231+ (0.027) g_explic 
-0.0414t (0.019) 
g_implic -0.0063 (0.036) g_implic 0.0867+ (0.019) 
secured 0.1962+ (0.027) secured 0.4227+ (0.011) 
Increase 0.0159 (0.036) Increase 0.0117 (0.033) 
constrpt 0.2584+ (0.061) constrpt 0.4480+ (0.026) 
tradind 0.1786+ (0.035) tradind 0.3395+ (0.021) 
finservb -0.1536+ (0.040) finservb 
-0.1399+ (0.032) 
finservn 0.1734+ (0.044) finservn -0.0702+ (0.023) 
high-tech 0.1814+ (0.036) high-tech 0.3416+ (0.021) 
infrastr 0.5433+ (0.197) infrastr 0.2924+ (0.058) 
popserv 0.3648+ (0.062) popserv 0.4727+ (0.021) 
state -0.0488 (0.049) state -0.1711+ (0.040) 
transpor 0.1858+ (0.048) transpor 0.2156+ (0.032) 
debtgdp 0.0037* (0.001) debtgdp -0.0072t (0.003) 
debtgdp_l -0.0028 (0.002) debtgdp_l 0.0050 (0.003) 
brent -0.0114+ (0.004) brent 0.0026 (0.001) 
brentl -0.0199+ (0.004) brentl -0.0008 (0.001) 
treas -0.0437 (0.035) treas -0.0370+ (0.012) 
treas_l 0.0121 (0.028) treas_l -0.0370t (0.017) 
pppsh 1.9781+ (0.619) pppsh -0.1774t (0.089) 
PPPSh_l -1.0844* (0.592) pppsh_l -0.0049 (0.096) 
growth -0.0047 (0.010) growth 0.0392+ (0.011) 
growth_l 0.0036 (0.004) growth_ 1 0.0009 (0.011) 
wrgdp -0.2125+ (0.072) wrgdp -0.1928+ (0.038) 
wrgdp_l -0.3345+ (0.072) wrgdp_l -0.2764+ (0.032) 
trade 0.0768+ (0.016) trade 0.0401+ (0.008) 
trade_l 0.0684+ (0.017) trade_l 0.0535+ (0.007) 
cty_shar 0.0502 (0.053) cty_shar -0.0030 (0.002) 
ctyshaLI 0.0467 (0.042) ctyshaLl 0.0079+ (0.002) 
bus_shar -0.0235t (0.010) bus_shar -0.0142+ (0.003) 
busshar_l 0.0225t (0.010) busshaLI 0.0116+ (0.004) 
restodeb 0.0000 (0.000) resdebt -0.0170+ (0.006) 
resdeb_1 0.0002 (0.000) resdebtl 0.0184+ (0.006) 
gra 0.0972t (0.047) defgdp -0.0650+ (0.010) 
defiGDP 0.0133+ (0.005) defgdp_1 -0.0286+ (0.008) 
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Appendix 7 (continued): pooled bond and loan pricing regressions 
Dependent variable: In(spread) 
Fixed effects panel regression, considering each borrower country as a group. 
variable Developing countries variable Industrialised countries 
curacGDP -0.0002 (0.006) curgdp_I -0.0303:1: 
curgdp_I 
-0.0245:1: (0.008) invgdp -0.1019:1: 
invGNP 
-0.0508:1: (0.008) invgdp_I 0.0753:1: 
mvgnp_I -0.0244:1: (0.008) iegdp O.OO64t 
tdstoxgs 0.0051 t (0.002) iegdp_1 0.0089:1: 
tdsxgs_1 0.0001 (0.001) credgdp 0.0072:1: 
iegdp 0.0001 (0.000) credgdp_1 -0.0031:1: 
iegdp_I 0.0061 t (0.002) corrupt -0.0131 
credgdp -0.0000 (0.000) usd 0.1993:1: 
credgdp_I -0.0000 (0.000) py -0.2381:1: 
corrupt eur -0.0291 
usd -0.1232 (0.081) bond -0.1071:1: 
JPY -0.2141 * (0.113) intercept 8.0924:1: 
eur -0.0544 (0.089) 
bond 0.7697:1: (0.045) 
intercept 6.4446:1: (0.409) 
Note: standard elTors In parentheses. Number of observatIOns In loan spreads regressIOn = 3,302; 
in bond spreads regression = 25,451. F-tests are significant at the 1 % level. 
*: significant at the 10% level; t: significant at the 5% level; :j:: significant at the I % level. 
(0.011) 
(0.014) 
(0.016) 
(0.003) 
(0.003) 
(0.001) 
(0.000) 
(0.010) 
(0.022) 
(0.074) 
(0.026) 
(0.027) 
(1.179) 
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Appendix 8: Corruption index regressions 
Table 9: Corruption index regression for developing country borrowers 
Regression with robust standard errors, all variables as in panel regression. pcpi = inflation; sCtdebt 
= ratio of short-term to total external debt. Dependent variable - In (spread) 
variable Loan spreads Bond spreads 
maturity 0.0197t (0.003) 0.0083t (0.001) 
In_size 
-0.0757t (0.014) -0.0014 (0.041) 
nbprov 
-0.0003 (0.001) 
-0.0095t (0.004) 
g_explic 
-0.2873t (0.035) 0.0719 (0.071) 
g_implic 0.0050 (0.054) -0.0905 (0.074) 
secured 0.203It (0.032) 
-0.5443t (0.215) 
Increase 0.0495 (0.047) 
-0.1166 (0.073) 
constrpt 0.1499t (0.067) 0.0986 (0.113) 
tradind 0.1453t (0.048) -0.0270 (0.095) 
finservb -0.1748t (0.047) -0.4567 (0.404) 
finservn 0.1629t (0.048) -0.1290 (0.165) 
high-tech 0.1160t (0.048) 0.1297 (0.097) 
infrastr 0.4176t (0.122) 0.3037t (0.122) 
popserv 0.3503t (0.076) 0.0675 (0.104) 
state -0.1396* (0.073) -0.2184t (0.107) 
transpor 0.0416 (0.059) 0.1736 (0.136) 
debtgdp 0.0080t (0.002) 0.0183t (0.005) 
debtgdp_l -0.0054t (0.002) -0.0042 (0.006) 
brent -0.0016 (0.005) -0.0540t (0.015) 
brentl -0.0192t (0.005) 0.0242* (0.014) 
treas 0.0134 (0.034) -0.1986* (0.104) 
treas_l 0.0256 (0.030) 0.0273 (0.158) 
pCpl -0.0004 (0.000) -0.0015 (0.000) 
pCpLl 0.0003 (0.000) 0.0018 (0.001) 
pppsh -3.7932t (0.638) -4.6333t (1.321) 
PPPSh_l 3.6706t (0.650) 4.5535t (1.304) 
growth 0.0533t (0.010) 0.0947t (0.032) 
growth_1 -0.0144t (0.005) -0.0173 (0.018) 
sCtdebt -0.0057 (0.003) 0.0098 (0.008) 
sCtdebtl 0.0045 (0.003) -0.0148 (0.009) 
wrgdp -0.3923t (0.083) -0.2455 (0.246) 
wrgdp_l -0.3202t (0.065) 0.1067 (0.211) 
trade 0.0838t (0.016) 0.0603 (0.080) 
trade_l 0.0376t (0.016) 0.0464 (0.069) 
cty_shar 0.6312t (0.126) 0.1864t (0.086) 
ctyshar_l -0.0715 (0.128) -0.2940t (0.097) 
bus_shar -0.0247 (0.028) -0.0011 (0.014) 
busshaLl -0.0050 (0.027) 0.0055 (0.015) 
restodeb 0.0000 (0.000) 0.0042t (0.001) 
resdeb_1 -0.0001 (0.000) 0.0012t (0.000) 
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Table 9 (continued): Loan and bond pricing regression for 
developing country borrowers 
Dependent variable: In(spread) 
OLS estimation with robust standard errors. 
variable Loan spreads Bond spreads 
gra 0.0186 (0.041) 0.3792:1: (0.130) 
defiGDP 0.0211 :I: (0.006) 0.0439 (0.034) 
defigdp_l -0.0027 (0.008) 0.0499* (0.027) 
curacGDP -0.0146 (0.009) 0.0324* (0.018) 
curgdp_l 0.0085 (0.008) -0.0597:1: (0.016) 
invGNP -0.0685:1: (0.009) 0.0014 (0.028) 
invgnp_l 0.0112 (0.008) 0.0011 (0.026) 
tdstoxgs 0.0030 (0.002) 0.0163t (0.006) 
tdSXgS_l -0.0018 (0.002) -0.0086 (0.007) 
iegdp 0.0002 (0.000) 0.0001 (0.000) 
iegdp_l -0.0010 (0.001) -0.0107:1: (0.002) 
credgdp 0.0000 (0.000) 0.0000:1: (0.000) 
credgdp_l -0.0000 (0.000) -0.0000* (0.000) 
corrupt -0.1360:1: (0.014) -0.1570:1: (0.035) 
usd -0.1643 (0.119) 0.1764 (0.125) 
jpy -0.1707 (0.134) -0.0092 (0.237) 
eur -0.2382* (0.132) 0.2157* (0.120) 
intercept 8.6935:1: (0.291) 5.9998:1: (0.713) 
R2 0.4404 0.6405 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations in loan spreads regression = 2,772; 
in bond spreads regression = 530. 
*: significant at the 10% level; t: significant at the 5% level; :j:: significant at the 1 % level. 
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Table ~O: C~rruption index regression for industrialised country borrowers 
RegressIOn wIth robust standard errors. All variables as in panel regression. pcpi = inflation. 
Dependent variable: In(spread) 
variable Loan spreads Bond spreads 
maturity 0.0672:1: (0.002) 0.0283:1: (0.001) 
In_size 
-0.2429:1: (0.004) 
-0.0805:1: (0.012) 
nbprov 0.0009 (0.000) 
-0.0229:1: (0.001) 
g_explic 
-0.0616t (0.024) 
-0.0294 (0.031) 
g_implic 
-0.0968:1: (0.031) 0.2297:1: (0.029) 
secured 0.4146:1: (0.010) 
-0.1790:1: (0.060) 
Increase 
-0.1513:1: (0.036) 0.1453t (0.062) 
constrpt 0.4757:1: (0.026) 0.2319t (0.101) 
tradind 0.3293:1: (0.023) 0.1759t (0.069) 
finservb 
-0.1576:1: (0.034) 0.0559 (0.104) 
finservn 0.0643t (0.026) 
-0.2429:1: (0.061) 
high-tech 0.2955:1: (0.023) 0.5054:1: (0.078) 
infrastr 0.2932:1: (0.055) -0.1644 (0.219) 
popserv 0.4505:1: (0.024) 0.4065:1: (0.095) 
state 
-0.6374:1: (0.100) -0.3730:1: (0.063) 
transpor 0.2379:1: (0.033) -0.0283 (0.116) 
debtgdp -0.0149:1: (0.005) 0.0177:1: (0.004) 
debtgdp_I 0.0154:1: (0.005) -0.0143:1: (0.004) 
brent 0.0033* (0.001) -0.0059 (0.005) 
brent I -0.0036* (0.002) 0.0161:1: (0.005) 
treas -0.0394:1: (0.014) -0. 156l:j: (0.026) 
treas_l -0.0286 (0.018) 
-0. 157l:j: (0.044) 
pCpI -0.0370* (0.020) 0.0938:1: (0.023) 
PCpi_1 -0.0295* (0.017) 0.0622:1: (0.019) 
pppsh -0.1781 (0.111) 0.0518 (0.165) 
PPPSh_1 0.2090* (0.109) -0.0541 (0.166) 
growth 0.0309t (0.014) 0.0590:1: (0.015) 
growth_l 0.0145 (0.014) -0.0398t (0.018) 
wrgdp -0.0966t (0.045) -0.2494:1: (0.091) 
wrgdp_I -0. 144l:j: (0.042) 0.1332* (0.074) 
trade 0.0276:1: (0.009) 0.0249 (0.024) 
trade_l 0.0247t (0.010) 0.1116:1: (0.017) 
cty_shar 0.0061 (0.005) -0.0041 (0.004) 
cty_shaLI -0.0067 (0.004) 0.0036 (0.005) 
bus_shar 0.0113 (0.009) 0.0021 (0.004) 
bus_shaLl -0.0092 (0.009) -O.Ol13t (0.005) 
restodeb -0.0253:/: (0.006) -0.0115 (0.009) 
restodeb_l 0.0143t (0.005) 0.0138 (0.009) 
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Table 10 (continued): Corruption index regression for industrialised country 
borrowers 
Dependent variable: In (spread) 
OLS estimation with robust standard errors. 
variable Loan spreads Bond spreads 
defiGDP 
-0.0556t (0.011) -0.0146 (0.015) 
defiGDP_1 -0.0164 (0.010) 0.0027 (0.014) 
curacGDP 0.0200* (0.010) 0.0168 (0.017) 
curacGDP_1 -0.0263t (0.011) -0.0548t (0.018) 
invGNP -0.0871:1: (0.020) -0.0129 (0.020) 
invGNP_1 O.l064t (0.021) 0.0136 (0.019) 
iegdp 0.0070* (0.003) -0.0056 (0.005) 
iegdp_1 -0.0068* (0.004) 0.0062 (0.005) 
credgdp 0.0074t (0.001) -0.0134t (0.002) 
credgdp_1 -0.0021 t (0.000) 0.0106t (0.002) 
corrupt -0.0003 (0.010) 0.0131 (0.023) 
usd 0.0143 (0.030) 0.1591t (0.031) 
JPY 0.1811 (0.129) -0.9432t (0.109) 
eur -0.2647t (0.039) -0.2455t (0.032) 
intercept 4.4085t (0.213) 4.3367t (0.356) 
R2 0.4414 0.4966 
Note: standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations in loan spreads regression = 20,365; 
in bond spreads regression = 5,086. 
*: significant at the 10% level; "I: significant at the 5% level; :j:: significant at the 1% level. 
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Appendix 9: Contagion effects regression 
Fixed effects panel regression; group variable = country. Dependent variable: 
independent variables as in Table 4, except contag variable as defined in Section 6. 
In(spread). All 
variable Loan spreads Bond spreads 
maturity 0.0696* (0.001) 0.0274* (0.001) 
In_size 
-0.2460* (0.004) 
-0.1017* (0.012) 
nbprov 0.0012t (0.000) 
-0.0209* (0.001) 
g_explic 
-0.0593t (0.025) -0.0210 (0.031) 
g_implic 
-0.0913* (0.028) 0.2247* (0.028) 
secured 0.4113* (0.011) 
-0.2028* (0.063) 
Increase 
-0.136U (0.040) 0.1713* (0.056) 
constrpt 0.4690* (0.027) 0.2774t (0.115) 
tradind 0.320U (0.022) 0.248U (0.077) 
finservb 
-0.1306* (0.033) -0.0037 (0.133) 
finservn 0.0605t (0.025) -0.1837t (0.072) 
high-tech 0.2860* (0.022) 0.550U (0.079) 
infrastr 0.2863* (0.058) -0.0513 (0.233) 
popserv 0.4436* (0.023) 0.448U (0.096) 
state -0.6008* (0.090) -0.3095* (0.075) 
transpor 0.2358* (0.033) 0.0416 (0.104) 
debtgdp -0.0148* (0.007) 0.0058 (0.006) 
debtgdp_I 0.0260* (0.007) 0.0000 (0.006) 
brent 0.0001 (0.001) 
-0.0203* (0.005) 
brent I -0.0042t (0.002) 0.0115t (0.005) 
treas -0.0312t (0.014) -0.1104* (0.029) 
treas_l -0.0308* (0.018) -0.1668* (0.044) 
pppsh 0.3162* (0.163) 0.2779 (0.354) 
PPPSh_1 -0.5458t (0.233) -0.1663 (0.346) 
growth -0.0060 (0.017) -0.0129 (0.023) 
growth_1 -0.0211 (0.016) -0.1264* (0.023) 
wrgdp -0.216U (0.049) -0.2162t (0.088) 
wrgdp_I -0.2957* (0.056) -0.1474 (0.099) 
trade 0.0658* (0.013) 0.0543t (0.026) 
trade_l 0.0582* (0.013) 0.159U (0.020) 
cty_shar -0.0374* (0.011) 0.0032 (0.006) 
cty_shaLI -0.0272* (0.006) 0.0096 (0.006) 
bus_shar 0.0141 (0.008) 0.0026 (0.004) 
bus_shaLl -0.0119 (0.009) -0.0081 (0.005) 
restodeb -0.0126 (0.008) -0.0002 (0.011) 
restodeb_l 0.0092 (0.007) 0.0174 (0.010) 
defiGDP -0.0530* (0.014) 0.0014 (0.022) 
defiGDP_1 -0.0208 (0.013) -0.0307* (0.016) 
curacGDP -0.0097 (0.012) -0.0241 (0.019) 
curacGDP_I -0.0015 (0.014) -0.0342 (0.023) 
invGNP -0.0483t (0.022) -0.0593* (0.031) 
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Appendix 9 (continued): contagion effects regression for industrialised country 
borrowers 
Dependent variable: In(spread) 
Fixed effects panel regression, considering each borrower country as a group. 
variable Loan spreads Bond spreads 
iegdp 0.0188t (0.004) 0.0057 (0.006) 
iegdp_l -0.0063 (0.004) 0.0128t (0.006) 
credgdp 0.0092t (0.002) -0.0180:j: (0.003) 
credgdp_l -0.0016* (0.000) 0.0063* (0.003) 
contag 0.1816:j: (0.057) -0.0602 (0.134) 
usd 0.0738t (0.030) 0.1933t (0.035) 
JPY 0.0103 (0.141) -0.9860t (0.102) 
eur -0.0158 (0.045) -0.1745t (0.036) 
intercept 11.090t (2.985) 3.2080* (1.677) 
Note: standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations in loan spreads regression = 20,365; 
in bond spreads regression = 5,086. F-tests are significant at the 1 % level. 
*: significant at the 10% level; t: significant at the 5% level; t: significant at the 1 % level. 
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Appendix 10: Corrleation matrices 
Table 11: Correlation matrix between variables - developing country loans 
":cty __ sba~~u;-=-shar ;restodeb defiGDP cnracGDPinvGNP tdstoxgs iegdp credgdp 
',~,' ~ 
tpspread 
atnrity ] V . VJkV 
-0.0321 * .1 
-
.0454* 0.0403*~0.0085 0.1291* 0.0255* -0.0116 0']'0% 1 
.4413'!' -0.1054* -0.1265* 0. 1396* ' 0.2476* 13* -0.0049 .,,0.01 0.0346* 
-0.0370~/:Qi219*'-0.1l54* 0.2315* -0.4466*~0.1933* -0.2178* -0.3337* 0.0362* -0.2132* 1 
curacGDPlO.Ol92 0.0305* 0.0381* "0.0204 -0.0364* 0.1373* 0.1005* 0.3405* -0.0059 0.0982* 0.1237* -0.0777* 0.0784* 0.0545* 0.2529* 
~~~ •• ", • - ._- •• -::-'- --- - .•. ~- ... n •• _n • •• n -_ ............ - - 0 .3557'" -0.4657* -0.1036'" 
. _., 
-0.3173* 0.2839* -0.1543* -0.5907* 1 
0.0540*" -0.0522* 0.0583* 0.0696* -0.1250* I 
- '---', - ~~-- ~ ~~~~ ~ ~~~~ 0.0995 * -0.0335* 0.0989* 0.0757* -0.1148* 0.0755* 1 
*: significant at the 10% level 
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Table 12: Correlation matrix between variables - developing country bonds 
cty _sharbus_shar J;estodeb defiGDP cnracGDP invGNP tdstoxgs iegdp credgdp 
pread 
hade 
cty_shar -0.1285* 1 
ill __ _ 
us_shar 0.0409* -0.0395* 0.1413* 1 
estodeb ~0.~187* ·-0.0411 * -0.0607* -0.1477* 1 
0.2054* -0.4923* -03128 * "~0.2778 * -0.1557* 0.0179 -0.0512* 1 
uracGD~O.Olll , 
invGNP-0.5360* O :OO5~! '-0.1878* v. 
-0.0524* 0.1 055* -0.0075 -0.0107 0.1025* -0.0661 * -0.1596* 0.1821 '* 0.0774* 
0.1434~-0 .0014 "-0.0313 0.2508* '0.4974* 0.-08Q9* 0.0494* 0.0229 0.0770* 0.1844* -0.4306* -0.1507* 
tdstoxgs J0.4544* -0.05:: 0.1909*~.0226 __ 0.1874* -0.0817* 0.0499* 0.0470* -0.3345* -0.0204 -0.0724* 0.0801 * 0.1383* -0.2886* 0.3572* -0.3138 * -0.6082* 1 
iegdp -0.0167 -0.0214 -0.2498 * -0.1787* -0.1220* 0.2224* -0.0054 -0.0986* -0.0036 0.0207 0.1145* -0.1295* -0.1243* 0.2240* -0.0443* 0.2914* 0.0787* -0.1944* 1 
credgdp J-0.1l83* 0.0707* -0.0322 ,~Q.0630*:?0918* 0.0939* 0.0629* -0.1194* 0.1726* 0.0873* 0.1027* -0.1 197* -0.1l31 * 0.0576* -0.0491 * 0.1649* 0.2206* -0.1787*-0-.2-5-93-*-'------ol 
*: signifi cant at the 10% level 
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Table 13: Correlation matrix between variables - industrialised country loans 
Inspread maturity In.-:size nbprov debtgdp ,brent treas trade cty_sharbus_shar resdebt defgdp curgdp invgdp iegdp 
0,0195* ~ 0,05~0* -0,0061 {),0264* 0,0129* -0.0628* 1 
i:.O.s64g"" -0.1533* ''[0110* 0.0220* -0.5474* ~().0379* 
.0.08H* ~0 .0640* -0.0098 0.2817* ~0.3548*-0.2730* -0.0947* -0.2457* ~0.2258* -0.1174* -0.0517*-0.0352* -0.0706* 1 
-0.2049* '0.15247 "'0.0271 * ::;:::V=.l=3S=8:"oj< ":;·0.1404* -0.2286*-0.0802 * '-0.620] '" -0.2575 * -OJ 141 * -0.0815* -0.5732* 0.0158* 0.6044* 0.2561 * 
-0.1075* ·O.0789~ 0.1029* Q.0999* -0.1185* ;0.1791;1<0.2093*-0.5743* 0.0122*0.1358* 0.0463* -0.6269* 0.0664* 0.4644* -0.3971*0.1627* 1 
-0.1852* 0.1883*' 0.1112* 0.1643* -0.0692* "0.1220* 0<0.0652* -0.8753* -0.1383* b.0'831* 0.0790* -0.8608* 0.0473* 0.5172* -0.0872* 0.5870* 0.5357* iegdp 
I 
credgdP j-0.1065* 0.1801* 0.0935* 0.1422* -0.3082* 0.1659* 0.0778* -0.6891* -0.2496* 0.0862* 0.0586* -0.7016* 0.0291* 0.4140* -0.0719* 0.3991* 0.5316* 0.7268* 
*: significant at the 10% level 
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Table 14: Correlation matrix between variables - industrialised country bonds 
Inspread maturity In_size ilbprov d~btgdp brent treas pppsh growth :Wrgdp trade cty_shar- bus~;iiarreg;debt defgdp curgdp 'invgdp iegdp credgdp 
0,0938* '0.1157* 0.5477* -0.0461* ' 0.0176 0.0029 1 
-0.0718* 0.0783* -0,23to* -0.1945* -0,0027 0.1980'" '1 
-0.0362'" -0.0214* -0.4398'!: -0.1453* '-0.0089 -0.0046 
curgdp 
,. d lUvg P -0.0274* 0.1447* '0.1478* 0,0280* -0.0640* -0.4967* -0.3371'" ,0.0458* 0.0386* -0.1100* 0.2453* 0,3101* 0.3544* 0.2505* 
iegdp -0.0289* 0.0224* -0.0650* 0.0492* -0.0306* 0.0274* 0.0249* -0.6950* 0.0199* 0.0277* 0.0394* -0.4223* 0.2117* 0.2993* -0.2795* 0.6237* 0.1488* 
credgdp J-O.1773*-0.0792*O.0344* ;..0,0042 -0.1084* 0.0637* 0.0873* -0.5819* -0.4296* 0.0242* 0.0314* 0.1148* 0.4020* 0.2327* 0.1424* 0.3950* 0.5519* 0.4850* 
*: significant at the 10% level 
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Lender characteristics and the structure and pricing of 
syndicated loans 
ABSTRACT 
THIS PAPER analyses the relationship between bank characteristics and the structure 
and pricing of syndicated loans. Such credit facilities amounted to more than one 
third of total international financing in 2001 and therefore constitute an important 
feature of the global financial system. We show that the pricing of loans is likely to 
be lower as banks participating in those loans become less liquidity-constrained or 
better capitalised. The relationship between bank characteristics and loan pricing 
generally appears to be stronger in the case of senior banks than for junior banks. 
This confirms the stronger pricing power of senior banks when arranging loans, 
while junior participants tend to act more as price takers. Contrary to the existing 
literature we find evidence of senior banks offloading riskier loans in a potentially 
opportunistic way to outsider junior banks (who may have little knowledge of the 
borrower), and they tend to hold higher proportions of loans they arrange when they 
are better capitalised. In addition, as information about the borrower becomes less 
transparent, junior banks rely more on the reputation of the senior bank, to 
determine their level of commitment, than when borrower information is widely 
available to the public. 
JEL classification: G21, D40, F30 
Keywords: syndicated loans, banks, liquidity, capital 
170 
1. Introduction 
IN 2001, INTERNATIONAL SYNDICATED LENDING represented $1.4 trillion or more than 
one third of new international capital market financing, and is deemed to have generated 
more underwriting revenue in recent years than either the equity or the bond market 
(Madan, Sobhani and Horowitz, 1999). In particular, leveraged lending has been 
growing rapidly, as commercial borrowers have increasingly displayed a preference for 
leveraged borrowing over junk bond financing (Jones, Lang, Nigro, 2000)63. Specific 
tranches of such syndicated loans are purchased by non-bank investors. These non-bank 
tranches are in most cases equivalent to public bonds and subject to an "arms-length" 
relationship in case of problems (Altman and Suggitt, 2000). This means that banks 
arranging syndicated credits, especially on the leveraged end of the credit quality 
spectrum, have de facto been acting as investment banks, collecting fees for putting 
together syndicates, but not always warehousing the loans themselves, leaving that 
activity to commercial banks or even non-banks64 • Indeed, in the aftermath of banks' 
reduced lending following the Russian crisis, the BIS locational banking statistics show 
a marked decline since 1995 of banks' international loan portfolios relative to their total 
foreign claims including holdings of securities (Figure 1). In other words banks have 
increasingly been investing in publicly marketable securities in relative terms over the 
past few years at the expense of traditional intermediation and monitoring activities. 
The question therefore arises as to which market participants ultimately act as the main 
risk-takers in the syndicated lending market. Their level of knowledge about risk raises 
important concerns for financial stability and one aspect this paper aims to answer is to 
examine the extent to which international syndicated lending over the last decade 
contributed to risk transfer from banks with insider knowledge of borrowers to less well 
informed outsiders. 
63 See footnote 52 for a definition of leveraged lending. 
64 Insurance companies, pension funds and collateralised debt obligation (CDO) arbitrage funds have 
become buyers of syndicated loans, especially on the leveraged and highly leveraged segments. 
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The first pillar of the new Basel Capital Accord65 refines the current capital weights 
existing under the 1988 version determining how much capital banks have to hold as a 
cushion against losses on loans. The refinement is undertaken by means of an explicit 
reference to external ratings issued by rating agencies or banks' internal ratings 
qualifying the borrowers. The new Accord will apply to all internationally active banks 
at every tier within a banking group. As far as we are aware, there have been no studies 
to date that explore the relationship between bank capital and individual loan and 
borrower characteristics at an international level. This paper aims to take a first step in 
65 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Consultative Document: The New Basel Capital Accord, 
January 2001 , issued for comment by May 200l. 
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addressing this issue. More specifically, based on the evolution of the international 
market for syndicated lending from 1993 to 2001, the paper examines the following: 
First, we investigate the effect of banks' capital and liquidity situation on the pricing of 
syndicated credits from 1993 to 2001, controlling for a series of borrower, loan and 
other bank characteristics.66 Thakor (1996) has reported that capital requirements linked 
solely to credit risk are shown to increase equilibrium credit rationing and lower 
aggregate lending. With the new Basle Accord linking capital requirements even more 
closely to risk, this issue has important policy implications and involves the issue of the 
international level playing field (Chen, Mazudmar and Yan, 2000). 
Second, we examine the extent to which capital- or liquidity-constrained banks engage 
in opportunistic behaviour by originating and subsequently selling low-quality loans 
about which they hold privileged information as senior banks. From this type of activity 
the senior banks gather syndication fees but do not hold the loans on their balance 
sheets (i.e. they do not warehouse the loans). The transfer of risk in the economy, in 
such a way or by other means, via credit derivatives for instance, to market participants 
who may have limited knowledge about the risk, is a serious issue for policymakers. 
Most empirical studies in this area (e.g. Jones, William and Nigro, 2000; Dennis and 
Mullineaux 2000) have drawn on US data, mainly from regulatory returns. However, 
data from Dealogic Loanware, a commercial data provider, shows that 51 % of the funds 
for syndicated loans arranged for US borrowers in 2001 were provided by non-US 
banks who do not necessarily complete US regulatory returns; 54% of those loans were 
arranged by non-US banks. We compile a unique international dataset combining the 
specifications of individual loan contracts such as size, maturity and pricing with 
lenders' balance sheet and income statement information67 • This allows us to undertake 
the first analysis of this kind at an international level. 
Third, we examine the effects of local knowledge on loan characteristics. As underlined 
by Boot and Thakor (2000), interbank and capital market competition can either leave 
banks to act like capital market underwriters and originators of transaction loans or 
66 E.g. loan size and maturity; borrower rating; bank size and business mix. 
67 See Section 3 for more on how this is done. 
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make them return to their roots as relationship lending experts. The greater, and more 
timely availability of borrower credit records, as well as the greater ease of processing 
these, makes it easier for banks to originate transaction loans even when they are at a 
great distance from the borrower (Petersen and Raj an, 2000). As an extension of the 
first two research questions outlined above, we also seek to detennine in this paper 
whether there is still an advantage - reflected in loan terms - for a bank to operate in the 
same country as the borrower or to be domiciled or headquartered in the country in 
whose currency the loan is made. 
In keeping with the credit rationing hypothesis developed by Thakor (1996), we show 
that the pricing of loans is likely to be lower as banks participating in those loans 
become less liquidity-constrained or better capitalised, or enjoy a regulatory advantage. 
The relationship between bank characteristics and loan pricing generally appears to be 
stronger in the case of senior banks than of junior banks. This confirms the stronger 
pricing power of senior banks when arranging loans, while junior participants tend to 
act more as price takers. Contrary to the existing literature we find evidence of senior 
banks offloading riskier loans to outsider junior banks with little knowledge of the 
borrower. They also tend to hold higher portions of loans they arrange when they are 
better capitalised. In addition, we document the fact that as information about the 
borrower becomes less transparent, junior banks rely more on the reputation of the 
senior bank, to determine their level of participation in the syndicate, than when 
borrower information is widely available to the public. Finally, this paper highlights the 
importance of local knowledge by senior syndicate banks about the most 
informationally opaque borrowers if those borrowers are to access international 
syndicated credit markets. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the theoretical 
and empirical literature. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the data and methodology, present 
analyse the results. A closing section concludes. 
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2. Literature review 
This section reviews the literature dealing with (i) how banks' capital constraints are 
reflected in loan terms, (ii) the possible occurrence of opportunistic behaviour by senior 
banks who arrange syndicates of banks and sell low quality loans to junior syndicate 
participants and (iii) whether some borrowers can still benefit from lending by 
syndicates of banks where senior banks have local or insider knowledge about 
borrowers. 
2.1 Capital constraints and loan syndications 
In an article exploring the effects capital regulations have on aggregate bank lending 
and monetary policy, Thakor (1996) demonstrates how binding capital constraints can 
result in credit rationing. According to Thakor, the most heavily regulated banks have 
the highest incentive to ration credit. Several authors investigate how loan syndications 
or loan sales can alleviate banks' financing costs under such constraints. Pennachi 
(1988) argues that loan sales allow some banks to finance loans less expensively than 
by traditional deposit or equity issue because bank funds received via loan sales can 
avoid costs associated with required reserves and capital. Other banks with substantial 
market power in deposit financing, but with limited loan-origination opportunities, may 
choose to hold marketable assets. These assets can take the form of loan shares 
purchased from those banks facing competitive financing. 
Banks that have capital-asset ratios below or close to regulatory minima or that are 
liquidity constrained may not want to increase assets by adding large loans to their 
balance sheets and may choose, instead, to share them with other banks by selling them 
(Pavel and Phillis, 1987) or by syndicating them (Simons, 1993). Furthermore, Simons 
points out that banks are limited in the size of the loan they can make to anyone 
borrower (exposure to a single borrower cannot exceed 15% of a bank's capital under 
US regulation). Participating in a syndicate thus allows small banks to acquire exposure 
to large borrowers which they would otherwise not be permitted to have. While loan 
sales or syndications from banks with higher capital requirements to banks with lower 
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requirements may take place in some instances, one main function of loan sales and 
syndications is to reduce the concentration of risk. 
Finally, Chen, Mazumdar and Yan (2000) explore how regulatory differences faced by 
banks can affect loan pricing. Following Thakor (1996), less heavily regulated banks 
may charge a premium on loans to borrowers which might otherwise fall victim of a 
credit crunch (i.e. would be denied credit by the more heavily regulated banks). In 
accordance with these hypotheses, Chen, Mazumdar and Yan (2000) show that Japanese 
banks operating in the US seem to have been extracting such premiums from US 
borrowers who might otherwise not been lent to by US banks. 
2.2 The interaction between senior and junior banks 
Some lead banks originating syndicated credits, especially when they are capital- or 
liquidity-constrained, may exploit the procedure during their behaviour vis-a-vis junior 
participants in the syndicate. Flannery (1989) shows how certain bank examination 
procedures may induce banks to hold only certain risk classes of loans while profitably 
selling the rest (i.e. that portion which cannot be efficiently funded by the bank itself). 
Pennachi (1988) demonstrates that the extent of banks' loan selling is limited by a 
moral-hazard problem that arises from the diminished incentive by banks to efficiently 
monitor and service loans after they have been sold. But this problem can be alleviated 
by optimally designing the loan sales contract. 
In Pennachi' s model, if the bank sells a proportion hi of loan i, then it only gets (1 - hi) 
of the return on the loan. In other words the marginal benefit of its monitoring effort 
will be discounted by factor (1 - hi). Rational loan buyers will infer the diminished level 
of monitoring this entails and hence expect a smaller state-contingent loan cash-flow. 
However the structure of the contract can be made incentive-compatible by giving the 
selling bank a disproportionate share of the loan, assuming certain loan distributions 
(notably that the bank's monitoring effort increases the "fatness" of the lower tail of the 
distribution of the borrowing firm's value). The contract is characterised by penalising 
the bank if low loan outcomes occur and rewarding the bank if high loan outcomes 
occur. Giving the bank a disproportionate share of the risk allows the bank to reap a 
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disproportionate share of the gains from monitoring, enabling a greater amount of the 
loan to be sold while maintaining monitoring-incentive efficiency. Practical illustration 
of this type of contracting can be found in banks' loan sales from a pool of credit card 
receivables where the seller retains an equity position in the pool equal to twice the 
historical default level of the receivables. To summarise, a bank's ability to sell loans 
depends on the loan buyer's perception of the bank's incentive to monitor those loans. 
Besides, by designing the loan sales contract in a way that gives the bank a 
disproportionate share of the gains to monitoring, Pennacchi shows that a greater share 
of the loan can be sold and, hence, a greater level of bank profits can be attained. 
The model of Banerjee and Cadot (1996) offers another example of how lead banks may 
have exploited insider knowledge when arranging syndicated credits. The authors relate 
that large syndicates lending to Latin American debtors were organised and managed by 
a couple of large banks who negotiated loan contracts and sold participations to smaller 
banks worldwide. The same group of banks could be found organising most of the large 
syndications in the late 1970s and early 80s, and could be considered real insiders of the 
country-risk business. Those large banks, being in close contact with officials in the 
borrowing-country governments, had private - albeit imperfect - information on the 
true level of credit risks in any particular country, and might even have got advance 
warning of coming repayment difficulties. Whether they had any incentive to pass that 
information on to other market participants is another matter. Such a situation makes 
junior participants vulnerable to a certain degree of opportunistic behaviour by the agent 
bank, which could withhold information about borrower or loan quality or possibly 
cherry-pick the high-quality syndicated loans for its own portfolio. It could do so by 
either not syndicating them at all or retaining a larger share of them on its books in case 
of a syndication. The agent may even be tempted to deliberately sell bad loans. Banerjee 
and Cadot develop a game theory model to show that prior to the 1982 international 
debt crisis, it was possible for banks with heavy exposure to troubled debtors to attract 
rational newcomers into syndicated loans which were, with positive probability, bailout 
loans. They use a model in which lenders enter the market sequentially in two rounds of 
lending. Between the two rounds, a shock separates borrowers into good ones and bad 
ones, and early entrants acquire information about individual borrower type, while late 
entrants only know the distribution of borrower types. The asymmetric information 
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structure gives rise to both signalling and screening issues. The authors note that there is 
always a pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which late entrants lend to both good 
and bad types, without the borrower type being exposed before final clearing at the 
terminal phase, at which borrower types are revealed. 
Several researchers have produced empirical work in this area. 
Working with a 1991 sample of US loans, Simons (1993) finds that agent banks who 
are more capital-constrained are also more likely to retain a smaller share of syndicated 
loans. She demonstrates that the agent bank's capital-to-asset ratio is positively and 
significantly related to the share of syndicated loans retained on the agent's books. 
However, agent banks typically hold greater shares of real estate loans, which in 1991 
were typically more risky than other types of loans. Therefore, there is no indication of 
opportunistic behaviour on agent banks' behalf in 1991 as they are found to keep a 
smaller share of higher-quality loans on their books. 
Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) show that lead banks which have established a 
reputation through a large volume of repeat business (or are rated better) are able to sell 
off larger portions of syndicated loans. Longer maturity makes a loan more saleable, 
presumably because longer term loans save on duplicative monitoring costs for the 
syndicate banks. Unsecured loans are as likely to be syndicated as secured ones. A loan 
is more likely to be syndicated as the managing agent is more heavily involved in repeat 
business, as the agent's credit rating improves and as the agent is a bank rather than a 
nonbanking institution. The identity of the managing agent also influences whether a 
particular loan will be syndicated. Moreover, according to the authors, although banks 
are more likely to engage in syndication when they are capital constrained, managing 
agents of syndicates hold larger proportions of information-problematic loans on their 
portfolios. This is in keeping with the standard view that the saleability of a debt 
contract depends on the scale and scope of information asymmetries, and that financial 
intermediaries engage in relationship-oriented finance that draws on their specialised 
monitoring skills. 
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Working with a sample of syndicated loans from the US Shared National Credit 
Programme, Jones, Wiliam and Nigro (2000) find evidence that capital constraints 
significantly influence the share of loans held by agent banks. The authors also show 
that agent share tends to be lower if the borrower is a public company and the loan is 
large (i.e. in cases where the agent's informational advantage is smaller). Finally, while 
agent banks generally hold a larger share of their low-quality loans, agent banks that 
have a greater portfolio concentration of lower quality credits hold a smaller share of 
their loans. That is, some banks specialise in originating low-quality loans and these 
banks are relatively successful in finding participants for such loans. 
Angbazo, Mei and Saunders (1998) conduct an empirical investigation of the 
relationship between credit spreads and the seniority of the bank in the syndicate that 
retains the largest share in the loan. They find that spreads are lowered by the presence 
of a lead lender who retains a large share of the loan (and thus bears broad monitoring 
responsibilities). Other members of the syndicate then supposedly perceive that the risk 
is lesser and hence are prepared to earn a lower margin. Conversely, if large chunks of 
the loan are sold down to junior syndicate members, then this should entail an increase 
in spreads, insofar as the junior syndicate members have narrower oversight authorities 
and lower incentives to monitor the borrower. 
2.3 Local presence effects 
The potential importance of relationship lending for smaller borrowers who would 
otherwise be unable to access funds has been underscored by Simons (1993). She points 
out that in the US, limitations on interstate banking closely link the fortunes of small 
mid-sized banks to those of their local and regional economies (the McFadden Act of 
1927 puts geographical restrictions on bank branching). Participating in syndicated 
loans can give banks a chance to lend to borrowers in regions or industries to which 
they might otherwise have no convenient access. 
Sirmans and Bejamin (1990), Jones, William and Nigro (2000) and Sommerville (2001) 
make the case that conditions on local or relationship loans are really different from 
those on other types of loans. In a study of the Louisiana mortgage market between 
179 
1985 and 1987, Sirmans and Benjamin (1990) argue that the product cost functions of 
national, regional and local mortgage banks are different - because of differing 
economies of scale and scope and that furthermore, local banks may have comparative 
cost advantages in originating and servicing mortgages compared to national financial 
institutions, because they can process geographically specific information about the 
creditworthiness of borrowers and the condition of local real estate markets68 • The 
authors provide empirical evidence that national lenders, on average, have higher 
mortgage interest rates than local lenders. Jones, William and Nigro (2000) argue that 
since it is more likely that the agent bank has special knowledge of local firms, the 
agent is expected to retain larger shares of loans made to such to firms. In a comparison 
of the behaviour of local and national banks that finance the housing market in British 
Columbia, Sommerville (2001) presents evidence that local lenders offer cheaper loans, 
and more importantly are more likely to extend credit to more marginal or less well 
capitalized borrowers (they are better at relationship banking, while with their 
economIes of scale or scope, larger national lenders focus on lending to bigger 
borrowers). 
An alternative view is developed in Petersen and Rajan (2000). The authors conjecture 
that greater, and more timely, availability of borrower credit records, as well as the 
greater ease of processing these, may explain why in the United States the distance 
between smaller lenders and firms has considerably increased between 1973 and 1997. 
Distant firms no longer have to be observably the highest quality credits, suggesting that 
a wider cross-section of firms can now obtain funding from a particular lender. These 
findings are interpreted as evidence that there has been substantial development of the 
financial sector, even in areas such as small business lending, that have not been directly 
influenced by the growth in public financial markets. From a policy perspective, that 
small firms now obtain wider access to financing suggests that the consolidation of 
banking services may not raise as strong anti-trust concerns as in the past. 
68 This is so despite the existence of information sources (such as credit reports and real estate appraisals) 
which national and local lenders can access with equal ease. But local institutions may have - among 
other information - past credit repayment histories of the mortgagor, information on local default rates, as 
well as specific legal knowledge allowing for lower servicing and origination costs. 
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Degryse and Ongena (2002) summarise the various considerations involved in distance 
and bank lending69 • They note that developments in technology and travel may 
ultimately diminish the relevance of borrower-lender distance in European banking, 
they find that proximity branching remains very important to ensure credit at accessible 
rates, particularly for small firms and entrepreneurs. 
3. Data and methodology 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse relationships between banks' characteristics 
participating in syndicated loans and conditions on those loans, as reflected by the price 
and share of the loan retained by the senior bank. We work with a sample of credit 
facilities granted by syndicates of banks between 1993 and 2001. These data were 
extracted from the Dealogic Loanware database, a primary market information provider 
on individual syndicated credit facilities, in particular the characteristics of the loans 
(amount, maturity, currency, pricing) and the borrowers (name, nationality, business 
sector). A large part (80%) of the facilities were contracted in US dollars. The database 
provides detailed information on the composition of the syndicate, the respective roles 
of senior participants such as arrangers, administrative agents or senior managers, as 
well as junior participants. In addition, information is provided on the amounts 
committed by each institution. We combined the individual loan transaction data with 
balance sheet and income statement information on syndicate participants available 
from the BankScope meA database. This unique dataset, linking international loan 
transaction data with individual bank characteristics70, allows us to perform an analysis 
of supply side issues in syndicated lending for the first time. 
To allow for time effects, we examine the relationship between loan characteristics and 
bank characteristics for the year of the transactions as well as for the year before. In 
order to explore the relationship between the characteristics of each participant and loan 
specifications, we introduce each transaction into the regression as many times as there 
69 See their paper for a comprehensive review of the distance literature. 
70 Most previous studies have relied on regulatory and hence national databases. 
181 
were banks participating in the loan at various levels of seniority, provided balance 
sheet and profit/loss statement information was available about these banks. Each 
observation then corresponds to the same transaction but to the various characteristics 
of each participating bank71 . 
We begin by exploring the effects of specific lender characteristics on loan pricing - the 
results are presented in §4.1. We analyse junior and senior banks separately through 
separate model specifications. Our indicators of capital, liquidity and loan quality 
constraints facing senior banks are similar to those used by Simons (1993), Dennis and 
Mullineaux (2000) and Jones, Williams and Nigro (2000): 
• Capital and liquidity constraints, reflected, respectively, by the ratio of 
equity72 capital to assets, the ratio of liquid assets to deposits and money market 
funding; 
• Specialisation In investment banking- vs commercial banking type 
activities, gauged by the ratio of interest income to total assets. Low values of 
this ratio reflect investment banking type behaviour while high values would 
mean more traditional intermediation activity; 
• Quality of the loan portfolio, proxied by the ratio of loan loss reserves to loans 
gross of reserves (discussed, for instance, in Berger, 1995); 
• Efficiency, measured by the cost-to-income ratio (personnel costs divided by net 
income) and by size (natural logarithm of total assets is used as a proxy for scale 
efficiency, as suggested, among others, by Berger and Humphrey, 1997); 
• Profitability, reflected by return on assets. 
Then, we analyse the effects on loan pricing of the presence in syndicates - at a junior 
level - of Japanese banks or Landesbanken. We hypothesise that these two types of 
institutions are less likely to price-ration credit than others because of funding 
71 Consider a syndicated credit facility granted by a syndicate consisting .of Socitete .Generale .and Cr~?i: 
Lyonnais. We enter two observations for that facility into the regressIOn. One v.:Ill compnse SocIete 
Generale's balance sheet and profit/loss statement indicators, the other one wIll feature the. s~me 
characteristics for Credit Lyonnais. Both observations will carry the same loan transaction charactenstIcs. 
72 We do not focus separately on tier 2 capital. This also follows the approach used in seminal work on the 
bank lending channel by Kishan and Opiela (2000). 
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advantages in yen (Eichengreen and Mody, 2000), differing regulatory regimes (Chen, 
Mazudmar and Yan, 2000) or implicit or explicit state guarantees on their debt or 
deposits. The findings are discussed in §4.2. 
We subsequently study the effects of reputation and business mix, plus liquidity, capital 
and portfolio quality constraints faced by senior banks on the share of the loan they 
retain on their books73 (§4.3). Bank regulations require participants to be responsible for 
their own credit analysis and evaluation (Jones, William and Nigro, 2000). In principle, 
though, junior banks often rely on the reputation of the senior bank with a view to 
determining their decision to join the syndicate or their level of commitment. Hence our 
inclusion of a proxy for the reputation of the senior bank into the model. This was 
calculated as the position in the arranger league tables, i.e. the percentage of total loans 
arranged by the bank concerned within total loans arranged worldwide, for the year 
under consideration. Higher percentages correspond to a better reputation and vice 
versa. 
Finally, we discuss location of lender vs. borrower issues in §4.4. 
In most of our models, we control for the following loan characteristics: 
• SIze, 
• maturity, 
• guarantees (implicit or explicit; implicit for instance in the sense that the 
borrower is the subsidiary of another major concern, without the parent 
providing a formal written guarantee), 
• collateral (dummy variable for secured loans), 
• loan purpose (purpose dummy for corporate control loans), 
• Standard & Poor's rating of borrower at time of signing. 
In order to reduce the effects of heteroskedasticity resulting from the inclusion of banks 
with different asset sizes into the sample, we use ordinary least squares with robust 
73 We entered a zero share in case the senior bank had sold down all the loan to junior participants. 
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standard errors as our estimation methodology in all our models where loan pricing is 
the dependent variable. As far as the share of the loan retained by senior banks is 
concerned, it has a lower boundary of zero and an upper limit of 100%. As such, we 
estimate it using a censored Tobit model with a lower limit of zero and an upper limit of 
100. 
4. Results and discussion 
Our sample comprises 8,767 loan facilities granted to industrialised and developing 
country borrowers between 1993 and 2001. Table 1 shows the distribution of the 
observations by year and rating and Figure 2 the evolution of loan pricing by year and 
rating. We observe that worse ratings have systematically faced higher loan prices than 
better ratings - this is the straightforward result that one would expect - and loan prices 
have generally been edging up for all borrower ratings since 1997-98, which roughly 
reflects the adverse influence of the Asian crisis. 
Table 1: Number of observations bl: borrower Standard & Poor's rating and l':ear 
. ,,'1~9 }.99 ,. 199~ 99 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Unknown Total 
Default 10 10 9 9 11 14 26 28 10 3 130 
CC to BB- 228 260 223 198 285 295 450 464 222 69 2,694 
BB to BBB- 90 172 156 177 212 215 253 336 195 34 1,840 
BBB to A 175 273 290 242 314 318 377 451 318 57 2,815 
A+ to AAA 79 164 164 180 134 127 155 172 90 23 1,288 
Total 582 879 842 806 956 969 1,261 1,451 835 186 8,767 
Source: Dealogic Loanware, author's calculations 
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Figure 2: Evolution of loan pricing, LmOR spread + fees , medians by rating class, in bp 
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4.1 Senior vs. junior bank characteristics and loan pricing 
To investigate banks' characteristics that influence pricing, we now test the effects of 
quantitative variables such as capital and liquidity constraints, specialisation 
(investment vs. commercial banking type activities reflected by the relative weight of 
loans in total activities of the bank), quality of the loan portfolio, efficiency and 
profitability. The variables used are explained in Section 3 above and detailed in 
Table 2 below. We test the effect of senior and junior banks ' characteristics on the 
pricing of loans separately to allow for the hypothesis that the former may have more 
power in determining loan pricing during the arrangement phase and also earn more 
fees for putting together the facility, while the latter may act more as pure risk holders 
and price takers. The lender characteristics considered mainly use changes in various 
ratios between the year when the loan was signed and the year before. This approach -
also used by Kishan and Opiela (2000) - has the advantages of reducing (1 ) the effects 
of individual banks in the sample, (2) the autocorrelation between the residuals, and 
particularly between the different explanatory variables. 
The results of our model estimation are shown in Table 2 below. 
All coefficients on loan and borrower characteristics except the one on the dummy for 
the presence of an implicit guarantee coefficients are strongly significant and have the 
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expected signs. Loan pricing decreases with the amount loaned, reflecting economies of 
scale in originating the loan or the ability of less risky borrowers to arrange larger loans 
or both. It also increases with maturity, translating the premium demanded by the lender 
for incurring risk for a longer period of time. Explicit guarantees significantly reduce 
loan pricing, while secured loans are more expensive than non-secured ones, potentially 
because they are very risk/4. There is a premium on corporate control loans possibly 
because of the borrower's urgent need to arrange funding quickly and discreetly. The 
numerical conversion of the borrower's Standard & Poor's rating is strongly and 
negatively associated with loan pricing, with better-rated borrowers incurring lower 
loan prices and vice versa. 
Capital and liquidity constraints and loan pricing: we find evidence that an 
improvement in senior lenders' capitalisation and an improvement in junior lenders' 
liquidity position are significantly and negatively associated with loan pricing (the 
coefficient on the deqas variable is weakly significant and negative in the case of senior 
banks, the coefficient on the dliq variable is strongly significant and negative in the case 
of junior banks). We surmise that as their capital or liquidity cushions become larger, 
banks can accept lower prices for the same risk. Equity seems to playa more important 
role for senior banks, while the focus is more on the liquidity position for junior banks. 
Loan loss reserves and loan pricing: A deterioration in the quality of the lenders' 
portfolio (reflected by an increase in the ratio of loan loss reserves to loans) is positively 
and significantly associated with loan pricing, reflecting a demand for more 
compensation to take on additional risk. This effect is weaker in the case of senior 
banks than in the case of junior banks, as the latter are more likely to be the ultimate 
risk-takers. 
74 Collateral has a cost (Bester, 1985) so it may also be the case that the cost of arranging or, war~hous~ng 
the collateral is charged for in the price of the loan (Freixas and Rochet, 1997!. OtherWIse, flll~nclllg 
constraints facing the borrower may be such that he accepts both collateral and a hIgher spread, SmIth and 
Warner (1979) argue that collateralisation is costly and that benefits to, securing the 10,an ,must excee? the 
cost for a particular loan to be secured, In a cross-section of loans thIS mean~ that rIskier ,loans wIll be 
collateralised, Examination of our data sample also confirms that borrowers WIth poorer ratll1gs ~re mo~e 
likely to require collateralisation. Berger and Udell (1990) also document that collateral typIca~ly ,IS 
associated with riskier loans, If collateral's main purpose is to solve moral hazard problems, then rISkIer 
borrowers or those who need more monitoring will post more collateral. 
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Table 2: The effect of bank characteristics on loan pricing 
We estimated the following equation separately for junior and senior banks, (OLS with robust 
standard errors): 
Indrawn = /30 Intercept + /31 Insize + /32 maturity + /33 g_implic + /34 g_explic + /35 secured + 
/36 CC + /37 spn + /38 deqas + /39 dllr + /310 dci + /3n dliq + /312lnasts + /313 dROA + /314 diita + E 
• Dependent variable: loan price 
• Indrawn = natural logarithm of drawn return (spread over LIBOR plus fees) 
• Control variables - Loan and borrower characteristics: 
• lnsize = natural logarithm of facility size converted to US dollars 
• maturity = maturity of loans, in years 
• g_implic, g_explic = dummies for implicitly or explicitly guaranteed loan (implicitly in the sense 
for instance that the borrower is the subsidiary of another major firm) 
• secured = dummy for secured loan 
• cc = dummy for corporate control loans (LBO, acquisition) 
• spn = numerical conversion of borrower's Standard & Poor's rating (onto a scale of a to 28, with 
a standing for default and 28 for AAA) 
• Senior or junior bank characteristics: 
• deqas = change between year preceding the signature of the loan (t-1) and the year of signature 
(to) in the ratio of equity to assets, in % [proxy for capital constraints] 
• dllr = change between (t-1) and (to) in the ratio of loan loss reserves to loans gross of reserves, in 
% [loan quality] 
• dci = change between (t-1) and (to) in personnel costs divided by net income, % [efficiency] 
• dliq = change between (t-1) and (to) in the ratio of liquid assets to deposits and money market 
funding, % [proxy for liquidity constraint] 
• lnasts = natural logarithm of total assets (in US D) [measure of size, proxy for scale efficiencies] 
at the end of the year when the loan was signed 
• dROA = change between (t-1) and (to) in return on assets, % [measure of profitability] 
• diita = change between (t-1) and (to) in ratio of interest income to total assets, % [measures the 
weight of lending in bank's total activities] 
• £ is a random disturbance 
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Table 2 (continued): The effect of bank characteristics on loan pricing 
Dependent va:iable is in_drawn. Type of estimation: OLS with robust standard errors. 
(naturalloganthm of drawn return = LIBOR pricing + fees). 
Variables are defined above. 
lnsize 
maturity 
g_implic 
g_explic 
secured 
cc 
spn 
degas 
dllr 
dci 
dlig 
lnasts 
dROA 
diita 
intercept 
N 
R2 
-0.1198=1= (0.005) -0.1113=1= (0.005) 
0.0100=1= (0.002) 0.0119=1= (0.002) 
-0.0505t (0.025) -0.0080 (0.022) 
-0.0903=1= (0.030) -0.2346=1= (0.030) 
0.4218=1= (0.014) 0.3853=1= (0.013) 
0.246l:j: (0.014) 0.2140=1= (0.016) 
-0.1372=1= (0.002) -0.1500=1= (0.002) 
-0.0102=1= (0.003) -0.0012 (0.002) 
0.0815=1= (0.008) 0.1168=1= (0.011) 
0.0002=1= (0.000) -O.OOO3t (0.000) 
-0.0006 (0.001) -0.0022=1= (0.001) 
0.0374=1= (0.005) -0.0086t (0.004) 
0.2312=1= (0.017) 0.0393=1= (0.015) 
0.0032 (0.007) -0.0166=1= (0.006) 
6.8533=1= (0.104) 7.9614=1= (0.082) 
15,934 16,391 
0.60 0.64 
NB Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*: significant at the 10% level; t: significant at the 5% level; :j:: significant at the 1 % level. 
Bank specialisation and loan pricing: we only find a relationship between changes in 
the ratio of interest income to total assets (diita) for junior banks, not for senior banks. 
Participating in syndicated loans has a greater impact on junior banks' size of traditional 
intermediation activities relative to their total assets. When senior banks put together 
syndicates of lenders, this is more of an investment banking type activity. 
Bank efficiency, size, profitability and loan pricing: bank size (lnasts) as well as 
increases in the personnel costs to net income ratio (dci) are strongly and positively 
associated with more expensive loans in the case of senior banks, but not in the case of 
junior banks (indeed for junior banks the relationship is negative7s) . The positive 
relationship between senior bank size and loan pricing may reflect large senior banks' 
market power in setting loan prices. In the case of junior and senior banks, higher loan 
75 This negative relationship between the logarithm of total assets and loan pricing may reflect cale 
economies for junior banks. 
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pnces significantly boost ROA, although this effect is stronger in the case of senior 
banks. 
To summarise, in accordance with the credit rationing hypothesis developed by Thakor 
(1996) we have shown that the pricing of loans where less capital- or liquidity-
constrained banks are present is likely to be lower than that of other loans. With regards 
to the relationship between bank characteristics and loan pricing we find that in several 
instances this relationship (capitalisation, size, return on assets), is stronger (in 
significance, magnitude, or both) in the case of senior banks than of junior banks. This 
confirms the stronger pricing power of senior banks when arranging loans, while junior 
participants tend to act more as price takers. 
4.2 Capital constraints and lending: the case of Japanese banks and 
Landesbanken 
Eichengreen and Mody (2000) argue that syndicated loan facilities granted to 
developing country borrowers and denominated in Japanese yen are relatively cheaper 
than others supposedly because of the low interest rates and hence the funding 
advantage enjoyed by Japanese financial institutions. Some authors (e.g. Wagster, 1996) 
have argued that the one purpose of the original Basel Capital Accord of 1988 was to 
reduce Japanese banks' funding advantage over other internationally active banks. 
German Landesbanken's or state co-operative banks' debt is implicitly or explicitly 
guaranteed by the respective German state and Landesbanken face little competition 
when attracting depositors' funds; this enables them to fund themselves at below-market 
costs76• We therefore compare the pricing of loans with and without Japanese and 
Landesbanken participation at a junior level. 
76 In July 2002, an agreement was reached to phase out the guarantees, thus enhancing the level playing 
field in the German banking sector. According to the 15 July 2002 issue of the Dresdner Bank Trends 
Newsletter, "[ED] Competition Commissioner Monti and representatives of Germany [had] agreed on 
details for the replacement of the Anstaltslast (maintenance obligation) and the abolition of the 
Gewahrtragerhaftung (guarantee obligation) for Landesbanken and Sparkassen (savings banks). The 
Anstaltslast [would] be replaced by a normal owner relationship based on market principles. Accordin~ly, 
institutions cannot be shielded from insolvency. Potential financial aid ofthe guarantor [would] be subject 
to ED subsidy rules. The Gewahrtragerhaftung [would] be abolished on 18 July 2005. Any liability 
assumed up to that date [would] be subject to the old liability rules - under the condition that its maturity 
[did] not extend beyond 31 December 2015". 
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In Table 3 we calculate loan pricing confidence intervals for the subsamples with or 
without participation by Japanese banks or Landesbanken. The Table shows that the 
pricing of loans with participation by Japanese banks or Landesbanken (at a junior 
level) is statistically different from and lower than that of loans without such 
participation (the confidence intervals do not overlap). 
T\,~bl~3: r.0an pricing 'Y>~th or without participation by Japanese banks or Landesbanken 
95 % conf. 
N Mean Median Standard deviation interval 
With Japanese participation 3,827 121.3 75 .0 1.7 117.9 124.6 
Without Japanese participation 4,940 154.7 125 .0 1.7 151.3 15 8.2 
With participation by Landesbanken 1,428 81.7 51.5 2.3 77 .1 86.3 
Without participation by Landesbanken 7,339 151.5 125.0 1.4 148.8 154.2 
Total 8,767 140.1 100.0 1.2 137 .7 142.6 
Source: Dealogic Loanware, author's calculations. 
We now estimate a regression model to corroborate this hypothesis, controlling for loan 
and borrower characteristics, using a methodology similar to the one employed by 
Chen, Mazudmar and Yan (2000). The results are displayed in Table 4. The effect of the 
presence of Japanese banks and Landesbanken is tested separatel/7 in two different 
model specifications. 
The signs, magnitude and significance of most control variables (for loan size, maturity, 
guarantee, purpose, borrower rating) are comparable to the previous model described in 
Table 2. 
The dummies for participation by Japanese banks and Landesbanken at a junior level 
significantly lower bank pricing, supposedly because the latter can raise funds relatively 
more cheaply78 . Japanese banks and Landesbanken appear relatively less likely to price-
ration credit than institutions without a regulatory advantage. 
77 A third model specification (not shown) where the dummies for Japanese banks and Landesbanken are 
introduced simultaneously yields similar results. 
78 Loans with Japanese participation are more expensive in Chen Mazudmar and Yan (2000) but the l~tter 
focus on US branches of Japanese banks operating in the US where they take advantage of the stncter 
regulatory regime applied to US-owned competitors. 
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Table 4: The effect on loan pricing of the presence of Japanese banks or La d b k . 
th d
" t n es all ell III 
e syn lca e 
We ran the following OLS regression with robust standard errors: 
Indrawn = /30 Intercept + /3[lnsize + /32 maturity + /33 g_implic+ /34 g_explic + /35 secured + /36 CC + 
/37 spn + /38 Ib_part + /39 jp_part + £ 
where: 
• lnd~'awn = natural logarithm of drawn return (spread over LIBOR plus fees) 
• lnslze = natural logarithm of facility size converted to US dollars 
• maturity = maturity of loans, in years 
• . g_implic, g_explic = dummies for implicitly or explicitly guaranteed loan (implicitly in the sense 
for Instance that the borrower is the subsidiary of another major firm) 
• secured = dummy for secured loan 
• cc = dummy for corporate control loans (LBO, acquisition) 
• spn = numerical conversion of borrower's Standard & Poor's rating (onto a scale of 0 to 28 with 
o standing for default and 28 for AAA) , 
• lb_part, jp_part: dummies for participation by one or several Landesbanken or Japanese banks in 
the syndicate (at a junior level) 
• E is a random disturbance 
lnsize -0.0976:1: (0.006) -0.0955:1: (0.006) 
maturity 0.0079:1: (0.002) 0.0092:1: (0.003) 
g_implic -0.0087 (0.037) -0.0183 (0.037) 
g_explic -0.1729:1: (0.035) -0.1777:1: (0.035) 
secured 0.3409:1: (0.018) 0.3482:1: (0.018) 
cc 0.3079:1: (0.022) 0.3062:1: (0.023) 
spn -0.1353:1: (0.002) -0.1355:1: (0.003) 
lb_part -0.0605:1: (0.019) 
jp_part -0.0532:1: (0.014) 
intercept 7.4769:1: (0.055) 7.4792:1: (0.055) 
N 8,736 8,736 
R2 0.5861 0.6277 
NB Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*: significant at the 10% level; t: significant at the 5% level; :j:: significant at the 1 % level. 
4.3 The effect of capital and liquidity constraints on the share of loans 
retained by senior banks 
Senior banks who arrange the loan may know more about the borrower and mayor may 
not pass that information on to junior participants (Banerjee and Cadot, 1996). We now 
focus our attention on the proportion of loans arranged by senior banks that 
subsequently gets passed on to junior banks in the syndicate. If liquidity- or capital-
constrained senior banks sell off relatively larger shares of loans that they arrange to 
junior participants than senior banks without such liquidity or capital constraints , then 
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this can constitute evidence of opportunistic behaviour on semor banks' behalf. 
Likewise, opportunistic behaviour can take place if the proportion of loans sold down 
by senior banks to junior participants is higher in the case of low-quality loans than in 
the case of high-quality loans. 
We construct a model to express the share of the loan retained by senior banks as a 
function of loan and senior bank characteristics. In the case where there are several 
senior banks for the same facility we enter the same facility as many times into the 
model as there are senior banks, each time with the retained share and bank 
characteristics specific to the relevant senior arranger bank. To allow for time effects, 
we look at senior bank characteristics for the year of the transactions as well as the year 
before. 
Our loan characteristics include the borrower's rating or the natural logarithm of the 
drawn return - LmOR spread plus fees - maturity, guarantees and a dummy for 
corporate control loans (acquisitions, LBO). Our senior bank characteristics comprise 
liquidity- and capital constraints (equity to assets, ratio of liquid assets to deposits and 
money market funding), loan portfolio quality (ratio of loan loss reserves to loans), 
specialisation (interest income as a share of total assets) and reputation (position in the 
Loanware arranger league table expressed as the percentage of total worldwide loans 
arranged by the senior bank concerned for the year under study). We did not include 
loan size into the model as it is highly correlated with senior banks' league table 
position. 
We tested four specifications of the model where we entered the various senior bank 
characteristics (contemporaneous with the year in which the loan was signed or lagged 
by one year) for rated and unrated borrowers. We used a censored Tobit estimation with 
an upper limit of 100 and a lower limit of zero on the share of the loan retained by 
senior banks. The results are displayed in Table 5 below. 
The coefficient on the natural logarithm of the drawn return, a proxy for the riskiness of 
the loan, is negative and significant in all specifications of the model. Senior banks are 
more likely to keep smaller portions of riskier loans on their books, which appears to 
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suggest that there is evidence of possibly opportunistic behaviour on their behalf - in 
the sense that they would offload risky loans to outsider junior banks. These results 
contradict Simons (1993) and Jones, William and Nigro (2000) who find that agent 
banks tend to hold a larger share of their riskier or low-quality loans. Loan maturity 
significantly reduces the share of the facility kept by the senior bank in two 
specifications, as it is necessary to call in more banks when the length of the exposure 
increases. Senior banks tend to hold larger portions of explicitly guaranteed or secured 
loans, and smaller shares of corporate control loans or implicitly guaranteed facilities. 
A relatively high position of the senior bank in the Loanware arranger league table, a 
proxy for "reputation" as an arranger of loans, tends to lower the share of the loan it 
retains on its books - this is reflected by the negative and significant coefficients on the 
league variable - in the case of unrated borrowers. It has no effect when the borrower 
has a rating. In other words, when information about the borrower is more opaque, 
junior banks joining the syndicate seem to rely on the reputation of the arranger bank 
when deciding which portion of the loan to purchase, and allow the senior bank to keep 
a lower share of the loan on its books when that reputation is relatively high, although 
the monitoring incentives for the arranger bank resulting from that lower share may then 
also be lower. We can relate this result to Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) who find a 
positive relationship between the degree of syndication and the senior bank's reputation. 
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Table 5: The effect of bank characteristics on the share of the loan retained by the senior 
bank 
We estimated specifications of the following model (censored Tobit with lower lirru't of ze 0 d r . f 100) . h r an upper lrrut 0 ,WIt contemporaneous and lagged values of the senior banks' characteristics. 
sen_shr = fJo Intercept + fJl Indrawn + fJ2 maturity+ fJ3 ~implic+ fJ4 g_explic + fJ5 secured + fJ6 CC + 
fJ71eague + fJ8 eqas + fJ9 llr + fJ10 liq + fJn iita + £ 
• sen_shr = share of the loan retained by the senior bank (mandated arranger, non-mandated arranger, 
arranger, co-arranger, agent, co-agent, facility/syndication agent) 
• Indrawn = natural logarithm of drawn return (spread over LIBOR plus fees) 
• maturity = maturity of loan, in years 
• g_implic, g_explic = dummies for implicitly or explicitly guaranteed loan (implicitly for instance in the 
sense that borrower is the subsidiary of another major concern) 
• secured = dummy for secured loan 
• cc = dummy for corporate control loans (LBO, acquisition) 
• league = senior bank's share in syndicated loans arranged worldwide (obtained from Dealogic Loanware 
arranger league tables) 
• eqas = ratio of equity to assets of the senior bank, in % 
• llr = senior bank's ratio of loan loss reserves to loans gross of reserves, in % 
• liq = ratio of liquid assets to deposits and money market funding of senior bank, in %. 
• iita = ratio of interest income to total assets of senior bank, in % 
• £ is a random disturbance 
Dependent variable is sen_shr (share of loan retained by senior bank). 
Senior bank characteristics lagged by one year 
Rated borrowers 
Indrawn -0.6762t -1.9151:1: -0.9175:j: (0.266) 
maturity -0.0079 -1.3676:j: 0.0046 (0.093) 
g_implic -2.5049t -9. 1766:j: -2.5609t (1.045) 
g_explic 10.0932:j: 6.0661:1: 10.4547:j: 6.6388:j: (l.056) 
secured 20.9627:j: 5.3231:1: 20.6555:j: 3.7221:j: (0.597) 
cc -12.5005:1: -0.8085 -12.1934:1: 0.2450 (0.668) 
league -1.0894:1: -0.0815 -0.7461:1: -0.0297 (0.095) 
eqas 0.0434 0.0821 0.1571t 0.2278:1: (0.052) 
llr -0.0273 0.8559:1: 0.1148 0.8763:1: (0.150) 
liq -0.1204:1: -0.0442:1: -0.1328:1: -0.0483:1: (0.009) 
iita 0.8923:1: -0.2176 1.0447:1: -0.1112 (0.185) 
intercept -14.7632:1: -9.8872:1: -14.0989:1: -10.0220:1: (1.728) 
N 41,809 20,747 36,495 18,302 
NB Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*: significant at the 10% level; 'I: significant at the 5% level; :j:: significant at the 1 % level. 
The senior bank's equity position lagged by one year is significantly related to the share 
of the loan retained. Senior banks with a larger capital cushion appear to retain larger 
portions of loans that they syndicate. A lower quality loan portfolio - reflected by a 
higher ratio of loan loss reserves to loans - raises the share of the loan retained only in 
the case of rated borrowers. As the quality of their loan portfolio deteriorates, senior 
banks prefer to take on more exposure to rated borrowers and less to unrated ones, 
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relying more on publicly available information about borrowers. Rather surprisingly, 
the share of the loans retained by senior banks appears to decrease with their liquidity 
ratio. Finally, there is evidence (reflected by the significantly positive coefficient on the 
iita ratio in two model specifications) that higher loan shares retained reflect a 
behaviour on senior banks' behalf that is closer to the activities of a commercial bank 
(whose interest income is higher when related to its total assets) rather than to the 
behaviour of an investment bank. 
Table 6: The effect on loan pricing of the share of the loan retained by the senior bank 
We ran the following OLS regression with robust standard errors: 
Indrawn = /30 Intercept + /31 sen_shr + /32 maturity + /33 ~implic + /34 g_explic + /35 secured + /36 CC + 
/37 spn + £ 
variable names as in Table 5. 
sen_shr -0.0006* (0.004) 
maturity 0.0068:1: (0.021) 
g_implic -0.0332 (0.023) 
g_explic -0.1112:1: (0.029) 
secured 0.4073:1: (0.013) 
cc 0.2346:1: (0.013) 
spn -0 .1598:1: (0.002) 
intercept 7 .3363:1: (0.045) 
N 20,910 
R2 0.56 
NB Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*: significant at the 10% level; t: significant at the 5% level; t: significant at the 1 % level. 
To complement the analysis, in Table 6 we present the results of subsequent tests of the 
effect of loan shares retained by senior banks in the syndicate on loan pricing. We find 
this share to be negatively and significantly related to loan pricing. Our results confirm 
the findings of Angbazo, Mei and Saunders (1998) who present evidence that junior 
banks participating in highly leveraged transaction loans accept to earn a smaller margin 
when a lead lender is present who retains a large share of the loan (and thus bears broad 
monitoring responsibilities). 
In §4.4, we provide evidence that senior banks' private knowledge about the borrower 
can also result in more favourable pricing. The advantage of these relationship lending 
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effects is strongest in the case of unrated borrowers located in developing countries 
being lent to by banks operating in these countries. 
4.4 Local presence and currency effects 
Above we have explored how insider knowledge of the borrower by the senior bank 
influences loan pricing and the syndicate structure. In this section we investigate 
whether closer knowledge of the borrower by the senior bank can be turned to the 
borrower's advantage. We partition our sample of loans into rated and unrated 
borrowers from industrialised and developing countries and distinguish between 
facilities where the senior arranger bank resides in the same country as the borrower and 
those where this IS not the case. Calculating confidence intervals for loan pricing 
(shown in Table 7 below), we find that unrated borrowers located in developing 
countries incur significantly lower loan prices when the senior bank is operating in the 
country concerned. Presumably this is because operating in the country of the borrower 
it is easier for the senior bank to exploit the relationship with the borrower and to take 
advantage of local knowledge in the jurisdictional, legal and cultural domains. This 
pricing advantage only materialises in the case of non-rated borrowers from developing 
countries where the exclusive knowledge of the senior bank about the borrower might 
be highest. In fact, rated and non-rated borrowers from industrialised countries pay 
significantly higher spreads on facilities where the senior bank is located in the same 
country as the borrower. We surmise that exclusive knowledge about the borrower is 
lesser in industrialised countries and there may be more price savings to be achieved 
from economies of scale for lending syndicates by operating out of a big financial centre 
such as London, New York or Tokyo than out of the same country as the borrower. 
Table 7: Loan pricing and senior bank vs. borrower country 
N Mean Median interval 
Emerging, rated borrower nationality :f. senior bank nationality 456 146.4 106.3 134.8 158.0 
borrower nationality = senior bank nationality 137 158.2 115 .0 135.8 180.6 
Emerging, not rated :f. 2,996 158.6 121.3 154.0 163.2 
= 1,325 122.3 84.0 116.4 128.1 
Industrialised, rated 632 116.0 70.0 107.4 124.6 
= 7,248 139.9 100.0 137.3 142.6 
Industrialised, not rated 2,706 161.5 144.4 157.0 166.0 
19,539 186.4 180.8 184.9 188.0 
NB loan pricing is LIBOR spread + fees . Source: Oealogic Loanware, author's calculations. 
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In Tables 8 and 9 we calculate loan pricing confidence intervals for various subsamples 
of syndicated loan facilities classified according to whether the facility of the currency 
is the home currency of the borrower or of the senior bank. It is interesting to notice that 
there are no rated borrowers from developing countries who borrow in their domestic 
currency. The existence of a rating seems to systematically warrant borrowing in a hard 
currenci
9
• Rated and unrated industrialised country borrowers are having to pay 
significantly more for loans expressed in their domestic currency. For all subsamples, 
facilities where the currency is the home currency of the senior bank cost significantly 
more than others, possibly reflecting a premium charged by the senior bank for 
potentially better knowledge about raising funds or inviting underwriters in its own 
currency than a foreign currency. 
Table 8: Loan pricing and currency of facility vs. borrower's home currency 
Emerging, rated currency of facility * borrower' s home currency 
currency of facility = borrower' s home currency 
Emerging, not rated 
* 
= 
Industrialised, rated 
= 
Industrialised, not rated 
= 
NB loan pricing is LIBOR spread + fees . Source: Dealogic Loanware, author 's calculations. 
Emerging, rated 
Emerging, not rated 
Industrialised, rated 
Industrialised, not rated 
currency of facility * senior bank's home currency 
currency of facility = senior bank's home currency 
* 
= 
= 
NB loan pricing is LIBOR spread + fees. Source: Dealogic Loanware, author ' s calculations. 
79 Such as US dollar, euro, Japanese Yen, Swiss Franc and Sterling. 
N Mean Median 
608 149.1 109.4 
o 
4,335 149.0 
52 168.8 
566 70.5 
7,593 144.6 
2,038 110.4 
21,698 192.7 
106.5 
128.4 
41.6 
110.0 
70.0 
200.0 
~. ~ Mean Median 
275 124.2 90.0 
318 170.6 136.3 
2,995 127.0 93 .3 
1,326 193.8 157.1 
650 110.2 62.1 
7,230 140.5 100.0 
2,923 152.0 125 .0 
19,322 188.2 187.5 
interval 
138.9 159.2 
145.2 152.7 
127.8 209.8 
64.1 76.9 
142.0 147.2 
105.8 115.0 
191.3 194.2 
95% conf. 
interval 
111.2 137.2 
155.4 185.8 
123.1 130.8 
185.9 201.6 
102.0 118.4 
137. 8 143.2 
147.7 156.3 
186.6 189.7 
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Table 10: Median loan pricing and borrower residence for industrialised country 
borrowers 
i ' 
year 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
Rated borrowers 
Not from EMU 
area 
150.0 
75.0 
62.5 
62.2 
62.5 
75 .0 
140.6 
150.0 
137.5 
From EMU area 
58.5 
42.5 
21.0 
19.5 
16.0 
24.7 
51.5 
65.0 
73.8 
Unrated borrowers 
Not from EMU 
area 
175.0 
150.0 
175.0 
175.0 
175.0 
187.5 
201.3 
200.0 
200.0 
From EMU area 
62.5 
50.3 
34.5 
30.0 
42.5 
75.0 
120.0 
145.0 
152.5 
NB loan pricing is LIBOR spread + fees. Source: Dealogic Loanware, author's calculations. 
Table 11: Median loan pricing and senior bank residence for industrialised country 
borrowers 
Rated borrowers Unrated bOlTowers 
year Senior bank Senior, bank Senior bank Senior bank 
f, Wi notJ'tQtThEMU area from EMU area not from EMU area from EMU area 
1993 150.0 94.2 156.3 150.0 
1994 75.0 86.3 150.0 125.0 
1995 68.8 42.5 175.0 67.5 
1996 62.5 44.3 175.0 99.5 
1997 75 .0 37.5 175.0 105.0 
1998 75.0 68.8 200.0 127.5 
1999 162.5 77.5 215.0 175.0 
2000 175.0 122.5 215.0 162.5 
2001 200.0 90.0 212.5 155.7 
NB Joan pricing is LIBOR spread + fees. Source: DeaJogic Loanware, author's calculations. 
Looking at the extent to which the advent of the euro may have contributed to these 
currency- or residence related pricing advantages, Tables 10 and 11 above show that the 
median pricing of facilities granted to industrialised country borrowers where the 
borrower or the senior bank are from the EMU area is lower than on facilities where 
they are not. The pricing advantage seems to have widened for facilities arranged by 
banks from the EMU area after 1999 in the case of rated borrowers. 
In order to quantify these results we regress loan pricing on a number of loan and 
borrower characteristics listed in Table 12 below, together with dummies to signal 
"proximity" effects. We also test for the effects of the borrower or the senior bank 
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residing in the EMU area before or after 1 January 1999, i.e. the introduction of the 
single currency. We estimate several specifications of the model, for industrialised and 
developing country borrowers, rated and not rated. We introduce a numeric conversion 
of the actual Standard & Poor's rating at signing in the case of rated borrowers and 
purpose and sector dummies in the case of unrated borrowers. 
Our findings on the residence of the borrower vs. that of the senior bank confirm the 
descriptive statistics presented earlier. Local knowledge about the borrower by the 
senior bank - reflected by identical residencies - can lower the pricing of loans in the 
case of unrated borrowers where monitoring information is not widely available to the 
public, the coefficient on the bbnat dummy is strongly significant and negative for 
specifications D, E and F. The absolute value of the coefficient is highest in the case of 
Specification D (non-rated borrowers from developing countries). We explain this by 
relationship effects and the importance of local knowledge, notably in the legal domain, 
being potentially most acute in the case of non-rated borrowers from developing 
countries. The bbnat dummy does not lower loan pricing in the case of rated borrowers; 
in fact in Specification A it even increases loan pricing - a premium can be demanded 
on loans where the senior bank has to operate out of the country of residence of the 
borrower when the latter is rated. Since in such a set-up, public monitoring information 
is widely supplied about such borrowers to the general public by rating agencies, the 
senior bank that has established a presence may be considered a waste of resources, 
resulting in higher loan pricing. 
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Table 12: Local presence and the advent of the euro 
We estimated the following regression with robust standard errors 
Indrawn = /30 Intercept + /31 lnsize + /32 maturity+ /33 secured + /34 gjmplic+ /35 g_explic + /36 spn + /37 cc + /38 cs + /39 gen + PlO prj + Pll pty + /312 tr + PH multi 1 
/314 constrpty + /315 finservb + /316 finservn + /317 high-tech + /318 util + /319 infrastruct + /320 popserv + /321 state + P22 tradind + /323 tansport + /324 bbnat + P2s brcur -I 
/326 bkcur + /327 bremu98 + /328 bremu99 + /329 bkemu98 + /330 bkemu99 + £ 
• Indrawn = natural logarithm of drawn return (spread over LIBOR plus fees) 
• lnsize = natural logarithm of facility size converted to US dollars 
v 
• maturity = maturity of loans, in years 
• g_implic, g_explic = dummies for implicitly or explicitly guaranteed loan (implicitly in the sense for instance that the borrower is another major firm's subsidiary) 
• secured = dummy for secured loan 
• spn = numerical conversion of borrower's Standard & Poor's rating (on a scale of 0 to 28, with 0 standing for default and 28 for AAA) 
• cc, cs, gen, prj, pty, tr, multi = purpose dummies for corporate control, capital structure, general corporate purpose, project finance, property, transport finance, multi-
purpose. The residual dummy for other purposes not listed here has been excluded as it would have overspecified the model. 
• constrpty, finservb, finservn, high-tech, util, infrastruct, popserv, state, tradind, transport = sectoral dummies for construction and property, financial services (banks), 
financial services (non-banks), high-tech industry, utilities, infrastructure, population-related services, state, traditional industry, transport. The residual dummy for other 
sectors not specified here was excluded from the equation as the case by default as its inclusion would have overspecified the model. 
• bbnat = dummy to indicate that the residence of at least one senior bank in the syndicate is identical to that of the borrower. 
• brcur = dummy to indicate that the currency of the facility is identical to the home currency of the borrower. 
• bkcur = dummy to indicate that the currency of the facility is identical to the home currency of a senior bank. 
• bremu98, bremu99 = dummies to indicate that the borrower is resident of a country of the EMU/euro zone (respectively before and after the first of January 1999) 
• bkemu98, bkemu99 = dummies to indicate that a senior bank is resident of a country of the EMU/euro zone (respectively before and after the first of January 1999) 
• E is a random disturbance 
The sectoral dummies are correlated with borrower ratings so we included them into separate specifications of the model: 
Specification A: 
Specifications Band C: 
Specification D: 
Specifications E and F: 
rated borrowers from emerging economies 
rated borrowers from industrialised countries 
unrated borrowers from emerging economies 
unrated borrowers from industrialised countries 
.2()() 
Table 12 (continued): Local presence and the advent of the euro 
Dependent variable is In_drawn (natural logarithm of drawn return = LIBOR pricing + fees). Variables are defined above. OLS estimation with robust standard errors. 
~_aaabI~~._ _SJ?ecj,ficatl~;m, A'.. . '" ~eilli~iciQlLB ' ,,'~' .". ·.d· C· . "' , -S,~c.J.fj. < atlOn..~~_ .. ~~cifk~HionP""': __ ,~=--:.specjfjcatiQltli _. _ Sp~fjficationJ: ] 
lnsize -0.0186 (0.041) -0.1080:j: (0.007) -0. 1121:j: (0.007) -0.0816:j: (0.011) -0. 1746:j: (0.003) -0. 1734:j: (0.003) 
maturity -0.0331 t (0.014) 0.0139:j: (0.003) 0.0201:j: (0.003) -0.0097:j: (0.004) 0.0079:j: (0.002) 0.0135:j: (0.002) 
secured 0.3605:j: (0.121) 0.3382:j: (0.018) 0.3313:j: (0.018) 0.2489:j: (0.026) 0.3046:j: (0.009) 0.2919:j: (0.009) 
g_implic 0.4674:j: (0.116) -0.0929:j: (0.036) -0.1087:j: (0.035) -0.0402 (0.043) -0.10 l:j: (0.028) -0.0966:j: (0.028) 
g_explic -0.0851 (0.130) -0.1047 :j: (0.036) -0.0744t (0.035) -0.1515:j: (0.025) -0.2395:j: (0.023) -0.2035:j: (0.022) 
spn -0.1092:j: (0.016) -0.1331:j: (0.003) -0.1316:j: (0.003) 
cc 0.0703 (0.174) 0.2844:j: (0.023) 0.2778:j: (0.023) 0.6082:j: (0.067) 0.3334:j: (0.014) 0.3073:j: (0.014) 
cs 0.1449:j: (0.040) -0.0382:j: (0.013) -0.0461:j: (0.012) 
gen 0.3126:j: (0.034) -0.0062 (0.016) -0.0280* (0.016) 
prj 0.3139:j: (0.035) -0.0144 (0.034) -0.0143 (0.035) 
pty 0.3492t (0.142) 0.0757 (0.048) 0.0384 (0.046) 
tr -0.1092t (0.052) -0.1284t (0.059) -0.0957 (0.059) 
multi 0.4348:j: (0.047) 0.1099:j: (0.014) 0.0744:j: (0.014) 
constrpty -0.4902:j: (0.155) -0.0233 (0.060) -0.0265 (0.060) 
finservb -0.6762:j: (0.152) -0.6106:j: (0.065) -0.5484:j: (0.065) 
finservn -0.5288:j: (0.150) -0.3455:j: (0.061) -0.3485:j: (0.061) 
high-tech -0.5408:j: (0.150) -0.1049* (0.059) -0.0967 (0.060) 
util -0.5277:j: (0.152) -0.4006:j: (0.061) -0.3972:j: (0.062) 
infrastruct -0.1733 (0.241) -0.1163 (0.074) -0.1282* (0.074) 
popserv -0.1292 (0.161) -0.0411 (0.059) -0.0312 (0.060) 
state -0.5512:j: (0.161) -1.1095:j: (0.112) -0.9574:j: (0.114) 
trandind -0.4528:j: (0.150) -0.1214 t (0.059) -0.1093* (0.060) 
transport -0.6037:j: (0.154) -0.2147:j: (0.063) -0. 1953:j: (0.063) 
bbnat 0.1468t (0.066) 0.0517 (0.044) 0.0088 (0.042) -0. 155:j: (0.023) -0.0431* (0.026) -0.0798:j: (0.025) 
brcur 0.1897:j: (0.032) 0.1292:j: (0.033) -0.0432 (0.092) 0.4058:j: (0.021) 0.2799:j: (0 .021) 
bkcur 0.1608t (0.067) 0.1026t (0.043) 0.1152:j: (0.040) 0.286:j: (0.027) 0.1931:j: (0.026) 0.1898:j: (0.025) 
bremu98 -0.3097:j: (0.052) -0.5488:j: (0.029) 
bkemu98 -0. 1495:j: (0.021) -0.1016:j: (0.016) 
bremu99 -0.1822* (0.106) -0.3459:j: (0.034) 
bkemu99 0.24 17:1: (0.020) 0.1709:1: (0.016) 
intercept 6.7139t (0.329) 7.1336+ (0.071) 7.1892t (0.702) 5.3686:j: (0.152) 5.1479:j: (0.064) 5.3026:j: (0.065) 
N 574 7,869 7,869 4,239 22,200 22,200 
R2 0.2615 0.6153 0.6285 0.1921 0.3335 0.3595 
-
NB Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
SIgnificant at the 10% level; t: sigmficant at the 5% level; :j:: significant at the 1% leveL 201 
In a study of the US national mortgage market in Louisiana, Sirmans and Benjamin 
(1990) present evidence that national lenders, on average, have higher mortgage interest 
rates than local lenders. Our results on an international level are similar to the authors' 
findings but nuance it to the extent that the pricing gain is greatest when the amount of 
private information about the borrower held by the senior bank is potentially highest, 
i.e. in the case of unrated developing country borrowers. Petersen and Rajan (2000) 
argue that distance does not matter anymore in bank lending, at least in the US domestic 
market, because of the greater ease with which large national banks can access and 
process information about borrowers located in distant rural areas. This research 
provides evidence contradicting this theory for international loans, highlighting the fact 
that the presence of senior banks operating out of the country of residence of the 
borrower can lower the pricing of syndicated credits, especially in case of the most 
informationally opaque borrowers such as unrated ones from developing countries. 
Thus the access of such borrowers to the international syndicated credit markets seems 
an important policy concern. 
Loan facilities expressed in the home currency of the borrower are significantly more 
expensive than others in all cases except for rated developing country borrowers (we did 
not include the variable into Specification A, as they tend to borrow exclusively in hard 
currency) and for unrated developing country borrowers. 
Industrialised country borrowers from the EMU area have been able to arrange 
relatively cheaper loans than others, but the effect seems to have been greater before the 
advent of the euro than after (reflected by higher absolute values of the coefficients on 
bremu98 than on bremu9980). Curiously, while facilities arranged by senior banks from 
the EMU area are relatively cheaper than others before the introduction of the euro, they 
carry a premium after its introduction. 
80 bremu98 and bremu99 can also be interpreted as controlling for changes in institutional structure or 
regulatory environment. 
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5. Conclusion 
This study, as far as we are aware, is the first to analyse the effects of individual bank 
characteristics including non-US banks on the structure and pricing of syndicated loans 
at an international level, combining individual loan transaction data from Dealogic 
Loanware and information on individual lenders (the supply side) from BankScope 
meA. 
In accordance with the credit rationing hypothesis developed by Thakor (1996) we have 
shown that syndicated loan prices are lower when less capital- or liquidity- constrained 
banks participate in the syndication process. The relationship between bank 
characteristics and loan pricing, appears stronger (in significance, magnitude, or both) in 
the case of senior banks than of junior banks. This confirms the stronger pricing power 
of senior banks when arranging loans, while junior participants tend to act more as price 
takers. In the context of the New Basel Capital Accord which ties capital requirements 
more tightly than before to credit risk, the use of such market power of senior banks to 
set loan prices is important all the more because this paper also shows that as 
information about borrowers becomes less transparent, junior banks rely more on the 
reputation of the senior bank to determine their level of financial commitment within 
the syndicate. In other words, risk in the economy may end up with outsiders - even 
nonbanks such as insurance companies, pension funds, CDO arbitrage funds or non-
financial corporations - whose knowledge about the borrower may be limited, 
especially if, as we show, the senior banks tend to pass on higher shares of riskier loans 
to junior banks. This research shows that the remuneration junior participants is 
influenced by the characteristics of the senior banks who arrange the credit facilities. 
The effect of this on loan pricing is at least as great as that of the true riskiness of the 
borrower. 
However, we also observe a factor that should assuage policymakers' concerns about 
possible risk exposures associated with the price-setting practices of large senior banks 
arranging syndicated credits. This paper highlights the importance of local knowledge 
by senior syndicate banks about the most information ally opaque borrowers if those 
borrowers are to access international syndicated credit markets. 
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Appendix 1: The literature about the influence of lender characteristics on the supply 
of syndicated credits 
Authors Lead bank's characteristics as I Dependent 
Pavel and Phillis (1987) 
independent variables 
• Regulatory taxes (reserve requirements, 
primary capital ratio, total domestic 
deposits/total insured deposits) 
• Degree of loan type diversification 
• FundinglLiquidity (growth rate of the 
loan portfolio) 
• Loan quality (charge-offs/totalloans) 
• Comparative advantage (Non-interest 
expense in year y)/(total loans sold 
during year y + total loans at end year 
y) 
• Total Assets 
• Bank member of multi bank holding cy 
variable 
Probability of bank 
being a seller of 
loans 
Methodology and data 
The data used for the study are 
survey data for 13,763 banks 
from the Reports of Condition 
and Reports of Income for 1983, 
84 and 85 filed with the 
appropriate regulatory agency 
and from the Report of 
Transactions Accounts, Other 
Deposits and Vault Cash as of 
December 24, 1984 filed with the 
Federal Reserve. Logit and Tobit 
models are run with banks' 
decision to sell or not to sell 
loans (and amounts sold) as 
dependent variable. 
Main results 
Bank's size, its ratio of non-interest 
expense to loans and its level of 
diversification have the largest impact on its 
probability to sell loans. Undiversified 
banks are likely to sell loans. Regulatory 
tax burden also has a large impact. An 
increase in the bank's capital ratio or a 
decrease in its net charge-offs both reduce 
the probability of selling loans. Twenty-
three per cent of all commercial banks in 
the sample act as investment banks, i.e. 
selling off loans throughout the year. For 
these banks, their comparative advantage in 
originating and servicing loans as well as 
their size, that is, their level of 
sophistication, are more important than 
regulatory taxes in their decisions to sell 
loans. This is especially true for the 100 
largest banks in the sample. 
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Authors 
Sirmans and Benjamin 
(1990) 
Simons (1993) 
Lead bank's characteristics as I Dependent 
independent variables 
• Lender type (national mortgage banker, 
regional mortgage banker or local 
mortgage banker) 
• Capital-to-Asset Ratio 
• Loan-to-Capital Ratio 
variable 
Fixed rate 
mortgage interest 
rate 
Share of loan 
retained by lead 
bank on its books 
Methodology and data 
Weekly mortgage quotations 
(primary rates) are taken from 54 
different Baton Rouge, Louisiana 
lenders over a two-year period 
beginning in 1985. OLS 
regression of mortgage interest 
rates is run on lender 
geographical characteristics, loan 
processing time, collateralisation 
and securitisation dummies 
4,332 syndicated loans' 
characteristics (corresponding to 
3,601 borrowers) are taken the 
US Shared National Credit 
Program8! database for 1991. 
from the OLS regressions of the 
share of loans retained by the 
agent bank and of the ratio of 
bank loan exposure to bank 
capital on lender characteristics, 
controlling for loan quality and 
borrower sector 
Main results 
National lenders, on average, have higher 
mortgage interest rates than local lenders. 
Agent banks who are more capital-
constrained are also more likely to retain on 
their books a smaller share of syndicated 
loans. The agent bank's capital-to-asset 
ratio is positively and significantly related 
to the share of syndicated loans retained on 
the agent's books. The effect of the loan-to-
capital ratio is more ambiguous. Agent 
banks typically hold greater shares of real 
estate loans, which in 1991 were typically 
more risky than other types of loans. There 
is no indication of opportunistic behaviour 
in 1991 because agent banks arc found to 
keep on their books a smaller share of 
I higher-quality loans. 
8! US regulatory data The database is jointly owned by the three US federal regulatory agencies - the Federal Reserve, thc Fcderal Deposit Insurance Corporati()n and 
the Office of thc Comptroller of the Currency. 
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Authors Lead bank's characteristics as I Dependent Methodology and data Main results 
independent variables variable 
Angbazo, Mei 
Saunders (1998) 
and I • Lender behaviour (retention of a share I Loan Spread 
of the loan by the lead bank) 
OLS regression of Highly HLT loan spreads are lowered by the 
Leveraged Transaction (HL T) presence of a lead lender who retains a 
loan spreads on a series of loan large share of the loan (and thus bears broad 
and borrower characteristics and monitoring responsibilities). Other 
lender behaviour (retention of members of the syndicate then supposedly 
share of the loan by the lead perceive that the risk is lower in that case 
bank). 4,122 HLT deals are taken and hence are prepared to earn a lower 
Dennis and Mullineaux 
(2000) 
from the Loan Pricing margin. 
Corporation's database for 1987-
94. 
• Dummy to indicate if managing agent Likelihood of the 3,410 syndicated loan facilities 
has a bank charter or not loan being comprising bank and non-bank 
• Growth of loan portfolio, ratio of syndicated or not lenders taken from the Loan 
noncurrent loans to total loans, gearing, Pricing Corporation for the 1987-
tied ratio 95 period. controlling for loan 
• Loan facility's size divided by equity and borrower characteristics, 
of managing agent bank including presence of borrower 
• Ratio of loan charge-offs to total loans rating or stock listing to control 
• Frequency of managing agent bank's for cross-monitoring effects. A 
repeat business two-step procedure is used to 
• Managing agent's rating estimate the decision to syndicate 
a loan. 
A loan is more likely to be syndicated as 
the managing agent is more heavily 
involved in repeat business, as agent's 
credit rating improves and as the agent is a 
bank rather than a nonbanking institution. 
The identity of the managing agent also 
influences whether a particular loan will be 
syndicated. Moreover, although banks are 
more likely to engage in syndication when 
they are capital constrained (in acconJance 
with the regulatory tax hypothesis for loan 
sales developed by Pavel and Phillis. 1987 
and Simons, 1993), managing agents of 
syndicates hold larger proportions of 
information-prohlematic loans on their 
portfolios. This is in keeping with the 
standard view that the saleahility of a dcht 
contract depends on the scale and sc()pe of 
information asymmetries. thus engaging in 
relationship-oriented finance that dra\\'\ on 
their specialised monit()ring_~kUIs. 
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Authors 
Chen, Mazudmar 
Yan (2000) 
and 
Jones, William and Nigro 
(2000) 
Lead bank's characteristics as I Dependent Methodology and data Main results 
independent variables 
• 
• 
• 
Dummy for presence of Japanese bank 
in the syndicate 
Dummy to indicate whether loan was 
written before or after the Basel Accord 
of 1988 
Joint dummy based on the two 
variables above 
• Leverage ratio (equity capital to assets; 
proxy for capital constraints) 
• Geographical distance from borrower 
• Quality of loan portfolio 
variable 
Loan Spread A sample of 22,224 loan facility 
records for 1982-93 is obtained 
from the Loan Pricing 
Corporation's database. 
Considering only listed 
borrowers reduces the sample 
size to 6,352 loans. Model with 
logarithmic transformation is 
used to regress the loan spread 
on borrower balance sheet and 
share-price characteristics, 
presence of public debt or rating 
(to test the cross-monitoring 
hypothesis) and loan 
characteristics 
US branches of Japanese banks that 
participate in syndicated lending to US 
firms charge significantly higher spreads 
compared to syndicated loans to US firms 
without Japanese participation. This pricing 
disparity is primarily due to regulatory 
differences (that is, tougher regulation 
imposed on US banks). Banks price loans 
primarily on their own monitoring, i.e .. the 
borrower's bond rating or the ease with 
which loan contract covenants can be 
implemented on assets in place do not 
affect loan pricing in a significant way. 
Japanese banks seem to have been 
extracting premia from borrowers who 
would otherwise have faced a credit crunch. 
Share of loan Over 23,000 syndicated loans for Capital constraints positively int1uence the 
retained by lead the period 1995 to 1999 are taken share of loans held by agent banks. Agent 
bank on its books from the US Shared National share tends to be lower if the borrower is a 
Credit Program database. Panel 
regression with random effects to 
test the effect of capital 
constraints, loan quality and 
information variables (relative 
size of loan, presence of 
borrower rating or stock listing, 
sector; loan quality, maturity and 
size) on an agent bank's share of 
syndicated loans held in 
I portfolio. 
public company and the loan is large (i.e. in 
cases where the agent's informational 
advantage is !esser). While agent hanks 
generally hold a larger share of their low-
quality loans, agent banks that have a 
greater portfolio concentration of lowL'! 
quality credits hold a smaller share of their 
loans. That is, some hanks specialisL' ill 
originating low-quality loans and these 
banks are relatively successful in finding 
I par!icipants for such loans. 
2(}l) 
Appendix 2: Correlation matrices 
Table 13: Correlation matrix between variables - loan pricing and senior bank characteristics 
l~;~~*,,., ~!~; -~~:~::'~::~::~:19"3; ' :~-- ~"____ n~~,,:,~~:~~_, 
0.0371 * -0.0181* 0.01 -0.0409* ' -0.0708* -0.0626* :1 
0.0126* -0.0045 0.0342* -0.0251 * -0.0551* -0.0601* 0.0205 * 1 
lnassts 1-0.0378* 0.08Q2* -0.0559* 0.0622* 0.1391* -0.0200* 0.0031 0.0072 1 
'droa 0.0096 '0.0159* ---0.0115* 0 .01'38* -0.3254* -0.2699*~0. 1773 * 0.0584* 0.0305 * 1 
diita \0.0412* -0 .0375 ~ -0.0083 -0.0262* 0.0415* -0.0230* 0.1869* -0.1194* -0.1266* -0.0314* 1 
*: significant at the 10% level 
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Table 14: Correlation matrix between variables - loan pricing and junior bank characteristics 
FQ .. l0A8* 0.0093 .O.247!3* .to.11~9* 1~0~ 1239* \".0.01(;)7* 
~~~ .. > 
*: significant at the 10% level 
21 1 
Table 15: Correlation matrix between variables - share of loan retained by senior bank 
~ue 
:eqas 
1.1' 
*: significant at the 10% level 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
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1. Summary 
THE MAIN FINDINGS OF THIS THESIS can be summarised as follows. 
In Paper 1, we first defined the main features of a syndicated loan and explained why it 
lay on the borderline between public and private finance. The roles and motivations of 
the various parties (lender and borrower) to a syndicated credit were discussed and the 
different components of pricing were clarified. The historical analysis that followed 
identified three important periods: (i) the 1970s, when syndicated loans were a major 
source of finance for developing countries, (ii) the 1980s, marked by a period of sharp 
contraction in syndicated lending in the aftermath of the Mexican debt moratorium of 
1982, (iii) the renaissance of the 1990s. We moved on to present the richness of the 
breakdown available in the micro-level syndicated loan data used, and analysed the 
evolution of various loan market segments corresponding to specific borrower types, 
nationalities, ratings, lender nationalities, facility types, currencies, purposes and 
maturities. We presented a logical loan pricing equation that identified loan, borrower, 
lender and market characteristics as determinants of loan pricing and served as a basis 
for the extensive risk-return analysis carried out in the remainder of the thesis. We 
began that analysis in Paper 2 by focusing on syndicated lending to developing 
countries, which were historically the first recipients of such credits, thus constituting a 
very important market segment. 
In Paper 2 we began by reviewing the existing academic literature on the pricing and 
availability syndicated credits to developing countries. For the micro-economic 
determinants of loan pricing, the focus was on the information asymmetry literature of 
the late 1970s and early 1980s (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Fama, 
1985; Diamond, 1991) and for the macro-economic determinants, on the external debt 
literature (Sachs, 1981, 1984; Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981, Edwards, 1983, 1986; 
Boehmer and Megginson, 1990, Eichengreen and Mody, 2000). We subsequently 
presented a simple loan pricing model including both micro- and macro-economic 
factors as determinants of the loan price, discussing the expected effects of each 
variable. The pricing model was then estimated for a sample of 5,000-plus developing 
country loans signed between 1993 and 2001. Inferences were made about the relative 
influence of macro- and micro- economic variables as determinants of loan pricing. 
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Furthermore, evidence was provided about the relationship between market structure 
and bank market power together with perceived risk concentration on the one hand and 
loan pricing on the other. 
With regards to the effects of macro-economic factors on loan pricing, we found that 
higher values of indicators of developing countries' economic weakness (such as high 
ratios of debt to GDP, of debt service to exports, assistance from the IMF) resulted in 
higher loan prices. Meanwhile, favourable indicators (like high real GDP growth, high 
ratio of domestic credit to GDP) tended to lower loan pricing. This is in line with the 
existing literature. Our results establish a positive relationship between the borrower 
country's ratio of reserves to GDP and loan pricing in accordance with the willingness-
to-pay approach developed by Gersovitz (1985). 
Concerning micro-economic determinants of loan pricing, we presented evidence that 
loans granted to developing country borrowers for merger and acquisition purposes 
were pricier than other loans. Like Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), we found that 
guarantees - albeit only explicit82 ones - can lower loan pricing, while collateralised 
facilities are more expensive, potentially because they are very risky. This result is 
similar to the findings of Smith and Warner (1979) and Berger and Udell (1990) on 
collateral. 
Overall, the results show that risk is appropriately priced into loans, but lenders seem to 
attach more importance to macro-economic factors than to micro-economic ones when 
determining loan prices. In particular, if abstraction is made of macro-economic 
conditions, bank borrowers enjoy a discount on their loans over non-bank ones because 
of the presence of implicit or explicit state guarantees on their obligations. But that 
discount disappears when macro-economic factors are controlled for, possibly because 
bad macro-economic conditions prevailing in a country can wipe out the ability of the 
government concerned to bail banks out in times of crises. This result can be related to 
the findings of Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) who note that market discipline is 
present among insured depositors in selected Latin American countries, demonstrating 
that deposit insurance schemes are not always fully credible. Likewise, the significance 
82 Materialised by a written pledge, in contrast to implicit guarantees which can arise when the borrower 
is simply the emerging market subsidiary of a major Western corporation. 
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and absolute values of our coefficients on micro-economic variables are often lower 
when Inacro-economic variables are also present in the model. 
The study also provides evidence of banks potentially using their market power against 
borrowers in developing countries: they charge extra for changing loan terms once the 
agreement has been signed, and grant higher discounts on relationship or club loans 
than on facilities where a high number of institutions compete to provide loans. In 
addition - possibly also because of higher perceived concentration or risk - we find that 
premiums are charged to borrowers from countries that depend relatively more heavily 
on the syndicated loan market to finance themselves. The same is true for borrowers 
from "wealthier" developing countries (countries with relatively higher purchasing 
power parity shares of world GDP). 
All this poses a particular challenge for economic development in those countries whose 
new loan facilities are only sufficient to roll over existing lines of credit (i.e. provide no 
net new funding). They cannot seem to obtain funding at competitive rates for 
improving the quality of state-provided services such as health, education, for 
participating in world trade, or for supporting high-tech or innovative sectors. No loans 
are available at a discount for these countries and this inhibits their growth potential and 
future convergence prospects along the lines suggested by Balassa (1986), Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Barro (1997, 1999). 
Since bonds and loans are competing means of raising funds and emerging country 
borrowers compete for investors' money with particular market segments such as the 
US junk bond market, and since contagion can happen from one market segment to 
another easily in times of financial crises or turbulence, we then extended the analysis 
of Paper 2 to industrialised country loan markets and to emerging and industrialised 
country bond markets. In Paper 3, we began by reviewing the loan and bond pricing 
literature (e.g. Berlin and Mester, 1992; Kamin and von Kleist, 1999; Bolton and 
Freixas, 2000), and then re-estimated, for developing and industrialised country loans 
and bonds, refined versions of the developing country loan pricing model elaborated in 
the preceding article. We compared the riskiness of developing and industrialised 
country bonds and loans with reference to the pecking order theory, explored how 
market sentiment may have affected pricing by spilling over from one market segment 
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to the other. We drew inferences about the relative influences on pricing of market 
structure, perceived risk concentration and bank market power on each market segment. 
Our comparison of the four market segments (developing and industrialised country 
borrowers in loan and bond markets) found that on average, developing country bonds 
had been riskier than developing country loans and industrialised country loans riskier 
than industrialised country bonds. This provides confirmation, for industrialised 
countries, of the "pecking order theory" of external financing (Myers, 1984; Myers and 
Majluf, 1984; Diamond, 1991). Those theories posit that companies use internal money 
(retained profits) in the first instance to finance their development and when they 
subsequently seek external funds, they graduate from bank finance to bond finance as 
information about their creditworthiness becomes more complete. However, we only 
provided empirical verification of this for industrialised country borrowers. In 
developing countries, our results suggested, rather, the existence of a "reverse pecking 
order theory", with bonds appearing more costly than loans. 
We also examined how contagion may have taken place from one market segment to the 
other in times of financial turbulence. We provided evidence that following the Asian, 
Russian and Latin American financial crises of 1998-99, market sentiment translating 
into higher risk premia demanded from borrowers by lenders may have spilled over 
from developing to industrialised countries in the case of loans, but less so for bonds. 
The comparison of market structure on the respective market segments led to the 
conclusion that market access appears to have been more difficult for developing 
country borrowers on loan markets, where banks and investors may have exercised their 
market power to the greatest extent or where perceived higher concentration of risk may 
have resulted in higher premia being demanded, more than vis-a-vis industrialised 
country borrowers and on bond markets. 
While some of the existing literature suggests that the pricing of loans and bonds can 
empirically be estimated in the same way, we found differences in the way the two 
instruments were priced. Furthermore, pricing mechanisms for developing country 
borrowers appeared to differ from those observed for industrialised countries. 
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Firstly, the corruption index in the borrower's country was significantly related to bond 
and loan pricing in developing countries, but not in industrialised countries, possibly 
mirroring investors' view that the legal infrastructure may be insufficient in developing 
countries to enforce contracts. This result can be further be related to the findings of 
Bilson, Brailsford and Hooper (2002) who note that political risk is important in 
explaining stock return variation in individual emerging markets, particularly in the 
Pacific Basin, but not in developed markets. Our paper helps partially answer the 
research issue raised by these authors by providing evidence that there is some political 
risk exposure in emerging markets that is different to any exposure in developed 
markets, and this has implications for asset pricing and portfolio decisions in these 
markets. 
Secondly, in accordance with Kamin and von Kleist (1999) we failed to detect a 
significant relationship between the pricing of developing country loans and bonds and 
industrialised country interest rates. Kamin and von Kleist note that upturns in 
industrialised country interest rates may thus imply smaller than expected upturns in 
developing country spreads. However, we detected a significantly negative relationship 
between industrialised country interest rates and industrialised country loan and bond 
spreads. This could reflect poorer credits dropping out of the market during a period of 
high interest rates. 
We also analysed the structure of industrialised and developing country loan and bond 
markets during the 1990s. Regarding currency effects, we found that industrialised 
country bonds and developing country loans denominated in Japanese yen were 
relatively cheaper than others, and interpreted this as a funding cost effect for investors 
based in Japanese yen. This is in accordance with Eichengreen and Mody (2000). We 
also found industrialised country bonds denominated in euro or its predecessor 
currencies to be relatively cheaper than others, possibly reflecting the higher liquidity of 
that market segment. This effect did not materialise for developing country bonds 
denominated in euro, possibly because of relatively lower liquidity in that market 
segment. 
The liquidity of markets for developing country bonds should be an area of concern for 
policymakers' attention all the more because this research also provides evidence of the 
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still relatively low reliance of developing countries on bonds - at the expense of loans _ 
to finance their participation in world trade. Furthermore, when lending to developing 
country borrowers, banks are found to potentially exploit their market power. Possibly 
also because of higher perceived concentration of risk, the world share of the country 
concerned as a recipient of syndicated loans raises loan pricing and there is no positive 
reaction from the market in case of loan deals whose amount has been increased from 
the original facility amount. Finally, this research highlights the lower occurrence of 
contagion in financial markets from developing to industrialised country borrowers in 
the case of bonds than in the case of loans. 
In Paper 4, we extended the two preceding demand-side papers by looking at (1) what 
the effects of lender characteristics - including location - are on loan specifications (2) 
how information asymmetry issues between lenders and borrowers common in normal 
lending manifest themselves among different layers of lenders in syndicated lending. 
We first reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature on lenders' capital and 
liquidity constraints resulting in credit rationing (e.g. Thakor, 1996), on agency issues 
between banks of different seniorities operating in syndicates (e.g. Dennis and 
Mullineaux, 2000) and on the effects of relative borrowerllender location on loan 
specifications (e.g. Petersen and Raj an, 2000). Following Simons (1993), Jones, 
William and Nigro (2000) and Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) we then estimated a loan 
pricing model where we used loan and lender characteristics as explanatory variables. 
Distinction was made between lenders of different seniorities in the syndicate with a 
view to gauging their relative price-setting power. Evidence was provided on the 
relationship between bank capitalisation and loan pricing, and the possible exploitation 
of private information about the borrowers by senior syndicate members vis-a-vis junior 
syndicate participants. 
We established a positive relationship between bank capital constraints and syndicated 
loan pricing, in accordance with the credit rationing hypothesis developed by Thakor 
(1996). The characteristics of senior banks responsible for putting together the syndicate 
and arranging the loans were found to be more closely related to loan pricing (in 
significance, magnitude, or both) than those of junior banks who participated in the 
syndicates at a lower level. This appears to suggest that the pricing power of senior 
banks is stronger, leaving junior participants to act more as price takers. In the context 
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of the New Basel Capital Accord which ties capital requirements more tightly than 
before to credit risk, the possible use of such market power by senior banks to set loan 
prices is all the more important because this research also shows that as information 
about borrowers becomes less transparent, junior syndicate participants rely more on the 
reputation of the senior bank to determine their level of financial commitment within 
the syndicate. Transfer of risk in the economy to outsiders with possibly limited 
knowledge of the borrowers - banks or even nonbanks such as insurance companies, 
pension funds, CDO arbitrage funds or non-financial corporations - should be a concern 
for policymakers, especially, as we show, senior banks tend to pass on larger portions of 
riskier loans to junior banks. Likewise, caution should be exercised by policymakers if 
the pricing of risk is influenced by the characteristics of the originators (the senior 
banks) at least to the same extent as it compensates for the true riskiness of the 
borrower. 
2. General discussion 
Overall, the thesis makes several contributions to the existing academic literature on 
bond and loan pricing and bank market structure. 
To begin with, we use measures of loan specifications that innovate over prevIOUS 
empirical studies, which rely on spreads over a benchmark interest rate (e.g. LIBOR) to 
represent syndicated loan pricing. However, this does not represent the true economic 
cost of loans as additional pricing factors, such as fees, are typically charged in loan 
syndications. Our empirical analysis uses a pricing measure known as the drawn return 
which includes both fees and spreads, and is therefore a more comprehensive measure 
than looking at merely spreads. In addition, we distinguish between the notion of 
explicit guarantees and implicit guarantees as determinants of loan pricing: the former 
are explicit commitments by third parties while the latter can arise from ownership of 
the borrower by a parent company. We find different effects on loan pricing. 
We contribute to the developing country external finance literature in several respects. 
We investigate the relative importance of macro- and micro-economic determinants of 
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the pricing of syndicated loans granted to developing country borrowers; we find that 
macro-economic factors dominate micro-economic ones. Borrower market share and 
market structure variables are explicitly introduced into the analysis and conclusions are 
deri ved from this pertaining to banks' market power and the effects of perceived risk 
concentration on loan pricing. We establish that borrowers from developing countries 
that are more heavily dependent on syndicated loans are charged more to access funds. 
As an innovation over numerous earlier studies which focus on industrialised or 
developing countries separately, industrialised and developing country borrowers' 
access to bond and loan markets is analysed together, with a view to comparing pricing, 
market structure and spill-over effects from one market segment to another in times of 
financial turbulence. Empirically, we establish differences in the way bonds and loans 
are priced, although theory suggests similarities. We also detect differences in pricing 
mechanisms between developing and industrialised countries. Regarding spill-over 
effects, we find that market access conditions faced by developing country borrowers 
can influence those faced by industrialised country borrowers. For the first time, the 
effects of the corruption index are studied on loan and bond pricing for developing and 
industrialised country borrowers. We find differences in the way corruption and 
political risk influence market access conditions for developing country borrowers on 
the one hand and industrialised country borrowers on the other. 
Our contribution to the literature on the supply-side of syndicated lending consists in an 
investigation of the relationship between lender characteristics and loan specifications at 
an international level for the first time. Most studies so far have used US data, mainly 
from regulatory, i.e. national returns. But non-US banks appear to have arranged 54% of 
loans for US borrowers in 2001 and funded 51 % of them, so our study makes an 
important contribution to the extant literature by extending the analysis to encompass 
the global syndication market. 
Furthermore, for the first time as far as we know, distinction is made between banks of 
different seniorities within syndicates when analysing the relationship between lender 
characteristics and loan specifications. Senior banks are found to have more pricing 
power in syndicates while junior banks tend to act more as price takers. Junior banks 
appear to rely more on the reputation of the senior banks when participating in 
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syndications where information about the borrower is more opaque. Contrary to the 
previous literature, senior banks are found to behave in a potentially opportunistic way 
vis-a-vis junior banks by passing on relatively larger shares of riskier loans to junior 
participants after they have syndicated them. 
To all intents and purposes, in contributing a detailed micro-economic analysis of 
borrower access to loan and bond markets, this thesis verifies the existence of Myers' 
pecking order theory for industrialised country borrowers by providing evidence that the 
loans granted to these borrowers have been riskier during the 1993-2001 period than 
bonds issued over the same period. On the other hand, in the case of developing country 
borrowers, the pecking order theory is reversed, with bonds being riskier than loans. 
The thesis also contributes to the extant literature by being the first study of its kind to 
examine the relationship between lender characteristics and the specifications of 
individual syndicated loan transactions at an international level, distinguishing between 
banks of different seniority present in the syndicates. It thus adds to the discussion about 
the new Basel II Capital Accord - one of whose aims is to tie banks' capital 
requirements more closely to the risks they take - by directly linking bank 
capitalisation, loan pricing (some of the loan spreads must in principle compensate 
banks for the cost of their capital) and other loan characteristics at a transaction level. 
Different competitive effects are highlighted, in particular the greater price-setting 
power of senior banks relative to junior banks. Senior banks may exploit these 
competitive effects vis-a-vis junior syndicate participant banks and borrowers, in 
particular when lending to the most informationally opaque borrowers. 
Further evidence on the potential use of banks' market power vis-a-vis borrowers is 
provided in other parts of the thesis. Indeed, in the second paper, we demonstrate that 
banks potentially exploit their market power when engaging in syndicated loans to 
developing country borrowers. This phenomenon, most frequent in bank lending to 
developing country borrowers, (and less so in lending to industrialised country 
borrowers and on bond markets), can be seen as a concern for policymakers, especially 
because our results also reflect the relatively low participation of developing countries 
in world trade, or at least the low contribution of syndicated credits to support such 
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participation. Some of the most poorly rated developing countries further face a 
maturity trap because they are only able to obtain short-term loans which they can only 
use to refinance existing lines of credits (instead of genuinely improving state services). 
So for officials the issue is to find some form of financing for these countries to escape 
this maturity trap. 
The results offer various avenues that could be explored to help alleviate shortcomings 
in the availability of foreign funds to developing country borrowers. 
Firstly, as reflected in the results of the fourth paper, the local establishment of financial 
institutions acting as senior loan arrangers with local knowledge about the most 
informationally opaque borrowers and their countries appears to be important if those 
borrowers are to access international syndicated credit markets. Efforts to improve the 
local establishment of senior banks must come with safeguards attached, though. Boot 
and Thakor (2000) underline that interbank and capital market competition can either 
leave banks to act like capital market underwriters and originators of transaction loans 
or make them return to their roots as relationship lending experts. On the other hand, the 
greater, and more timely availability of borrower credit records, as well as the greater 
ease of processing these, makes it easier for banks to originate transaction loans even 
when they are at a great distance from the borrower (Petersen and Rajan, 2000). This 
research provides evidence for the interpretation of Boot and Thakor. Banks appear to 
perform a unique service especially when lending locally to the most opaque borrowers 
(i.e. non-rated borrowers in developing countries). Goldberg, Dages and Kinney (2000) 
also argue that foreign bank presence may increase the stability of available lending, by 
diversifying the capital and funding bases supporting the supply of domestic credit, 
especially in small and/or volatile economies. They further note that foreign banks 
improve the quality, pricing and availability of financial services, besides enhancing 
infrastructure, transparency and regulation83 • However there may be risks for the 
stability of the financial system if such risk is subsequently purchased by outsiders with 
limited knowledge about the risk, who, in addition, are influenced by the reputation of 
the senior arrangers to make their lending decisions. Just as rating agencies' opinion 
about fund managers' professionalism cannot by itself justify investors' decision to buy 
83 Although one of their major conclusion is that bank health, not ownership per se, has been critical in the 
growth, volatility and cyclicality of bank credit. 
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into a particular fund, junior loan participants cannot fully rely on the reputation of 
senior loan arrangers to make their lending decisions. Compelling loan participants to 
make their own risk analysis to a greater extent would, in this context, contribute to 
improving financial stability. 
Secondly, the findings of the third paper suggest that developing countries' access to 
bond markets could be enhanced, especially for the compartments denominated in euro, 
which appear to be potentially less liquid than others. Nowadays, the majority of 
emerging country bond issuers is sovereign and enhancing corporate access to emerging 
country bond markets could be a vital step in the right direction. Multilateral institutions 
that guarantee specific tranches of syndicated loans against political risk (e.g. 
suspension of transfers in foreign currency) also have a role to playas catalysts for 
marketing the non-guaranteed tranches of such loans to commercial banks. A history of 
successful loan contracting and repayment this initiated could then serve as a catalyst 
for issuing bonds. 
Lastly, our evidence regarding the significance of the corruption index as a determinant 
of the pricing of foreign funds to developing country borrowers - but not for 
industrialised country borrowers - underscores the influence of a legal/political 
environment that is permissive to financial deepening in developing countries, as 
illustrated in seminal work on financialliberalisation 84 (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; 
Fry, 1988). This suggests strong incentives for developing countries to improve their 
legal and political environments so as to promote access to cheaper international 
borrowing and therefore greater financial deepening. 
84 Goldberg, Dages and Kinney (2000) also note that the Asian Crisis amply demo~strated a .range of 
deficiencies in local financial systems, precipitating calls for reform in accountmg and disclosure 
practices, bank corporate governance, and home country supervision and regulation. 
225 
3. Limitations and suggestions for further research 
Our work is subject a number of limitations. We describe them below and provide 
suggestions for further research. 
To begin with, the individual loan transaction data that we use are available as from 
1993 onwards. Although we control for the effects of the macro-economic cycle in most 
of our loan pricing regressions, all our empirical work is cross-sectional. So there is 
scope for exploring the time-series properties of these data further or to perform the 
analysis over a longer period of time. We are also hampered by the frequency mismatch 
of the macro-economic data - most of it available on a yearly basis - and the loan 
transaction data - available on a daily basis. 
Moreover, all the individual loans data used corresponds to announced or signed 
facilities, and we do not know to what extent and when they are drawn. Indeed, 
ascertaining drawing patterns for each credit line would unfortunately require such 
detailed access to banks' proprietary balance sheet information that it is practically 
impossible. Even information about some of the smaller banks' public balance sheets is 
difficult to obtain. Besides, credit risk transfer mechanisms such as loan trading and 
credit derivatives further influence the way in which loan commitments result in 
portfolio exposure. The effects of these mechanisms should become easier to gauge in 
the near future as professional bodies such as the Loan Market Association in Europe, 
the Asia-Pacific Loan Market Association in Asia and the Loan Pricing Corporation in 
the US, and indeed the third pillar of the Basel II Capital Accord contribute to more 
information disclosure in this domain. 
Linking the specifications of individual loan transactions with detailed information on 
borrowers' balance sheet and profit and loss statement, in addition to detailed 
information on sector and nationality, could further enrich our analysis of corporate 
borrowers. For instance, no research exists as far as we know that explores the 
relationship between the conditions of firms' funding via syndicated loans and the 
evolution of some of their financial indicators such as leverage or profitability. Adding 
a dynamic aspect by looking at stock price movements and linking that information to 
the evolution of funding costs could also be explored as an avenue for further research. 
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Further analysis linking individual loan transactions with more detailed micro-economic 
information on borrowers could draw on Preece and Mullineaux (1996) who examine 
the size of abnormal returns achieved by borrowers on the stock market as a function of 
the size of the syndicates they obtain syndicated loans from. The papers of James 
(1987), Lummer and McConnell (1989), Wansley, Elayan and Collins (1992), Shockley 
and Thakor (1993), Kwan (1994), Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995) could also be 
usefully expanded. These studies show that the existence of a bank-borrower 
relationship increases firm value. Some of these studies also indirectly provide evidence 
about the value of the strength of a bank-borrower relationship. For instance, it is found 
that announcements of renewals of existing bank letters of credit often generate greater 
abnormal market returns than do announcements of new letters of credit. 
Finally, further research could be undertaken to examine the effects of financial sector 
development on the pricing of foreign funds more explicitly than by introducing the 
ratio of domestic credit to GDP into our loan and bond pricing models as a proxy for the 
extent of such development. Future research could also focus on the link between 
financial structure, bank profitability and economic development (King and Levine, 
1993; Demirgti~-Kunt and Huizinga, 2000; Beck and Levine, 2002; Demirgti<;-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 2002) by using a wider range of firm- and bank-level information. 
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